The rise of the far right: Is it the end of democratic politics in the EU?

© Photo: Pexels 2016

Citizen distrust in institutions and rising polarisation across Europe raises a critical question : does the rise of the far-right signal the end of the democratic European project or a pivot towards a new era of intergovernmental illiberalism?

A recent and dangerous rise to power

The European Parliament elections held in June 2024 significantly reorganised the political landscape of the Union. The far right is now a strong force within political institutions, securing 187 MEPs, 26% of the Parliament, which is a stark increase from previous terms. These representatives are distributed across three distinct political groups: the Patriots for Europe (PfE), the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), and the newly formed Europe of Sovereign Nations (ESN). 

How did we come to this?

A growing number of EU citizens are looking toward the perceived efficiency of illiberal governance models. Liberal democracies are struggling to keep up with this polarization, in the UK, Prime Minister Keir Starmer faces historically low approval ratings dropping to -46% net favourability in late 2024/2025. In France, political instability has become normal; following the dissolution of the National Assembly in 2024, the government has faced repeated crises, with Prime Ministers struggling to maintain viable coalitions for more than a few months plunging the country into economic and political instability. In Spain, the far-right party Vox has surged, particularly among the youth. Polling data from 2024 to 2025 indicates that Vox is the leading party among Spanish men aged under 25, revealing a stark gender and generational divide. According to a 2025 Journal of Democracy analysis, new cultural, racial, and religious cleavages are emerging and increasing the relevancy of these fringe parties whilst traditional parties, liberals and socialists, struggle to obtain new votes.

A not-so strong block

While far-right groups align on restrictive migration policies, opposition to the European Green Deal, and a desire to reclaim national sovereignty, they do not align on everything. Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine is an example of their deepest fracture. The ECR, dominated by Giorgia Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, is staunchly Atlanticist and pro-Ukraine, whereas the PfE, led largely by associates of Viktor Orbán and Marine Le Pen,  and the ESN often advocate for ending aid to Kyiv or softening sanctions on Russia.

Despite these internal divisions, the election results signal that the EU has lost steam towards federalisation. The votes clearly reflect citizens’ growing distrust in supranational institutions and the so-called “neoliberal order”.

The end of the “Demoicracy” dream?

Does this mean the end of democracy in the EU? To answer this, we must look at the concept of “Demoicracy”. The idea is that the EU is not one single demos (people) but a Union of separate demoi (peoples) governing together.

For decades, the “federalist dream” hoped to merge European people into a single European identity. The 2024 elections have likely shattered that specific aspiration. However, this does not necessarily signal the end of democracy itself, but rather a shift towards more illiberalism within the EU. Illiberalism is most prominent in Hungary where Viktor Orbán and his party have slowly restricted freedom of the press, expression, and representation, cracking down on political dissent and taking control of the national political discourse whilst keeping aspects of a democracy by still allowing Hungarians to vote. On the other hand, the new far-right blocs do not seek to leave the EU, as in Brexit, but to capture it from within. They envision a “Europe of Nations” where democratic legitimacy remains national, and the EU functions rather as a loose coordinating body for border security and economic protectionism.

The danger lies not in the collapse of the EU, but in its zombification. If the “cordon sanitaire”, the firewall preventing mainstream parties from governing with the far right,  collapses fully as it has arguably done in nations like Sweden, Finland, and Italy then the EU’s core values of rule of law and minority rights may be hollowed out, leaving behind a democratic shell that operates on majoritarian, exclusionist principles.

The normalisation of illiberalism

The most striking development of the post-2024 landscape is the normalization of previously fringe ideas. The concept of “remigration” or “naval blockades”, once limited to the radical fringe, has bled into the discourse of the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP).

This “mainstreaming” allows the far right to pass laws without having to govern Europe. By pressuring the center-right EPP to adopt their framing on security and migration, they have shifted the Overton Window. The EU is moving away from being a normative power that promotes human rights to a “Geopolitical Commission” focused on hard borders and transactional diplomacy.

Not yet the end?The rise of the far right does not mark the immediate end of democratic politics, but it likely marks the end of the liberal democratic consensus in the EU. We are entering an era of contested democracy, where the definitions of rights, citizenship, and the rule of law are battlegrounds rather than shared premises. The “Demoicracy” survives, but it is more fractious, defensive, and inward-looking than the architects of the European project ever intended.