How Europe’s Divisions Sustain Dependence on the United States

Europe’s relationship with the United States is often discussed in terms of dependence and autonomy, although this distinction does not play out in the same way across the continent. For the countries on NATO’s eastern flank, the American presence is still seen as the main guarantee of security. France and Germany, by contrast, speak more often of European autonomy, but their policies rarely match that ambition. In southern Europe, meanwhile, the costs of Atlantic alignment are often felt more clearly than its benefits. The result is a divided political landscape in which different parts of Europe experience dependence on the United States in different ways and for different reasons.

The eastern flank and dependency as choice

For the countries along NATO’s eastern border, subordination to Washington is still perceived as a guarantee more than a burden. EU member states like Poland, the Baltic states and Romania have long argued that their security rests on a visible American military presence. When Donald Trump demanded that NATO members raise defence spending to 5 percent of GDP, these capitals did not negotiate. They saw the figure as the price of retaining US troops on their soil.

Josep Borrell later said that the NATO summit in The Hague had turned into an exercise in flattery. Mark Rutte, the secretary general, sent what Borrell described as “fawning messages” to the US president. European governments accepted the 5 percent defence spending target as an exchange for a continued US military presence on their territory, which they still see as the most credible deterrent against Russia.

These countries tend to see the dependency merely as a Franco-German concern, and as a distraction from what they consider the immediate threat. Their priority is to keep the United States as closely tied as possible to European security, even if that means accepting tariffs, trade pressure, or a more subordinate position in other areas. Indeed, Europe has shifted its reliance from Russian gas to a heavy dependence on American Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). This dual military and energy dependence further explains why European governments frequently accept such compromises to avoid antagonizing their transatlantic ally. Furthermore, although their defence budgets have increased, much of that spending still goes to US manufacturers, deepening a dependence they regard less as a constraint than as a form of protection. In this part of Europe, the EU remains an important framework, but the core security relationship is still bilateral, transatlantic, and clearly unequal.

The Franco-German core

France and Germany economies are strong enough to sustain the idea of greater independence, and their post-war histories have made European integration central to their political outlook. Yet, the increase in arms purchases in Europe does not coincide with an emancipation from the United States. According to SIPRI data, between 2021 and 2025, Washington supplied a reduced 58 percent of the arms imports for the 29 European NATO members. However, the overall volume of European imports grew by 143% compared to the 2016-2020 period, keeping the situation at the pre-established equilibrium. Moreover, European military research and development still remains highly fragmented and far below the American level. Important capabilities such as satellites, communications, and air-to-air refuelling are still largely dependent on the United States. 

France has long argued for a stronger European defence industry, but its purchasing choices have often reinforced US dominance. Germany committed itself to the 5 percent target, yet its largest defence contracts also continue to go to American firms. What limits more the Franco-German core is the absence of a shared and coherent strategic line. France sees autonomy as greater political and military independence. Germany remains more reluctant to loosen the American framework, even while increasing defence spending. As long as this divide persists, the EU is unlikely to act with consistency. And without the industrial capacity to support greater independence, the ambition itself remains fragile.

The Mediterranean south

Italy, Spain, Greece, and the southern member states occupy a different position. Their main concerns are less about territorial defence against eastern threats than about energy dependence, migration, and economic fragility. Yet they are still expected to contribute to the 5 percent defence target, even though their priorities lie elsewhere. For example, Italy has struggled to reach even 2 percent of GDP, while Spain has described the 5 percent target as disproportionate and openly questioned its logic.

These countries also bear many of the economic costs of transatlantic decisions without having much influence on them. The war in Ukraine, which eastern Europe sees as an existential security issue, has affected the south above all through energy prices, inflation, and pressure on Mediterranean trade. When the United States imposes tariffs or pushes the EU towards sanctions, the effects are often felt most sharply in economies with weaker fiscal margins. Southern member states do not perceive nor receive American protection in the same way as the east. For the Mediterranean south, then, dependence is not only a strategic issue but an economic one. Defence obligations continue to grow while industrial weakness, debt, and external pressure narrow the room for political choice.

How Washington exploits Europe’s divisions

Europe’s internal fragmentation works as a source of leverage for Washington. The United States does not need to impose a single line on the continent when European governments already approach the alliance from different positions and with different priorities. What one part of Europe sees as protection, another experiences as constraint, and that asymmetry gives Washington room to manoeuvre.

On security, it can count on the eastern flank, where dependence on the American military presence remains strongest. On trade, it can exert pressure on Germany, whose industrial economy is highly vulnerable to transatlantic tensions. By exploiting the threat of tariffs here, Trump has imposed a broader logic of economic and geopolitical domination. In the Mediterranean south, weaker fiscal margins, energy dependence, and migration pressures create different but equally useful points of pressure. The result is a European Union that rarely responds as a single actor. The Board of Peace initiative earlier this year was only a small example of a wider pattern: unequal participation, limited coordination, and visibility without real influence. American power in Europe now depends less on direct control than on the ability to operate within a divided political space.

The dual technological dependency

Beyond the realms of military security and economic policy, Europe’s structural weakness is further compounded by a profound lack of technological independence. Europe relies on the United States for software and design, and on China for the physical supply chain and hardware. On the software side, Europe’s digital dependence is evident in cloud services. The market is dominated by US giants – Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud – which provide the foundational infrastructure for a growing share of the EU’s economy and public administration. Europe’s reliance on China stems from the need for critical raw materials, like lithium and gallium, which are vital for microchips, batteries, and digital infrastructure. Despite the EU’s 2024 Critical Raw Materials Act, China still controls about 60% of global extraction and 85-90% of the refining process. However, the scale of China’s technological influence, particularly in artificial intelligence, is perceived as a more urgent threat, reinforcing the need for Western ‘friend-shoring’ (the practice of restricting supply chains to allied nations) and bringing Europe closer to Washington.

Conclusion

The EU’s dependence on the United States persists not merely because of American power, but due to Europe’s own structural fragmentation. With member states deeply divided by competing regional priorities – from the need for military deterrence in the east to the economic vulnerabilities of the south – a common European line is difficult to sustain and a political leverage is offered to Washington. It is precisely to overcome this weakness that figures like Mario Draghi argue Europe must “transition from a confederation to a federation in order to gain power”. Yet, as long as security priorities, defence spending, and industrial capacity remain organised along these separate lines, European autonomy will remain weak and dependent.