Europe’s divided response to Washington’s initiative reveals a deeper problem: a diplomatic framework that strengthens the US control while narrowing Europe’s strategic influence. The dispute over participation shows how a US-led diplomatic strategy can work against European interests, weakening both individual member states and the European Union (EU) as a political union.
Europe fragmented again
The US Board of Peace (BoP), presented by Washington as an initiative linked to Gaza’s post-war governance, has triggered a visibly divided response across Europe. Some EU governments rejected the format or voiced strong reservations, others chose to attend as observers, and the European Commission itself joined the first meeting in Washington through EU Commissioner Dubravka Šuica. The European response quickly fragmented along national lines. Hungary and Bulgaria agreed to join the Board, while Italy, Romania, Greece, Slovakia and the Czech Republic chose to participate only as observers. France, Germany and Spain remained outside the initiative altogether, and the European Commission’s decision to attend drew criticism from several capitals and from political groups in the European Parliament. Another relevant point is the choice of the US to exclude the Baltic states.
These differences illustrate the absence of a coherent European approach to initiatives that originate outside established multilateral frameworks. For some governments, remaining close to Washington remains a central consideration even when the institutional format raises political and legal concerns. Others view participation as problematic because it risks legitimizing a structure that appears to challenge the role traditionally played by the United Nations and multilateral diplomacy in crisis management, on which the EU strongly relies to maintain its presence on the international stage and its global credibility.
Washington’s design and European interests
From Washington’s perspective, the rationale behind the BoP is relatively clear. A diplomatic body created outside established multilateral channels gives the United States greater discretion over membership, agenda and political direction. It reduces the constraints associated with broader diplomatic bargaining and allows crisis management to take place in a more selective setting. Le Monde explicitly described the Board as “designed to supplant the UN”, while President António Costa said the EU had “serious doubts” about elements of its charter, including its scope, governance and compatibility with the UN Charter.
For member states’ governments, participation in the Board is often presented as a pragmatic choice. Remaining present in the process is seen as a way to preserve access to diplomatic discussions and maintain close relations with Washington. Observer status, in particular, allows governments to signal engagement without fully endorsing the initiative. Yet this presence offers limited influence over the structure itself. European governments that join the process enter a framework whose political parameters have already been defined by other actors. They gain visibility and information, but their ability to shape outcomes remains constrained and subordinated to American interests. In some countries, this has already generated political controversy. For example, the Italian decision to participate as an observer raised questions about the coherence of Rome’s position regarding the EU and Israeli-American aggression in the Middle East.
The Brussels Dilemma
When crisis management moves away from established multilateral frameworks and into selective diplomatic arenas, the conditions that normally sustain European influence become weaker. The EU enters a setting where its structural advantages are reduced and where the agenda is largely shaped by competitors. This tension has become visible in the debate surrounding the Commission’s participation in the Board. Critics in the European Parliament questioned whether the EU should lend legitimacy to an initiative that appears to operate outside the institutional principles the Union usually defends.
Aside from the legal or procedural issues, the most relevant concern is the impact on the credibility of the EU’s own external posture and the consistency of its commitment to multilateral diplomacy. Brussels argued that, given the EU’s direct interest in Gaza’s reconstruction, it could not afford to remain absent from discussions on the territory’s future. As EUobserver reported, Commission spokesperson Paula Pinho framed the issue by saying that Europe wanted to be “a player, not just a payer”. The Union has often financed post-conflict arrangements largely shaped by other actors, but joining a framework designed and controlled elsewhere does not in itself increase European leverage.
Being present in a diplomatic forum does not automatically translate into influence on the process. When the institutional architecture of a process is defined by another actor, access is not a guarantee for leverage. The EU already possesses significant tools for engaging in Middle Eastern diplomacy: reconstruction funding, economic leverage, institutional partnerships and long-standing relations with regional actors. These resources have often allowed Europe to play a meaningful role in stabilization and reconstruction processes. Their relevance and application, however, depend heavily on the framework in which they are used. When they are deployed through recognized multilateral settings or broad diplomatic partnerships, they can translate into both influence and legitimacy. If absorbed into formats like the BoP, these resources will not only drain the EU’s political and financial resources, but will also hinder its interests both in the region and globally.
Conclusion
Taken together, these dynamics explain why the BoP sits uneasily with European interests, reshaping multilateral approaches and in ways that favor the United States while reducing the room for maneuver for European actors. Its structure allows Washington to define membership, agenda and political direction, while European governments are divided regarding the participation in a framework whose strategic parameters they do not control. Some member states prioritize political proximity to Washington, others emphasize legal and institutional concerns, and EU institutions attempt to balance engagement with caution. The result is a fragmented European response to a process that demands coherence if it is to be influenced effectively. Over time, arrangements of this kind risk weakening Europe’s capacity to defend its own strategic interests both in the Middle East and in the wider international system.
Through the BoP, the United States gains a controlled diplomatic structure with fewer multilateral constraints. European governments, by contrast, are drawn into a process in which their visibility exceeds their influence. For the EU as a union, the longer-term effect is deeper division and a narrower diplomatic space in which to act. The effect that the BoP produces for European states and the EU is a more fragile position and further marginalization on the international stage. For individual member states, it encourages a politics of appeasement to the Washington-Tel Aviv redesign project in the Middle East, revealing current governments’ priority of pleasing Washington over diplomatic autonomy and political coherence.