Europe’s divided response to Washington’s initiative reveals a deeper problem: a diplomatic framework that strengthens the US control while narrowing Europe’s strategic influence. The dispute over participation shows how a US-led diplomatic strategy can work against European interests, weakening both individual member states and the European Union (EU) as a political union.
Europe fragmented again
The US Board of Peace (BoP), presented by Washington as an initiative linked to Gaza’s post-war governance, has triggered a visibly divided response across Europe. Some EU governments rejected the format or voiced strong reservations, others chose to attend as observers, and the European Commission itself joined the first meeting in Washington through EU Commissioner Dubravka Šuica. The European response quickly fragmented along national lines. Hungary and Bulgaria agreed to join the Board, while Italy, Romania, Greece, Slovakia and the Czech Republic chose to participate only as observers. France, Germany and Spain remained outside the initiative altogether, and the European Commission’s decision to attend drew criticism from several capitals and from political groups in the European Parliament. Another relevant point is the choice of the US to exclude the Baltic states.
These differences illustrate the absence of a coherent European approach to initiatives that originate outside established multilateral frameworks. For some governments, remaining close to Washington remains a central consideration even when the institutional format raises political and legal concerns. Others view participation as problematic because it risks legitimizing a structure that appears to challenge the role traditionally played by the United Nations and multilateral diplomacy in crisis management, on which the EU strongly relies to maintain its presence on the international stage and its global credibility.
Washington’s design and European interests
From Washington’s perspective, the rationale behind the BoP is relatively clear. A diplomatic body created outside established multilateral channels gives the United States greater discretion over membership, agenda and political direction. It reduces the constraints associated with broader diplomatic bargaining and allows crisis management to take place in a more selective setting. Le Monde explicitly described the Board as “designed to supplant the UN”, while President António Costa said the EU had “serious doubts” about elements of its charter, including its scope, governance and compatibility with the UN Charter.
For member states’ governments, participation in the Board is often presented as a pragmatic choice. Remaining present in the process is seen as a way to preserve access to diplomatic discussions and maintain close relations with Washington. Observer status, in particular, allows governments to signal engagement without fully endorsing the initiative. Yet this presence offers limited influence over the structure itself. European governments that join the process enter a framework whose political parameters have already been defined by other actors. They gain visibility and information, but their ability to shape outcomes remains constrained and subordinated to American interests. In some countries, this has already generated political controversy. For example, the Italian decision to participate as an observer raised questions about the coherence of Rome’s position regarding the EU and Israeli-American aggression in the Middle East.
The Brussels Dilemma
When crisis management moves away from established multilateral frameworks and into selective diplomatic arenas, the conditions that normally sustain European influence become weaker. The EU enters a setting where its structural advantages are reduced and where the agenda is largely shaped by competitors. This tension has become visible in the debate surrounding the Commission’s participation in the Board. Critics in the European Parliament questioned whether the EU should lend legitimacy to an initiative that appears to operate outside the institutional principles the Union usually defends.
Aside from the legal or procedural issues, the most relevant concern is the impact on the credibility of the EU’s own external posture and the consistency of its commitment to multilateral diplomacy. Brussels argued that, given the EU’s direct interest in Gaza’s reconstruction, it could not afford to remain absent from discussions on the territory’s future. As EUobserver reported, Commission spokesperson Paula Pinho framed the issue by saying that Europe wanted to be “a player, not just a payer”. The Union has often financed post-conflict arrangements largely shaped by other actors, but joining a framework designed and controlled elsewhere does not in itself increase European leverage.
Being present in a diplomatic forum does not automatically translate into influence on the process. When the institutional architecture of a process is defined by another actor, access is not a guarantee for leverage. The EU already possesses significant tools for engaging in Middle Eastern diplomacy: reconstruction funding, economic leverage, institutional partnerships and long-standing relations with regional actors. These resources have often allowed Europe to play a meaningful role in stabilization and reconstruction processes. Their relevance and application, however, depend heavily on the framework in which they are used. When they are deployed through recognized multilateral settings or broad diplomatic partnerships, they can translate into both influence and legitimacy. If absorbed into formats like the BoP, these resources will not only drain the EU’s political and financial resources, but will also hinder its interests both in the region and globally.
Conclusion
Taken together, these dynamics explain why the BoP sits uneasily with European interests, reshaping multilateral approaches and in ways that favor the United States while reducing the room for maneuver for European actors. Its structure allows Washington to define membership, agenda and political direction, while European governments are divided regarding the participation in a framework whose strategic parameters they do not control. Some member states prioritize political proximity to Washington, others emphasize legal and institutional concerns, and EU institutions attempt to balance engagement with caution. The result is a fragmented European response to a process that demands coherence if it is to be influenced effectively. Over time, arrangements of this kind risk weakening Europe’s capacity to defend its own strategic interests both in the Middle East and in the wider international system.
Through the BoP, the United States gains a controlled diplomatic structure with fewer multilateral constraints. European governments, by contrast, are drawn into a process in which their visibility exceeds their influence. For the EU as a union, the longer-term effect is deeper division and a narrower diplomatic space in which to act. The effect that the BoP produces for European states and the EU is a more fragile position and further marginalization on the international stage. For individual member states, it encourages a politics of appeasement to the Washington-Tel Aviv redesign project in the Middle East, revealing current governments’ priority of pleasing Washington over diplomatic autonomy and political coherence.
Source: European Union – European Parliament (via Multimedia Centre)
As the peace talks for Ukraine restart and seem to gain new momentum over the last months of 2025, the EU tries to assert its presence as a central and fundamental actor for the peace process. Brussels insists that its absence would hinder every possibility of a just and lasting peace, undermining not only Ukraine’s future, but also the EU’s security. The EU is willing to pass from a role of financial supporter (and possible post-conflict stabilizer) to an actual co-architect of peace. Nevertheless, the Union continues to be excluded from formal peace talks, while the US President Donald Trump continues to seek direct negotiations with Putin’s Russia, hardly considering Ukraine’s will.
The Union’s commitment
The EU has been committed to the conflict since the very beginning; through financial and humanitarian aid, equipment shipping to Ukraine, sanctions as well as through the isolation of Russia. Despite its political exposure and geographical proximity to the conflict, Brussels still struggles to sit at the negotiating table. On the one hand, the internal division between the Union’s Member States plays a significant role in the incapacity of the EU to speak with a single, authoritative voice and to pursue a common interest. On the other hand, it is in the converging interest of both Russia and the US to exclude the EU from this process, favoring instead bilateral negotiations.
Brussels risks bearing part of the costs of the war while being excluded from the outcome of the negotiations. Since the early days of Russia’s invasion, the Commission and the other European institutions, as well as major Europeanist parties, have framed the war in Ukraine as an existential challenge, stressing repeatedly that Ukraine’s security is inevitably tied to Europe’s own stability, interpreting it as a conflict that defines the Union’s own destiny. Thus, the EU has become Ukraine’s largest financial supporter, a major provider of military assistance, and the primary sponsor of Kiev’s post-war reconstruction, also pressing for the integration of Ukraine in the Union.
In March 2025, the European Council reaffirmed that “there can be no negotiations on Ukraine without Ukraine” and that European security arrangements cannot be decided without the participation of the EU itself. The same message was repeated later that month, when EU leaders explicitly linked diplomatic engagement to continued military and financial support under the banner of “peace through strength”. At an institutional level, the EU has been consistent in warning that a simple ceasefire, if not embedded in a broader political framework, risks freezing the conflict rather than resolving it.
Europe’s structural weakness
Despite this outward unity, the EU’s bid to act as a coherent and cohesive political force is undermined by deep internal divisions. While all Member States formally support Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, strong differences among them remain, mainly on the quality and quantity of support, peace talks proceedings and the post-war organization. Another important division concerns the trade-offs that can be considered acceptable with Russia.
Eastern and Nordic Member States, which tend to perceive Russia as a direct and long-term threat, strongly oppose any negotiations involving territorial concessions. From their perspective, any compromise with Moscow risks setting a precedent where aggression can be rewarded, thus destabilizing European security as a whole. Other countries, particularly in Southern Europe and parts of Central Europe, tend to prioritize de-escalation and conflict management. Their significant openness to ceasefire arrangements derives from the potential economic and political costs of an endless war as well as risks of further escalation.
Even though the EU acts as a single actor through its institutions in the international field, the sharp internal political differences undermine its reliability and its effectiveness. The lack of a unified strategic vision weakens the EU’s credibility as a negotiating actor and makes it easier for external powers to bypass Brussels’ will. The European Parliament has warned explicitly about this risk. In a March 2025 resolution calling for faster and more substantial military assistance to Ukraine, Members of the European Parliament stressed that Europe’s influence over peace efforts depends on its ability to act cohesively and decisively.
Crushed between giants
Even though both Washington and Brussels are allies and supportive of Ukraine’s war effort against Russia, their interests and their desired outcomes diverge significantly. The current US-led diplomatic initiatives do not take into account the EU and marginalize its role both in the war and in the possible post-war context. According to the Financial Times, different EU Member States fear the US stance on the conflict, expecting to be ousted definitively from the peace process. The reason behind the American action would be to limit the number of stakeholders involved in the negotiation and to get better leverage in the talks with Putin.
From the US perspective, excluding the EU offers tangible advantages. Bilateral engagement with Moscow allows Washington to negotiate more rapidly, retain strategic flexibility and avoid being constrained by the EU’s institutional complexity. Involving Brussels would require accommodating legal considerations, collective decision-making among 27 Member States, and long-term commitments to reconstruction, accountability and security guarantees, which are all elements that restrict room for maneuver and dilute US leverage. More fundamentally, keeping the EU out of the process helps preserve American primacy in shaping Europe’s security order. Peace negotiated directly by Washington reinforces the US role as the central guarantor of stability on the continent, while limiting the emergence of the EU as an autonomous strategic actor.
In November 2025 this dynamic was clearly exposed when Reuters published the full text of a European counterproposal to a US peace framework. While the US approach prioritized rapid conflict management and de-escalation, the EU proposal focused on sovereignty, defense capabilities and long-term security guarantees, which are elements that would anchor Europe firmly in the post-war order. In this sense, the marginalization of Europe is not a side effect, but a structural feature of US diplomacy.
Russia has shown little interest in engaging the EU as a central negotiating partner. From Moscow’s perspective, Brussels is not a neutral actor, but a normative power committed to sanctions enforcement, accountability mechanisms, and Ukraine’s long-term European integration. Engaging the EU directly would require Russia to negotiate under multiple constraints, including adherence to international law and potential oversight of reconstruction efforts, areas where Brussels wields significant leverage.
Russian officials have consistently framed the conflict as primarily a confrontation with the United States, implicitly downplaying Europe’s independent agency. By limiting EU participation in peace talks, Moscow avoids discussions on war accountability and long-term guarantees for Ukraine, which are core elements of Brussels’ policy agenda. Both Washington and Moscow are interested in reducing the EU’s influence in the negotiation. The result is a diplomatic environment in which Europe is barely consulted and rarely decisive.
The risks of the exclusion
Ukraine itself has consistently argued for Europe’s inclusion in peace efforts, recognizing the EU as a fundamental actor for its future security and economic integration. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has repeatedly highlighted the EU’s role in sustaining Ukraine’s war effort and post-war recovery.
However, Kiev’s reliance on US military support inevitably constrains its diplomatic autonomy. When negotiations accelerate, Ukraine risks being pressured to accept frameworks shaped largely by Washington and Moscow, even when these frameworks do not fully align with Ukrainian or European preferences. According to The Guardian, EU leaders fear a settlement that freezes the conflict, leaves Ukraine exposed to renewed aggression, and forces Europe to manage chronic instability along its eastern flank.A more recent Guardian analysis warned that Europe’s marginalization in peace talks has become a growing political fault line, with long-term consequences for the continent’s security credibility. The struggle over Ukraine’s peace process has become a critical juncture for the EU’s geopolitical relevance. Europe possesses resources, proximity and long-term stakes, but remains constrained by internal divisions and by the dominance of both Washington and Moscow. Unless the EU overcomes its internal fractures and translates its economic power into diplomatic leverage, it risks being confined to a reactive role: financing reconstruction, managing instability, and absorbing the outcomes of decisions taken by other powers.
Source : Dennis M. Swanson – Adobe Stock
In the past decade, housing prices have risen sharply across Europe. For many people, especially young, owning a home now feels out of reach. With rents increasing and supply falling short, some questions stand out: why is this happening, and what can the EU do about it?
From 2015 to 2024, average rents in the European Union rose by one quarter and house prices by half. As a result, 1 in 10 Europeans now spends 40% or more of their disposable income on housing. This rising pressure is delaying homeownership. Right now the average age of first-time buyers is 32 across Europe, and around 36 in countries like Spain, Portugal or Belgium. For many people, this directly shapes their personal, educational, and career decisions affecting labour mobility and ultimately weakening Europe’s competitiveness.
But affordability is only one side of the problem. Since 2010, the share of social housing has continued to decrease, even as vulnerable groups such as homeless people and new migrants have grown in number. On top of that, half of Europe’s housing stock was built before 1980 and needs urgent renovation, adding another layer of strain for governments and households.
These, together with other challenges play out differently in each Member State, shaped by national economic, social, and cultural factors. Yet despite these differences, the housing crisis is clearly pan-European. Countries face similar pressures that have created the perfect fertile ground for a housing crisis across Europe.
What’s driving the crisis
According to the Council of the EU, several trends have pushed Europe into its current housing crisis. One key factor is the rise in housing costs. Rents have increased by 50% to 100% in many major cities, and prices are also rising in suburban areas and smaller university towns. At the same time, more homes are being bought as short-term rentals or investment properties. This has intensified competition in the rental market and contributed to rising inequality, social exclusion, and a growing mistrust in public institutions, ultimately threatening the long-term attractiveness and competitiveness of Europe’s cities and regions, as highlighted by the President of Housing Europe, Marco Corradi.
In addition, the supply of new social and affordable housing is limited. Member States emphasise that the core solution is to build more homes, and estimates suggest that nearly 1 million new dwellings are needed to meet demand. However, constructing new affordable housing faces different obstacles across Europe. Major economies report declining construction activity due to higher material costs, rising interest rates, and limited financing. Some countries, like Luxembourg, addressed this through supply acquisitions and new constructions, while Hungary and Belgium are increasing social housing by purchasing existing homes. But overall, construction has still not fully recovered from the 2008 financial crisis and recent shocks like the pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have further slowed investment.
The report also notes a lack of renovation and innovation, even though buildings account for around 40% of total energy use and nearly half of the EU’s gas consumption.
On top of this, social and demographic trends are also a challenge. Europe’s population continues to move toward urban centres, which already host more than half of EU residents and are projected to grow further. While some local governments are trying to address population decline in rural areas, many territories risk irreversible depopulation. Housing needs are also changing, smaller households of one or two people will dominate in the coming decades, and the number of individuals needing assistance will increase.
These dynamics don’t affect everyone equally. Who benefits from all of this? Mainly homeowners, including low-income ones, since housing values have increased and often make up a large share of their assets. Meanwhile, those who own second homes in tourist areas have also profited from rising property values and strong demand for short-term rentals.
For Europeans, the cost of political and institutional inaction is high. These pressures are rising while incomes fail to keep pace with living costs and property prices. Youngsters face a sense of insecurity and vulnerability in housing that previous generations did not experience. This creates a perfect combination for nationalist and far-right movements to grow, which often use vulnerable groups like migrants as scapegoats for the housing crisis. At the same time, citizens lose confidence in public institutions’ ability to solve social challenges, weakening democratic legitimacy.
What can Brussels actually do?
For years, the European Union largely left housing to national and local governments. But after the 2024 elections, something shifted. The appointment of the first EU Commissioner for Energy and Housing, Dan Jørgensen, sent a clear signal that the problem has landed on the European Commission‘s (EC) table – being worthy of the “power of the pen” – and the EC aims to address it. Housing remains a national, regional, and local competence, in line with the principle of subsidiarity, which limits the EU’s ability to address the problem directly. But Member States (MS) are increasingly asking the supranational level to help address common root causes linked to EU rules.
In September, the European Parliament’s HOUS Committee, created by the Von der Leyen Commission to focus specifically on Europe’s housing crisis, published the first draft of its report, centred on two priorities: boosting supply and supporting demand. Its findings fed into the EU’s first Affordable Housing Plan, presented at the end of 2025 after a public consultation. With the goal of producing solutions tailored to Member States’ realities, the Housing Advisory Board brings together mayors, academics, and real estate experts to provide recommendations to the Commission. For the Board, the key message is that housing should be seen as an essential social and economic infrastructure, not a speculative asset.
So what can the EU actually do? Support is expected in several key areas.
First, boosting housing supply by cutting red tape, supporting renovation and the better use of existing buildings, and addressing speculative pressures and the impact of short-term rentals. This could allow authorities in cities and regions facing severe housing shortages to limit short-term rentals. As Commissioner Jørgensen put it, Europe should stop treating homes “the same way they treat gold”.
Second, mobilising investment, notably by scaling up EU funding, attracting private capital, and prioritising affordable housing under the current and next Multiannual Financial Framework (2028–2034).
Third, by giving local authorities the tools and guidance to act quickly in areas with severe housing stress. This includes using data to identify where intervention is most needed, providing technical and financial assistance, and helping implement reforms that improve market stability. Finally, protecting those most affected by the housing crisis, by strengthening social housing, safeguarding vulnerable tenants, and targeting support at low- and middle-income households.
The bottom line is simple: Europe needs more affordable housing, and it needs it fast. Institutions, MS and key stakeholders recognise similar challenges and the areas where the European level can make a difference. As with many issues in the EU, real change depends on local, regional, and national action, but these levels cannot solve the crisis alone. Coordination and support from Brussels are crucial. If the EU succeeds, the next five years could mark a shift from crisis to recovery. If it fails, rising housing costs will continue to determine who can live, work, and build a future in Europe’s cities.
© Photo: Pexels 2016
Citizen distrust in institutions and rising polarisation across Europe raises a critical question : does the rise of the far-right signal the end of the democratic European project or a pivot towards a new era of intergovernmental illiberalism?
A recent and dangerous rise to power
The European Parliament elections held in June 2024 significantly reorganised the political landscape of the Union. The far right is now a strong force within political institutions, securing 187 MEPs, 26% of the Parliament, which is a stark increase from previous terms. These representatives are distributed across three distinct political groups: the Patriots for Europe (PfE), the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), and the newly formed Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN).
How did we come to this?
A growing number of EU citizens are looking toward the perceived efficiency of illiberal governance models. Liberal democracies are struggling to keep up with this polarization, in the UK, Prime Minister Keir Starmer faces historically low approval ratings dropping to -46% net favourability in late 2024/2025. In France, political instability has become normal; following the dissolution of the National Assembly in 2024, the government has faced repeated crises, with Prime Ministers struggling to maintain viable coalitions for more than a few months plunging the country into economic and political instability. In Spain, the far-right party Vox has surged, particularly among the youth. Polling data from 2024 to 2025 indicates that Vox is the leading party among Spanish men aged under 25, revealing a stark gender and generational divide. According to a 2025 Journal of Democracy analysis, new cultural, racial, and religious cleavages are emerging and increasing the relevancy of these fringe parties whilst traditional parties, liberals and socialists, struggle to obtain new votes.
A not-so strong block
While far-right groups align on restrictive migration policies, opposition to the European Green Deal, and a desire to reclaim national sovereignty, they do not align on everything. Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine is an example of their deepest fracture. The ECR, dominated by Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, is staunchly Atlanticist and pro-Ukraine, whereas the PfE, led largely by associates of Viktor Orbán and Marine Le Pen, and the ESN often advocate for ending aid to Kyiv or softening sanctions on Russia.
Despite these internal divisions, the election results signal that the EU has lost steam towards federalisation. The votes clearly reflect citizens’ growing distrust in supranational institutions and the so-called “neoliberal order”.
The end of the “Demoicracy” dream?
Does this mean the end of democracy in the EU? To answer this, we must look at the concept of “Demoicracy”. The idea is that the EU is not one single demos (people) but a Union of separate demoi (peoples) governing together.
For decades, the “federalist dream” hoped to merge European people into a single European identity. The 2024 elections have likely shattered that specific aspiration. However, this does not necessarily signal the end of democracy itself, but rather a shift towards more illiberalism within the EU. Illiberalism is most prominent in Hungary where Viktor Orbán and his party have slowly restricted freedom of the press, expression, and representation, cracking down on political dissent and taking control of the national political discourse whilst keeping aspects of a democracy by still allowing Hungarians to vote. On the other hand, the new far-right blocs do not seek to leave the EU, as in Brexit, but to capture it from within. They envision a “Europe of Nations” where democratic legitimacy remains national, and the EU functions rather as a loose coordinating body for border security and economic protectionism.
The danger lies not in the collapse of the EU, but in its zombification. If the “cordon sanitaire”, the firewall preventing mainstream parties from governing with the far right, collapses fully as it has arguably done in nations like Sweden, Finland, and Italy then the EU’s core values of rule of law and minority rights may be hollowed out, leaving behind a democratic shell that operates on majoritarian, exclusionist principles.
The normalisation of illiberalism
The most striking development of the post-2024 landscape is the normalization of previously fringe ideas. The concept of “remigration” or “naval blockades”, once limited to the radical fringe, has bled into the discourse of the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP).
This “mainstreaming” allows the far right to pass laws without having to govern Europe. By pressuring the center-right EPP to adopt their framing on security and migration, they have shifted the Overton Window. The EU is moving away from being a normative power that promotes human rights to a “Geopolitical Commission” focused on hard borders and transactional diplomacy.
Not yet the end?The rise of the far right does not mark the immediate end of democratic politics, but it likely marks the end of the liberal democratic consensus in the EU. We are entering an era of contested democracy, where the definitions of rights, citizenship, and the rule of law are battlegrounds rather than shared premises. The “Demoicracy” survives, but it is more fractious, defensive, and inward-looking than the architects of the European project ever intended.
Le 11 septembre 2025, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (CJUE), dans son arrêt Bervidi, a reconnu le droit de Julia (prénom d’emprunt), maman d’un enfant mineur porteur d’un handicap grave, de bénéficier d’aménagements raisonnables de ses horaires de travail en raison de sa qualité « d’aidant familial ». La Cour affirme que Julia a été victime d’une discrimination indirecte « par association » fondée sur le handicap au vu du refus de son employeur de lui octroyer des aménagements raisonnables permanents.
Au cours des deux dernières décennies, la CJUE n’a cessé d’étendre l’interprétation des instruments européens qui consacrent le principe de l’interdiction de la discrimination. Son approche a permis d’englober davantage de situations dans le champ d’application de cette protection contre la discrimination. C’est notamment à travers la Directive 2000/78/CE, consacrant le principe général de la non-discrimination en matière d’emploi, que la Cour avait reconnu en 2008 dans son affaire Coleman, une application large de cette directive en affirmant l’existence d’une discrimination directe fondée sur le handicap. La façon dont la Cour a étendu le sens de cette protection fondamentale a permis de consacrer la garantie d’être protégé contre une discrimination au travail dans de multiples situations. Elle a notamment admis l’obligation pour l’employeur de prévoir des aménagements raisonnables de travail par ricochet pour l’employé portant assistance à son enfant handicapé, évitant ainsi une discrimination indirecte « par association » fondée sur le handicap.
L’histoire de Julia
Julia est opératrice de gare d’une ligne de métro. Son régime de travail s’articule autour d’horaires flexibles. Cependant, les soins qu’elle doit prodiguer à son enfant doivent être effectués à un certain horaire, durant l’après-midi. Elle souhaitait être affectée de façon stable à un poste de travail à horaires fixes le matin, de manière à pouvoir s’occuper de son enfant, en situation de handicap grave, le matin. Elle a alors fait une demande d’adaptation de ses horaires à son employeur, qui lui a refusé.
Une mesure neutre aux conséquences discriminatoires
Pour comprendre comment la Cour a déterminé le caractère discriminatoire des manquements de l’employeur de Julia, il faut saisir la nuance entre une discrimination indirecte et une discrimination indirecte « par association ». La première vise la situation dans laquelle une politique ou une pratique apparemment neutre est susceptible de désavantager particulièrement des personnes caractérisées par l’un des critères protégés par la loi – tels que le sexe, la race ou encore la religion – par rapport à d’autre personnes se trouvant dans une situation similaire. La seconde désigne le cas où une personne subit une discrimination indirecte en raison du fait qu’elle est associée à une personne caractérisée par l’un des motifs protégés, sans que ce motif lui soit inhérent.
Dans le cas de Julia, elle n’était donc pas discriminée sur la base d’un handicap, mais bien sur la base du handicap de son enfant, donc par le biais d’une association. Il est crucial de mentionner le fait qu’il n’est ici pas nécessaire pour la plaignante de démontrer quelconque élément intentionnel de discriminer dans le comportement de son employeur. Bien que le refus d’aménagement raisonnable permanent des horaires de travail de Julia puisse apparaître comme une décision neutre pouvant être basée sur d’autres raisons – comme par exemple le manque de personnel travaillant le soir. Julia est en fait désavantagée en raison du fait que son enfant soit caractérisé par l’un des motifs visés par cette directive européenne, à savoir le handicap. En d’autres termes, l’employée a été discriminée en raison du lien indissoluble qui l’unit à une personne vulnérable.
L’aménagement raisonnable, clé de l’égalité au travail
Les aménagements raisonnables sont également consacrés par la même directive. Elle les définit comme étant des mesures appropriées qui sont prises dans une situation concrète en fonction des besoins d’une personne handicapée, pour lui permettre d’accéder à un emploi, de l’exercer ou d’y progresser, ou pour qu’une formation lui soit dispensée, sauf si ces mesures imposent à l’employeur une charge disproportionnée. Aujourd’hui, la protection contre le refus d’aménagements raisonnables a seulement été consacrée en matière de handicap. Par l’arrêt Bervidi, la Cour affirme l’obligation positive de l’employeur de prendre des mesures adaptées à la situation particulière de son employée. Ces mesures permettent que Julia ne soit pas désavantagée par rapport aux autres employés, et ce même si elle n’est pas elle-même en situation de handicap. Cette action positive n’est pas une faveur, mais bien une obligation légale qui incombe à l’employeur.
Précisons toutefois que la protection contre le refus d’aménagements raisonnables ne constitue pas un droit absolu pour les employés. L’employeur peut effectivement estimer que prendre de telles mesures représente une charge disproportionnée lorsque les aménagements raisonnables demandent des efforts ou des coûts manifestement excessifs par rapport aux ressources et aux moyens de l’organisation. Si le refus n’est pas justifié de manière solide par l’employeur, il sera considéré comme une mesure discriminatoire.
Quand le droit du travail intègre l’écosystème familial
En montrant que Julia n’est pas seulement une entité isolée mais qu’elle fait partie d’un écosystème familial, cet arrêt met en avant une vision humaniste du travail. La protection des travailleurs est davantage étendue car il est tenu compte de leur environnement au sens large. La Cour protège ainsi les aidants proches et, de manière indirecte, elle protège les personnes handicapées en assurant leur inclusivité à travers le soutien de leurs proches, sans que ces derniers ne soient contraints de sacrifier leur vie professionnelle.
Bervidi représente une victoire juridique importante. Au-delà de cette victoire, la reconnaissance de l’aménagement raisonnable par ricochet pose la première pierre d’une mutation du monde du travail où le social doit se concilier avec la performance économique. Avec le vieillissement continu de la population, l’employeur n’aura plus le choix de prendre des actions positives pour éviter que ses employés, ayant la qualité d’aidants proches des ainés de notre société, soient victimes d’une discrimination indirecte « par association » fondée sur l’âge. L’obligation d’aménagements raisonnables « par association » sera-t-elle bientôt élargie aux aidants proches de personnes âgées ?
Depuis presque six décennies, l’Union européenne (UE) cultive un délicat équilibre : faire prospérer un marché intérieur où la concurrence se joue sur les mérites, tout en laissant aux États la faculté d’intervenir lorsque l’intérêt général l’exige. Le triptyque des articles 107 à 109 du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne (TFUE), socle du régime des aides d’État, incarne cette dialectique : interdiction de principe, exceptions encadrées, contrôle centralisé. Longtemps, cette architecture a fonctionné comme un garde-fou contre tout dérapage protectionniste intra-européen. Toutefois, l’enchaînement de crises sanitaires, géopolitiques et climatiques, doublé d’une compétition industrielle mondiale débridée, a brouillé les frontières entre discipline et stratégie. Sous la bannière d’une « autonomie stratégique ouverte », la Commission européenne réinterprète désormais le droit des aides d’État : d’outil policier, il devient un levier d’orientation industrielle. Le présent article, qui se veut plus vivant qu’un commentaire d’arrêt mais tout aussi rigoureux juridiquement, retrace cette mue.
Le cadre juridique classique : discipline tempérée par des exceptions
Le principe d’incompatibilité
L’article 107 §1 TFUE prohibe « toute aide accordée par un État membre ou au moyen de ressources d’État qui, en favorisant certaines entreprises ou certaines productions, fausse ou menace de fausser la concurrence ». La Cour de justice de l’Union européenne (CJUE) applique de façon large les quatre critères ; imputabilité, avantage, distorsion ou menace de distorsion de la concurrence, incidence sur les échanges, si bien que la plupart des interventions financières tombent dans le filet.
Les dérogations
Le §2 dresse une liste d’aides réputées compatibles de plein droit (actions sociales individuelles, indemnisations post-catastrophe, réparations de dommages causés par des troubles graves). Le §3 confie à la Commission un pouvoir discrétionnaire pour autoriser des aides poursuivant des objectifs d’intérêt commun : cohésion régionale, R&D, transition verte, services d’intérêt économique général, etc. Ce « balancier » est contrôlé par la CJUE, qui impose un triple test : nécessité, proportionnalité, transparence.
Ingénierie normative de la Commission
Pour concrétiser ces clauses, la Commission a empilé directives, communications et règlements : lignes directrices sectorielles (R&D&I, environnement-énergie, sauvetages et restructurations, aides régionales) et règlement général d’exemption par catégorie (RGEC), refondu en 2023. Le RGEC exempte désormais environ 70 % des régimes d’aide standards, à condition de respecter des seuils d’intensité et certaines obligations.
L’ère de la modernisation prudente (2012-2019)
Avant même la pandémie, Bruxelles avait entamé la “State aid modernisation” : recentrage des notifications sur les cas transfrontaliers, encouragement aux PIIEC (Projets importants d’intérêt européen commun), intégration de clauses d’évaluation ex post. Néanmoins, la philosophie demeurait essentiellement défensive : éviter un dumping budgétaire entre États.
La bascule conceptuelle : de la neutralité à la stratégie assumée
Genèse de l’« autonomie stratégique ouverte »
Trois chocs exogènes (Covid-19, l’invasion russe de l’Ukraine entraînant une flambée du gaz, ainsi que la mobilisation par la Chine et les USA de puissants arsenaux budgétaires, Made in China 2025, CHIPS Act, Inflation Reduction Act) ont révélé la vulnérabilité stratégique d’une Europe cantonnée à la seule discipline concurrentielle.
Formulé en 2020, entériné par le Conseil en 2021, le concept conjugue deux impératifs : l’autonomie , visant donc à maîtriser des chaînes de valeur critiques (énergie propre, semi-conducteurs, santé, défense) et à réduire les dépendances jugées naïves, ainsi que l’ouverture afin de préserver l’accès aux marchés, la concurrence et la coopération multilatérale. Ce concept peut donc être défini comme la capacité de l’UE à agir de manière autonome pour défendre ses intérêts et valeurs, tout en restant ouverte au commerce et à la coopération internationale.
Dans la pratique, il s’agit d’identifier les domaines où l’Europe doit impérativement développer ses propres capacités (énergies propres, semi-conducteurs, défense, santé…) et d’y encourager les investissements (publics et privés), tout en continuant à prôner des échanges internationaux basés sur des règles.
La politique d’aides d’État est au cœur de cette dialectique : elle doit évoluer pour soutenir l’autonomie stratégique de l’UE mais rester suffisamment encadrée pour ne pas briser l’intégrité du marché intérieur ni déclencher une course aux subventions dans tous les azimuts.
La nouvelle boîte à outils
Face aux défis évoqués, l’UE a mis en place ou renforcé récemment plusieurs instruments juridiques pour ajuster la politique d’aides d’État à l’ère de l’autonomie stratégique ouverte.
L’encadrement temporaire “crise et transition” (TCTF)
Initié en plein Covid (mars 2020), puis adapté à la crise énergétique (mars 2022), le cadre temporaire a été remodelé le 9 mars 2023 pour soutenir la transition verte. Trois innovations marquantes :
En somme, l’encadrement temporaire “crise et transition” illustre la manière dont l’UE peut jouer la flexibilité dans son droit des aides d’État pour répondre à des circonstances extraordinaires et à des enjeux stratégiques de court terme. Reste la question de sa durée limitée (jusqu’à fin 2025) et de ce qu’il adviendra ensuite : un retour au statu quo ante ou l’incorporation de certaines de ces dérogations dans le droit commun des aides ?
Le règlement (UE) 2022/2560 sur les subventions étrangères (FSR)
Jusqu’à récemment, un angle mort du droit européen était l’incapacité à contrôler les subventions octroyées par des gouvernements étrangers à leurs entreprises qui opèrent au sein du marché unique. Le FSR, applicable depuis octobre 2023, étend la surveillance aux aides non européennes : notification ex ante des concentrations de plus de 500 M€ lorsque le groupe a reçu plus de 50 M€ d’aides étrangères sur trois ans ; notification des marchés publics >250 M€ si le soumissionnaire bénéficie de telles aides ; pouvoir d’enquête horizontal pour les cas en dessous des seuils. La Commission peut imposer des remèdes proportionnés, voire interdire l’opération, sur la base d’une balance coûts/bénéfices. Le FSR s’insère dans la logique d’autonomie stratégique ouverte : il ne vise pas à élever des barrières tarifaires, mais à instaurer de la réciprocité. Les entreprises étrangères sont toujours les bienvenues dans le marché européen, à condition qu’elles n’y opèrent pas grâce à des aides déloyales de leur État d’origine.
Le renouveau des PIIEC
Les PIIEC permettent, en vertu de l’article 107 §3(b) TFUE, d’autoriser des aides d’État normalement prohibées, dès lors qu’elles soutiennent un projet transnational impliquant plusieurs États membres et concourant à l’intérêt stratégique de l’Union. En pratique, il s’agit de grands projets innovants mobilisant des investissements publics et privés dans des secteurs de pointe. Par exemple, les batteries électriques, les microprocesseurs, l’hydrogène vert, le calcul haute performance, etc. Depuis 2018, quatre vagues de PIIEC ont été approuvées : batteries, microélectronique-1, hydrogène-1, microélectronique-2, ect. Les PIIEC incarnent une politique industrielle dite « coopérative » : mutualiser les risques et éviter le chacun pour soi.
Tensions juridiques et perspectives
Fragmentation budgétaire
L’assouplissement des règles européennes sur les aides d’État révèle de fortes disparités entre pays : ceux disposant de finances publiques solides, comme l’Allemagne et la France, peuvent soutenir massivement leurs entreprises, tandis que les autres ont une marge de manœuvre limitée. Entre mars 2022 et septembre 2023, près de 742 milliards € d’aides ont été approuvés ; l’Allemagne en concentre 48,4 % et la France plus de 22 %, laissant des parts inférieures à 1 % à de nombreux États. Cette asymétrie menace d’élargir les fractures du marché unique : concurrence faussée, risques de délocalisations intra-européennes vers les pays les plus généreux et remise en cause de la cohésion économique. Pour éviter une logique de « chacun pour soi », il faut instaurer des garde-fous : meilleure coordination par la Commission, conditionnalités strictes et, surtout, mécanismes de financement mutualisés (comme un éventuel fonds de souveraineté européen) afin de compenser l’inégalité des trésors publics nationaux.
Ouverture commerciale vs. protection industrielle : le spectre du protectionnisme
L’UE s’efforce de concilier son engagement de longue date en faveur du libre-échange multilatéral avec une politique industrielle plus interventionniste, un exercice délicat car toute extension des aides d’État doit demeurer compatible avec les règles de l’OMC et ne pas apparaître comme protectionniste aux yeux des partenaires commerciaux. En embrassant cette voie, l’UE s’expose en effet à des ripostes ou à des imitations d’autres puissances. Pour éviter cet écueil, elle invoque le principe d’« autonomie stratégique ouverte », qui cherche à réduire les dépendances critiques sans ériger de barrières généralisées, et déploie des outils ciblés déjà dénoncés par la Chine comme discriminatoires. La Commission devra garantir que ces soutiens demeurent transparents, temporaires et conditionnés, afin qu’ils ne se muent pas en rentes pour quelques champions abrités de la concurrence. Sur la scène internationale, Bruxelles promeut la réciprocité ouverte : elle réclame de nouvelles disciplines multilatérales sur les subventions, notamment celles des économies émergentes, et renforce la coordination avec ses alliés, comme en témoigne le dialogue UE–États-Unis sur les subventions vertes, afin de prévenir toute escalade. Le succès de cette stratégie dépendra de la capacité de l’Union à maintenir cet équilibre fragile entre ouverture extérieure et protection ciblée, gage de sa crédibilité et de son efficacité industrielles.
Face aux défis durables de compétitivité et de transition écologique, l’UE ne pourra ni revenir à un contrôle strict et uniforme des aides d’État, ni maintenir indéfiniment les largesses actuelles ; elle s’oriente plutôt vers une voie médiane consistant à cibler les soutiens indispensables (technologies émergentes, décarbonation, projets d’intérêt européen) au moyen de régimes d’exemption pérennes et encadrés, tout en renforçant la discipline sur les aides non justifiées. Cette évolution s’accompagne de la relance d’un instrument financier commun, tel un fonds de souveraineté, pour offrir aux États aux ressources limitées la capacité de suivre le rythme et éviter la fragmentation du marché intérieur. Parallèlement, l’UE envisage de promouvoir, au niveau international, un cadre coopératif distinguant les subventions « vertueuses » climatiques des mesures purement protectionnistes. Ainsi, le droit des aides d’État, longtemps perçu comme un frein, est appelé à devenir un levier d’autonomie stratégique ouverte, à condition d’être redéfini avec rigueur juridique pour préserver l’intégrité du marché intérieur tout en rendant l’Europe plus résiliente et souveraine dans une économie mondiale ouverte.
Gradis Ngolo, étudiant au sein du master de spécialisation (LLM) en droit européen au sein de l’Institut d’études européennes (IEE).