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Editorial

Yves Luiz-Paulo Paquet

Editor-in-chief of Eyes on Europe



Dear Reader,

as a student attending classes in European Studies, one knows that the wide academic field of European institutional matters is far from being a static or set landscape. Each university year, there have been some chapters added to or crossed out of the courses' curriculum. The Lisbon treaty (and its insuing implications), taken as an academic subject matter, was kind of an unsteady topic for some time, as it was not quiet sure then if it would make the final cut into the learn books. Other issues linked to the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice or the EU Foreign policy have been continuously reviewed in order to account for the ever changing nature of the European Union and the respective role in the world.

Aware of the profound context changes that have happened since the beginning of the last decade - in terms of both, the nature of threats and the limitations of the existing international order - we decided to focus our present edition on the most sensitive issues in this epoch of geopolitical transformation : Security.

Thanks to the active involvement of Eric Remacle, professor at the Department of Political Sciences of the Université libre de Bruxelles, we gave students of various nationalities the opportunity to write an article looking at different aspects of « European Security ». What seems to be a recurrent *Leitmotiv* is that no single country can provide answers on its own to the challenges of today's world. I warmly invite you herewith to read the five selected articles introduced by some inspiring words of Eric Remacle.

Furthermore, we asked the Brazilian ambassador to the EU, Mr. Ricardo Teiva Navares, to share his position on the ongoing EU-Mercosur negotiations and the remaining obstacles to the conclusion of a Free trade agreement. We are honored to publish contributions from Mrs. Viviane Reding, Vice-President of the European Commission and Dmitry Rogozin, Russia's permanent representative to NATO, to name just a few out of many authors who have written highly interesting articles for this edition. Finally, at the the end of our magazine, you will find four book recommendations about the various topics treated in the articles.

A second dossier about EU-Russia relations (energy, media,...) as well as several other non-printed essays are provided on our renewed website.

Eyes on Europe has been running successfully for 6 years now. In the main, the magazine is distributed to the European Parliament, the European Commission, Permanent Representations of Member States, universities and numerous think tanks based in Brussels as well as abroad. Our trilingual magazine (français, english, Deutsch) has featured editorials by Javier Solana, Hans-Gert Pöttering, Isabelle Durant and many more.

We administer institutional partnerships with the university of Geneva (Switzerland) and Leuven (Belgium) and we are currently in talks with the university of Warsaw (Poland) and Straßburg (France) for further cooperation possibilities. The result is an efficient and informal yet structured network of students and academics all over Europe who share the same vision: contributing, in our way, to the reflection on the European integration process.

My final thanks are extended to all of the authors, sponsors and institutional members, without whose efforts all of our endeavours would be in vain.

I wish you an entertaining and stimulating read !

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
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Invited Language

- Langue invitée - Gastsprache

O, MERCOSUL E A UNIÃO EUROPEIA A visão do Brasil sobre as negociações em curso para a conclusão de um Acordo de Associação entre as duas regiões

Ricardo Neiva Tavares - Embaixador do Brasil junto à União Européia

A história das relações entre o Mercosul e a União Européia em muitos casos se confunde com a própria história dos países que compõem os dois blocos. Essas relações estão baseadas em ampla identidade de valores e em herança cultural comum, bem como em sólidos interesses econômico-comerciais de parte à parte. A Europa constitui um dos principais mercados do Mercosul e uma de nossas principais fontes de investimento e de tecnologia. O Mercosul é um importante parceiro comercial da Europa (a corrente de comércio entre os dois blocos foi de mais de US\$ 100 bilhões em 2010), recebe mais investimentos europeus do que China, Índia e Rússia juntos e também é fonte de mais investimentos na União Européia do que aqueles três países em conjunto.

Em 1995, começou a ser envidado esforço adicional de intensificação do relacionamento entre o Mercosul e a União Européia. Naquele ano, foi assinado, em Madri, o Acordo Quadro de Cooperação Inter-regional, o qual visava a preparar o início das negociações do Acordo de Associação Inter-regional Mercosul-União Européia - já delineando os três pilares desse relacionamento: o diálogo político, a cooperação e o comércio.

Por ocasião da Reunião de Cúpula Mercosul-União Européia realizada no Rio de Janeiro, em junho de 1999, foi lançada formalmente a negociação do Acordo de Associação. Até outubro de 2004, as negociações foram intensas e, em grande medida, proveitosas. Foram alcançados progressos significativos nos pilares de diálogo político e de cooperação. No pilar comercial, avançamos de forma pragmática, o que permitiu praticamente concluir diversos capítulos.

Não conseguimos, porém, fechar o acordo naquele momento. O impasse deveu-se, antes de mais nada, a diferenças de percepção sobre o ponto de equilíbrio das concessões recíprocas no acesso a mercados do pilar comercial. Paralelamente, dois processos internacionais, alheios às negociações propriamente ditas, contribuíram para inserir fatores adicionais. Em primeiro lugar, dez novos países acederam formalmente à União Européia em 2004, acrescentando grau adicional de complexidade à formulação de uma posição única do lado comunitário. Em segundo lugar, mas não menos importante, 2004 testemunhou relançamento dos esforços da Rodada Doha da Organização Mundial de Comércio (OMC). Tendo em conta a prioridade que ambos os lados atribuem ao sistema multilateral de comércio, o Mercosul e a União Européia acabaram por se concentrar na vertente multilateral de seu relacionamento comercial.

Não queremos hoje, porém, olhar para as dificuldades do passado. De um lado, porque não parece proveitoso ficar buscando as causas daquele impasse, para o qual não há uma única explicação. De outro, e seguramente mais importante, porque o mundo atual encerra cenário extraordinariamente diferente e mais complexo do que aquele no qual negociamos até 2004.

Hoje, as economias dos países do Mercosul encontram-se em franco crescimento e apresentam vasta gama de oportunidades em termos de comércio e investimentos para um parceiro tradicional e importante como a União Européia. Já a Europa, cuja economia muito sofreu com a crise de 2008-2009, procura aumentar suas exportações para o Mercosul, em razão

do menor dinamismo nos mercados dos países desenvolvidos. Além desse claro interesse econômico-comercial, ambos os lados parecem ter bem presente também a importância política da aproximação das duas regiões. A conclusão do Acordo Inter-regional vai ao encontro dos objetivos comuns de estimular a conformação de uma ordem internacional multipolar, em um mundo em rápida evolução.

O Relançamento das Negociações Mercosul-União Européia

Após o impasse nas negociações da Rodada Doha da OMC, em 2008, o Mercosul e a União Européia iniciaram, em 2009, processo de consultas consubstanciado em uma série de reuniões informais, com vistas a estimular as possibilidades de reiniciar os entendimentos para a conclusão do Acordo de Associação. Esse processo culminou com o relançamento oficial das negociações entre os dois blocos, formalizado na Reunião de Cúpula Mercosul-União Européia realizada em Madri, em maio de 2010.

Desde o relançamento do processo negociador bi-regional, já foram realizadas quatro reuniões, no nível técnico. Os entendimentos transcorrem em clima de muita cordialidade e estão sendo guiados por espírito construtivo e pragmático francamente positivo. Nota-se hoje mais disposição negociadora de parte à parte. Onde anteriormente existiam posições por vezes dogmáticas, agora se vê genuína busca de compreender os interesses e limites do parceiro e de procurar soluções aceitáveis aos dois lados. Esse novo enfoque se tem refletido em resultados no que tange à redação dos muitos capítulos que compõem o novo



Acordo - os quais envolvem de acesso a mercados para bens e serviços e investimentos, passando por propriedade intelectual, compras governamentais, solução de controvérsias, defesa comercial, política de concorrência e até outros aspectos como regras de origem, barreiras técnicas, medidas sanitárias e fitossanitárias e assuntos aduaneiros.

Até o momento, as negociações estão concentrando-se na parte normativa. Paralelamente, estamos trabalhando com vistas a que sejam trocadas ofertas de acesso a mercados. Não se pode, contudo, minimizar os desafios que permanecem à frente. Há sensibilidades de parte à parte, mas a persistência do novo espírito que tem norteado as discussões permite enfrentar esses obstáculos com confiança.

A busca de um equilíbrio de concessões recíprocas se reveste de especial importância, tendo em vista as particularidades específicas dessa negociação, que entendo serem diferentes de todas as demais já concluídas pela União Européia. Além de estarmos buscando criar a maior área de livre comércio do mundo e a primeira entre duas uniões aduaneiras, deve-se levar em consideração o fato de ser hoje o Mercosul um dos maiores e mais eficientes supridores em escala global de produtos agropecuários - setor que é precisamente o de maior sensibilidade na Europa, em função de sua evolução histórica e de outros fatores.

O Mercosul, mesmo antes de 2004, já demonstrara compreensão quanto às sensibilidades da Europa no setor agrícola e nunca se negou a discutir também o acesso em termos de quotas - ainda que modestas, do nosso ponto de vista - precisamente naqueles produtos de nosso maior interesse exportador. Continuamos abertos a explorar soluções, desde que o Acordo proporcione efetiva ampliação do comércio bi-regional de produtos agropecuários.

Para que o equilíbrio se alcance, contudo, terá de haver compreensão equivalente do lado europeu para as sensibilidades do Mercosul, sobretudo em alguns subsetores específicos de bens industriais e de serviços, que ainda não estão capacitados a enfrentar a concorrência dos produtores europeus. Da mesma forma que não exigimos, como resultado das negociações, que as tarifas européias para todo o setor agropecuário sejam eliminadas por completo, esperamos que os nossos parceiros da União Européia não façam demandas impossíveis de serem atendidas.

A única forma de chegarmos ao entendimento que todos desejamos é sermos realistas e pragmáticos nos pedidos de parte à parte. Não podemos deixar que os setores mais sensíveis fiquem comprometidos, mas precisamos garantir que haja ganhos concretos para ambos os lados.


Mantenho meu otimismo com o avanço das negociações entre o Mercosul e a União Européia. Não me parece haver obstáculos intransponíveis pela frente. E sobram impulsos para a conclusão do Acordo. Percebo firme empenho político de ambos os lados do Atlântico. Confio em que a conclusão do Acordo Inter-regional será uma demonstração inequívoca do compromisso do Mercosul e da União Européia com o comércio como instrumento de plena superação da crise econômica.



MERCOSUR AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

A Brazilian perspective on the current negotiations for an Association Agreement between the two regions

Ricardo Neiva Tavares - Ambassador of Brazil to the European Union



The History of the relations between Mercosur and the European Union in many cases is deeply intertwined with the very History of the countries that are part of the two blocs. These relations are based on a broad identity of values and on a common cultural heritage, as well as on solid economic and commercial reciprocal interests. Europe constitutes one of the main international markets for Mercosur and one of its most important sources of investment and technology. Mercosur is an important trading partner of Europe (the overall trade flow between the two regions surpassed US\$ 100 billion in 2010), receives more European investments than China, India and Russia put together and is also a source of more investments to the European Union than those three countries combined.

In 1995, an additional effort to intensify the relationship between Mercosur and the European Union was initiated. The Framework Agreement on Inter-Regional Cooperation, aiming at the preparation for the beginning of negotiations towards an Inter-Regional Association Agreement between Mercosur and the European Union, was signed. The Framework Agreement already specified the three pillars of this relationship: political dialogue, cooperation and trade.

During the Mercosur-European Union Summit which took place in Rio de Janeiro in June 1999, the negotiations for an Association Agreement were formally launched. Until October 2004,

the negotiations were intense and, to a large extent, very positive. Significant progress was reached in the pillars of political dialogue and cooperation. In the trade pillar, there were pragmatic advances, which enabled us to virtually conclude several chapters.

We did not manage, however, to strike the deal at that moment. This setback was due mainly to differences of perception about the balance of reciprocal concessions in market access in the trade pillar. In parallel, two international processes not directly related to our inter-regional negotiations contributed to add additional factors to the Mercosur-European Union negotiations. Firstly, ten new countries formally acceded to the European Union in 2004. This fact made it more difficult for the European bloc to formulate a common position. Secondly - but not less important -, negotiating efforts within the Doha Round were re-launched at the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2004. Taking into account the priority that both sides attribute to the multilateral trading system, Mercosur and the European Union ended up concentrating in the multilateral sphere of their trade relationship.

We do not want, however, to look today at the difficulties from the past. On one hand, because it does not seem useful to speculate about the causes of that setback, for which there isn't only a single explanation. On the other hand - and most importantly -, because today's world is extraordinarily different and more complex than it was until 2004.

Nowadays, Mercosur countries' economies are growing fast and offer a vast range of opportunities in terms of trade and investment for a traditional and important partner like the European Union. And Europe, whose economy has suffered a great deal after the 2008-2009 crisis, is trying to boost its exports to Mercosur, due to the lower dynamism of the markets of developed countries. Apart from this obvious economic and trade interest, both sides also perceive

very clearly the political importance of forging a closer relationship between the two regions. The conclusion of the Inter-Regional Agreement meets the common objective of stimulating the formation of a multipolar international order, in a world in rapid evolution.

Re-launching Mercosur-European Union Negotiations

After the impasse in the Doha Round negotiations at the WTO, in 2008, Mercosur and the European Union started, in 2009, a consultation process in the form of several informal meetings, in an attempt to evaluate the possibilities of re-initiating negotiations for the conclusion of the Association Agreement. This process enabled the official re-launching of the negotiations between the two blocs, which was formalized at the Mercosur-European Union Summit in Madrid, in May 2010.

Since the re-launching of the inter-regional negotiating process, four technical meetings have taken place. The understandings have occurred in a very cordial manner and are being guided by a constructive and pragmatic spirit, which is highly positive.

It is noticeable today that there is more willingness to negotiate on both sides. Where before there were sometimes dogmatic positions, now a genuine effort to understand the interests and limits of the partner and to try to find acceptable solutions for both sides can be perceived. This new approach has provided some results in the texts of the many chapters that will compose the new Agreement - which involve market access for goods, services and investment, intellectual property, government procurement, dispute settlement, trade defense and competition, as well as some other aspects such as rules of origin, technical barriers, sanitary and phytosanitary measures and customs issues.

Until now, negotiations have been concentrated in the normative ele-



ments. In parallel, we are working towards an exchange of offers in market access. We cannot minimize, however, the challenges that lie ahead. There are sensitive sectors on both sides. Yet the persistence of the new approach that has guided the discussions enables us to face these obstacles with confidence.

The search for balance in reciprocal concessions is of paramount importance, because of the specific particularities of our negotiations, which I believe are different from all others already carried out by the European Union. Besides the fact that we are trying to build the world's largest free trade area - and the first between two customs unions -, it must be taken into account that today Mercosur is one of the world's most efficient suppliers of agricultural products - a sector which is precisely the most sensitive for Europe, due to its historical evolution, among other factors.

Even before 2004, Mercosur had already recognized Europe's sensitivity in the agricultural sector and never refused to discuss market access in terms of quotas - even though modest from our point of view - precisely in those products of major export interest for us. We are still open to examine solutions, as long as the Agreement provides an effective increase in the bi-regional trade of agricultural products.

For this balance to be reached, however, there must be an equivalent approach from the European side concerning Mercosur's sensitive sectors - especially some specific sub-sectors of industrial goods and services, which are still not capable of facing European competition. In the same way that we do not demand that European tariffs for the whole agricultural sector be completely eliminated as a result of our negotiations, we expect that our European partners do not make demands that are impossible to be met.

The sole manner for us to reach the agreement we all desire is to be rec-

listic and pragmatic vis-à-vis the demands from both sides. We cannot allow that the most sensitive sectors be compromised. Yet we must guarantee concrete gains for both sides.

I remain optimistic with the advance of the Mercosur-European Union negotiations. It does not seem that there are insurmountable obstacles ahead. And there are plenty of positive impulses for the conclusion of the Agreement. I can see firm political engagement from both sides of the Atlantic. I trust that the conclusion of the Inter-Regional Agreement will be an unequivocal demonstration of the commitment of Mercosur and the European Union to trade as an instrument to overcome the economic crisis.



Citizenship

- Citoyenneté - Bürgerschaft

Shagreen Europe

Dr. Dmitry Rogozin - Permanent representative of Russia to NATO

Let us be frank: today Europeans do not believe that military threats for their continent are real. People are accustomed to peace and do not see any alternative. Whatever NATO's aspiration to prove its *raison d'être* with stories told to its tax payers about "missile threats" or a noble sacrificial war in Afghanistan, Europeans are not objectively threatened by a genuine (not far-fetched) external adversary. Europe is now more concerned about the so-called "soft security", which implies maintaining a high quality of life, including fight against crime, the enhancement of social guarantees and the improvement of the consumption level.

After talking to both ordinary people and politicians I arrived at a conclusion that Europeans are increasingly concerned about the future of their children. They fear that the riches and possibilities gained over the centuries will not pass over to their children and grandchildren, but to someone else. And in my opinion the cause of these fears is the demographic change (in quality and quantity) linked to the unprecedented influx of immigration from the "third world" countries.

Europe can see that the assimilation of migrants, their adaptation and integration into Western society has stalled. I am tired of bending the fingers counting how many Western European politicians and Heads of State have recently spoken about the collapse of multicultural policies. That was hard to imagine even a couple of years ago.

After speeches by Merkel, Cameron and Sarkozy, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan made an appeal to the Turks in Germany: "Avoid assimilation!". This perfectly illustrates the failure of the very idea of the equality of cultures

and mutual benefits of their fusion. The insight seems to have ultimately settled in, even if late. Europe realised it was wrong to reject its religious tradition and historic memory. This sacrifice was not only pointless, but also harmful: Europeans were literally disarmed faced with those who are firm in their faith, strong in their national feelings and determined to settle down in the occupied territory.

Europe's concealed irritation grew increasingly apparent. After shifting left after the Second World War Europe's pendulum of current public opinion and political preferences has swung right before our very eyes.

It is worth reminding that the "left" movement in the post-war years triumphed largely thanks to the example of the Soviet Union as a state with social guarantees, equality of labourers, free education and medicine. In their turn European and American "left" – socialists, Trotskyites, advocates of minorities' rights, "culture revolution" activists and philosophers-neo-Marxists (for example, representatives of the "Frankfurt School") – achieved the state when the doctrine of political correctness and tolerance was firmly established in the countries of the Western block, which in a way was aimed to mirror Soviet internationalism.

The idea of tolerance played its positive role in keeping European nation states from racism, especially considering massive migration of labour from the South. But an unexpected thing happened – these labourers did not go back home. Moreover, they stayed in such countries as the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands and Scandinavian countries and grew into the soil. In just two generations Europe was facing the

consequences of migration policies its former governments were pursuing.

Besides, the example (and threat at the same time) of the USSR no longer compelled employers and ministers to live up to the expectations. Against the background of exacerbating social guarantees the situation with migrants came to the point of absurdity – now thanks to social benefits in Western European states an unemployed immigrant is not much poorer than the employed "indigenous" European.

In some countries the very social support system induces the incomers to keep away from employment: the benefits and allowances are significantly higher than the pay for unskilled labour. And if formerly immigration was justified by the need to have cheap work force to do the "dirty job", immigrants are now staying increasingly unemployed, with their benefits laying a heavy burden on the wallets of working citizens.

Economic problems are further weighed down by the following circumstances. First, crime. Many cities have seen entire districts become zones where even police are afraid to go. For instance, it is no secret for Brussels residents that law enforcement officers do nothing about small offences in the area around the Midi railway station fearing large-scale unrest in the district. You can also remember Paris suburbs being set on fire in autumn 2005. Not a single Western European city is any longer secure from such events.

Second, cultural differences – the liberal and secular West indifferent to its Christian roots and national customs has faced the traditional medieval type of religious conduct and the corresponding behavioural pattern. Diasporas do not



wish to accept European values and set themselves off in an open, determined and ardent way against indigenous Europeans and their lifestyle. The most visible expression of this phenomenon is the traditional clothing Muslim women wear, which is a culture shock for Europeans. It is not accidental that precisely the issue of headscarves and hijabs aroused such heated polemics in France and in a number of other countries.

As a result of all that, right and ultra-right parties – from nationalists and conservatives of every colour to democratic patriots and liberal nationalists to Christian traditionalists and even inveterate xenophobes – have gained victory after victory in elections and referendums of all levels as, for example, in Switzerland on the issue of building minarets. And today no tolerance aspirin pill can cool down the degree of interethnic and intercultural tension.

As for the elites and EU bureaucrats, they prefer to discuss the consequences rather than the original causes. They slam the French President for expelling Gypsies as if forgetting about the hot Arab heads who sparked off riots in Paris after which the French elected Sarkozy.

In this sense, the reaction to the book by Thilo Sarrazin on the situation in Germany was quite revealing – instead of discussing arguments and figures the author was branded as a “racist and xenophobe”.

The position taken by the Western European political class is similar to that of an ostrich that hides his head in the sand. Such a stand is “very tolerant”, but, I would say, short-sighted. It is especially true in the wake of the latest developments in the Middle East and North Africa: a series of revolutions will inevitably lead to social instability in African and Asian countries that will dramatically increase the influx of refugees to Europe. Is the Old World ready for new waves of immigration? I am sure, it is not.

In this context, that is what I am preoccupied about.

Firstly, never leave your adversary behind your back. The problems that are neglected have the habit of piling up and breaking through as an abscess. If you do not address problems today by civilized means, you will have to deal with them in an emergency situation tomorrow, and then “easy solutions” will come most handy.

Secondly, Europe's right forces have languished in the back seat way too long. I am worried that the political pendulum that has swung far right could lead to totally unpredictable and dramatic consequences for the entire post-war European party and political system. Today even the most insignificant local victories of nationalists drive hitherto moderate governments to the right. The agenda of Europe's right forces does not boil down to the problem of Islam and immigrants alone. Many put forward separatist demands as, for example, in Belgium, Great Britain and Spain to name a few. Having recognised the independence of the Serbian Province of Kosovo Western political elites without much hesitation gave the green light to champions of creating new states by way of dividing the old ones.

Thirdly, in both the EU and NATO there are countries that cherish discriminatory norms. For instance, in Latvia and Estonia with regard to the Russian population. It looks as though modern Europe, rapidly sliding right, could follow the contagious example of these xenophobic regimes. Yet a “right answer” to failed projects of integration and assimilation could turn out far more radical than we can imagine today.

No, I am far from trying to teach somebody something. Russia has also made plenty of mistakes in the North Caucasus, and not only there. But unlike Western Europe we have lived along with Muslims for centuries, and our current problems, despite their scale, are just temporary difficulties for a great

country. Our Muslims are our traditional citizens and compatriots. They are not immigrants, so the *modus vivendi* in new conditions will undoubtedly be found. Yet the “tolerance” and “political correctness” wrongly perceived by the West played a mean trick on indigenous Europeans and Diasporas. While Euro bureaucrats are shamefully shying away from working out migration policies, proponents of the new Reconquista are ready to take their seats.

Why am I so concerned? It is because Europe's experience has always been exemplary for Russia. And even if wrong decisions are taken by Europe there will always be politicians in my country who will urge us to step on the European rake, without thinking twice about the consequences.

Besides, being Russian Ambassador to NATO, I cannot help worrying about the future of our relations with this military bloc. Who should I discuss it with? With my current counterparts? Or with Ambassadors of North African and Middle Eastern countries?

At a particular point transition from the Bush Administration to the Obama Administration alone was enough for the “reset” in Russia-US relations to facilitate confidence-building and to step up cooperation between Russia and NATO.

But this positive example shows that the relations of such a global giant as NATO with its strategic partner, Russia, are dependent on the policy change in one particular country, even if in such an influential one as the US.

Therefore, I would like to appeal to Western elites for them to be more attentive to the problems that their countries' public opinion is concerned about. I hope that my article can help stir a respectful and serious discussion on these topics that are so preoccupying to Europeans and mean so much for the future of our common European home.



Nationalismes et morcellement étatique en Europe

Frank Tétart – Maître de conférences à Sciences Po Paris

Deux événements récents interpellent sur la permanence en Europe du nationalisme en tant que processus libératoire menant à l'avènement étatique et le phénomène qui en découle la fragmentation spatiale. D'un côté, l'incapacité de la Belgique à former un nouveau gouvernement en raison des dissensions existantes entre partis francophones et flamands, 290 jours après les élections législatives, montre les limites du fédéralisme belge comme réponse à l'affirmation identitaire flamande ; de l'autre, l'avis consultatif de la Cour internationale de Justice de La Haye en date du 22 juillet 2010 estimant que la déclaration d'indépendance du Kosovo ne violait pas le droit international laisse entendre que la naissance de ce petit État balkanique n'est au fond qu'une nouvelle étape dans le démembrement de la Fédération yougoslave née au lendemain de la Première Guerre mondiale.

Entamé au XIXe siècle, le réveil des nationalités en Europe ne semble pas avoir pris fin avec l'émergence d'États-nations au cours du XXe siècle. Bien au contraire, ce que montrent, en ce début de XXIe siècle, en plusieurs lieux du continent, les revendications nationales des Abkhazes, des Ossètes, des Tchétchènes, des Catalans, des Basques, des Flamands, des Corses ou des Écossais, c'est bel et bien la permanence de la nation. Le phénomène ne se limite d'ailleurs pas géographiquement à la seule Europe, puisqu'au Québec, au Tibet, en Palestine ou au sein du peuple kurde, existent des mouvements nationalistes. La nation reste donc un élément de base pour comprendre les rapports entre territoires et État, populations et État et les dynamiques du phénomène étatique et des relations interétatiques. L'intensification de la mondialisation, à laquelle nous assistons depuis la Chute du Mur de Berlin en 1989, n'a de fait en rien ralenti ou entamé le phénomène national, comme le relatif affaiblissement des frontières étatiques le laissait présager. A l'heure où l'Europe a aboli ses frontières intérieures au sein de son espace de coopération qu'est l'Union européenne (UE), la

potentialité de voir naître de nouveaux États européens serait-elle paradoxalement plus grande que jamais ? De fait, la relativité des frontières est avant tout d'ordre économique, mais n'entame, en aucun cas, leur fonction politique. Les frontières restent un référent primordial de la souveraineté étatique sur la scène internationale et l'exemple de l'UE démontre que l'abolition des frontières en son sein ne signe en rien leur disparition en tant qu'institution, mais uniquement leur report sur les limites de son enveloppe territoriale. En outre, en dépit de l'harmonisation des normes, des règlements, et de l'uniformisation croissante des modes de vie, du métissage culturel, sous l'effet de la mondialisation des échanges et de la communication, le référent national ne s'est pas estompé, ou seulement en apparence. C'est même au fond l'inverse qui se produit, le phénomène de la mondialisation, a tendance à favoriser le repli sur le national, le local, la communauté et donc sur soi, son identité propre, sa nation. D'ailleurs, même en cas de diaspora, le référent national reste prégnant pour bon nombre de populations, si bien qu'il contribue, dans un sens, à l'utilisation de ces populations à des fins avant tout économiques par leurs États d'origine, et dans l'autre, au développement du multiculturalisme comme modèle d'intégration que ce soit aux États-Unis ou au Royaume-Uni, avec pour conséquence, la dévalorisation ou la remise en cause des politiques d'assimilation dans les États accueillant des migrants, réfugiés ou immigrés économiques. Reste que le concept même de nation est complexe à appréhender et à définir, tant la nation est façonnée par chaque groupe humain. Elle ne répond au fond qu'à une universalité partielle, celle peut-être d'aspirer à sa réalisation en tant qu'entité stable reconnue de tous. Cette aspiration à la nation et sa concrétisation en tant que processus dynamique peuvent servir de définition au nationalisme, un phénomène qui se doit d'être envisagé au-delà des stéréotypes de violence extrême et de conflits.

Depuis les indépendances des territoires sous domination coloniale, l'affirmation nationale en Europe reste particulièrement marquée, aussi bien en Europe centrale et orientale qu'au sein même de certaines « vieilles démocraties » occidentales. Faut-il s'étonner du maintien du fait national et de l'émergence de nouvelles nations en Europe ? Sans doute faut-il d'abord y voir une continuité, dans la mesure où l'Europe est le lieu de naissance du nationalisme et de sa réalisation dans sa formulation la plus aboutie – l'État-nation. La recherche de la congruence absolue entre population d'une même nationalité et territoire démultiplie les potentialités nationales, même si, comme le souligne Ernest Gellner, les nations relèvent « de la contingence et non de la nécessité universelle ». Ensuite, s'affirmer comme nation dans le contexte de construction européenne et de supranationalité qu'elle sous-tend apparaît comme l'unique moyen viable de l'émancipation nationale ; les nationalistes semblant trouver plus rassurant de devenir autonome ou indépendant au sein d'une institution supranationale telle que l'UE, où le respect du droit et des normes est légion. L'émancipation nationale rime donc souvent en Europe avec intégration européenne. En tout cas, cette dernière est exprimée comme seconde aspiration après la réalisation de la nation, même si les potentialités européennes relèvent dans la majorité des cas plus de la représentation géopolitique que d'un ordre juridique favorisant réellement l'émancipation.

En moins d'un siècle, on a assisté à une importante fragmentation de l'espace mondial par la multiplication des États. En 1900, il n'y avait dans le monde que 46 États souverains, le reste des territoires étant sous domination coloniale. En 2011, on recense à l'échelle mondiale près de 200 États, dont 192 sont membres des Nations-Unies. L'Europe est sans doute la région du monde qui a connu les transformations les plus importantes en termes de frontières au cours du XXe siècle, puisque 48,6% exactement des kilométrages de frontières datent



d'après 1945 (Foucher, 2007). Le morcellement est donc à l'œuvre sur le continent européen. Parmi les derniers États à être parvenu à l'indépendance, on trouve le Monténégro, à l'issue d'un référendum d'autodétermination organisé en mai 2006, et le Kosovo en février 2008, même s'il n'est pas reconnu de tous. D'ailleurs, le processus de fragmentation semble loin d'être terminé si l'on prend en considération la naissance en juillet prochain d'un État soudanais et l'émergence de « pseudo-États », c'est-à-dire de territoires qui se sont unilatéralement déclarés indépendants, mais ne sont pas reconnus internationalement, tels la République turque de Chypre du Nord, la Républi-


que moldave de Transnistrie, le Haut-Karabakh (Azerbaïdjan), l'Abkhazie et l'Ossétie du Sud (Géorgie) ou au sein même de l'Union européenne, l'apparition de mouvements identitaires, voire séparatistes à l'échelle de ses États-nations membres, comme en Catalogne, en Flandre, en Écosse, en Italie du Nord, au Pays Basque espagnol ou en Corse. Ces mouvements font valoir des aspirations nationales qui dépassent le plus souvent la seule reconnaissance d'une personnalité culturelle, économique ou politique régionale au sein de leurs États d'origine. Ils se distinguent en cela du « régionalisme », car non seulement leur demande d'autonomie remet parfois en cause la légitimité des États dont ils

dépendent, mais le référent de leurs revendications est celui de l'État-nation issu de la Révolution française, et peuvent être dans ce sens qualifier de nationalismes « régionaux ». Ils interrogent par conséquent sur le potentiel émiettement de l'espace politique européen et sur le risque de dilution et de dissolution d'anciens États européens, au profit d'entités étatiques réduites en taille et d'une viabilité économique limitée, sources d'instabilité. La démission du premier Ministre belge en avril 2010 due à l'incapacité des institutions belges à répondre aux velléités d'autonomie accrue demandée par les Flamands, qui désirent poursuivre la fédéralisation de l'État belge (notamment par la régio-

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
Carto s'intéresse aussi aux zones franches, à la Hongrie à la tête de l'UE, aux trois ans d'indépendance du Kosovo, à la « révolution » tunisienne, à la crise ivoirienne ainsi qu'au Vietnam, à Oman, au Qatar...




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nalisation de la fiscalité ou la sécurité sociale) illustre l'acuité du phénomène du nationalisme « régional » et l'instabilité politique qui en résulte, le pays, en dépit d'élections législatives en juin 2010, n'ayant pu parvenir à former un nouveau gouvernement fin mars 2011. Cette situation politique commence à nuire à la santé économique du pays, en raison de l'importante dette publique du pays qui représente 101% de son PIB en 2011. Les agences de notation ont ainsi dégradé sa note financière fin 2010, considérant que la Belgique présentait des risques sur la réputation de la solvabilité de son gouvernement. Dans ce contexte se pose la question du « droit au divorce » pour les Flamands qui ne souhaitent plus vivre avec les Wallons, à l'instar des Tchèques et Slovaques qui se sont scindés pour former deux États en 1992. « À partir du moment où dans un couple les deux mariés ne parviennent plus à s'entendre et qu'il y en a un qui veut partir, je crois que la décision tombe d'elle-même (...) Si le dialogue n'est plus présent, je pense que la Belgique n'aura plus d'avenir » déclarait le bourgmestre de la commune de Linkebeek, en périphérie de Bruxelles, Damien Théry, en avril 2010. Selon Philippe Moreau Defarges, deux dynamiques de fond étaieraient cette représentation d'un droit au divorce : d'une part, le droit de chaque individu ou groupe à être lui-même et à vivre dans des institutions qui lui sont propres, d'autre part, une approche de plus en plus utilitariste des individus vis-à-vis des États (ainsi que des entreprises) qui contribue à désacraliser ces institutions, en les évaluant en termes de coûts et avantages (combien cela me coûte-t-il ? Et combien cela me rapporte-t-il ?). Les Flamands semblent avoir fait leurs calculs. Sauf pour Bruxelles, territorialement en Flandre mais majoritairement francophone et de surcroît au statut de capitale de la Belgique, de la Région Flandre, de la région bruxelloise, de la Communauté francophone et de l'Union européenne. Ce nœud gordien bruxellois reste peut-être le garant de la survie de l'État belge, sans toutefois empêcher de nouvelles évolutions des

institutions politiques du pays, avec le risque de transformer la structure fédérale belge en une coquille de plus en plus vide.

¹Après l'Irak qui avait mis 249 jours pour conclure un accord de partage du pouvoir, la Belgique après 290 jours sans gouvernement en date du 29 mars 2011, bat le record du monde de la plus longue crise politique.

²GELLNER, Ernest (1989), Nations et nationalisme, Payot, Paris

³Ce concept a été proposé pour la première fois par Béatrice Giblin, dans Géopolitique des régions françaises.

⁴Entretien avec Guilhem Delteil, RFI, le 23 avril 2010, consultable sur : <http://www.rfi.fr/content/20100423-crise-politique-belge-damien-thiery-bourgmestre-linkebeek-cameroun-mort-bibi-ngota>

⁵MOREAU-DEFARGES, Philippe (2009), « Belgique-Kosovo : la fêlure », Ramses 2009, éditions Dunod, Ifri, Paris, p. 257-262.



Über die Versöhnung von nationaler und europäischer Identität

Daniel Fritz – Student am Institut für Europastudien IEE, Brüssel

«Die Nationen sind nichts Ewiges. Sie haben einmal angefangen, sie werden enden. Die europäische Konföderation wird sie wahrscheinlich ablösen.»

Ernest Renan, 1882, Paris

Klingt sie nicht wunderbar, die Idee, unsere antiquiert wirkende und oft nicht unbelastete nationale Identität gegen eine frische, Europäische einzutauschen? Eine Idee, die in Deutschland und unter pro-Europäern durchaus ernstzunehmend diskutiert wird und Anklang findet. Eine Idee jedoch auch, der man in Ländern wie Frankreich, der Grande Nation oder in den neuen Mitgliedsstaaten der EU mit Skepsis und Ablehnung begegnet. Nicht selten beschwört sie auch Ängste. Was jedoch ist diese Idee, die so unterschiedliche Reaktionen hervorrufft? Ist ein Austausch von Identitäten überhaupt möglich? Und wenn ja, wäre er wünschenswert? Um diese Fragen zu beantworten, müssen wir uns den Begriffe Identität und Nation emotionsärmer nähern als wir es gewohnt sind. Zusätzlich müssen wir die Natur einer möglichen Europäischen Identität ausmachen. Dabei geht es um mehr als ein reines Gedankenspiel. Ein politischer Verband hat es schwer ohne eine Identität. Es geht nicht darum der EU eine schöne philosophische Note zu geben, es geht darum sie auf ihre Zukunftsfähigkeit abzukopfen!

Was ist Identität? Diese Frage steht wohl am Anfang jeder Auseinandersetzung damit. Umgehen wir jedoch die seit den alten Griechen geführte Diskussion um das «Ich» und versuchen wir uns Identität anhand eines cineamatischen Ansatzes zu verdeutlichen: in John Woos Film *Face/Off* aus dem Jahre 1997 nehmen Nicolas Cage und John Travolta die Identität des jeweils anderen durch Austausch ihrer Gesichter an. Oberflächlich werden sie so miteinander verwechselt. Das Verwirrspiel scheitert letztlich jedoch daran, dass Bekannte durch untypische Charaktereigenschaften misstrauisch werden. Einen Schritt weiter geht 1998 Alex Proyas in seinem Film *Dark City*. Dort lässt er in einer fiktiven Stadt die Erinnerungen

der Bewohner austauschen und neu zusammensetzen. Zusätzlich wird die Umgebung der Stadtbewohner an ihre neuen Erinnerungen angepasst. Das Experiment ist stabil und scheitert letztlich nur daran, dass ein «Identitätstausch» in einem Fall nicht vollendet werden kann. Dieser misslungene Transfer produziert einen gedächtnislosen Rebellen, welcher keinen Stein auf dem anderen lässt um sein wahres Ich ausfindig zu machen.

Was sagen uns nun diese filmischen Beispiele über Identität? Zuerst einmal erfahren wir, dass die menschliche Identität, die «kennzeichnende und das Individuum von anderen Menschen unterscheidende Eigentümlichkeit eines Wesens», nicht per se existiert, sondern von vielen Faktoren abhängig ist. So definiert «Meyers Großes Konversationslexikon» Identität (Persönlichkeit) als das Resultat «bewusster Wechselwirkung des Individuums mit seiner Umgebung und die teils bewusste, teils unbewusste Ansammlung der gemachten Erfahrungen in Form von Erinnerungen, Gewohnheiten et cetera». Identität ist also alles andere als von Natur aus gegeben. Sie ist erlernt, sie kann sich verändern und beeinflusst werden. Als zweites lernen wir, dass Identität oder vielmehr die Beantwortung der Frage «Wer bin ich», existenziell ist. Bereits Plato bezeichnete sie als unverzichtbaren Grundbestandteil des menschlichen Seins. Hegel klärte uns dann später darüber auf, dass das Bedürfnis nach der Suche des Ichs nur durch die Auseinandersetzung mit anderen befriedigt werden kann. Dem Menschen wohne ein Drang nach Anerkennung inne. Er entwickelt dazu ein Bild von sich selbst, um es nach außen zu präsentieren und notfalls für eine höhere Anerkennung anzupassen.

Diese Einleitung zeigt, dass Identität mit keiner konkreten Idee von vornherein verknüpft ist. Wir können uns vielmehr mit einer Vielzahl an Menschen, Gruppen, Dingen oder Ideen identifizieren. Ganz selbstverständlich sehen wir uns als Familienmitglied, Student, Fan oder

Sportler. Diese unterschiedlichsten Identitäten tragen wir zumeist gleichzeitig mit uns, ohne darüber aktiv einen Gedanken verlieren zu müssen. Neben dieser Vielzahl an Identitäten, die wir mit uns führen, gibt es nun eine, die die anderen zu überragen scheint, manchmal gar mit dem Begriff Identität selbst synonym verwendet wird. Die nationale Identität. Eine besonders machtvolle und folgenreichste Konzeption, die Menschen suggeriert, sich nach ihrer Sprache, Kultur, Geschichte und Herkunft zufolge in Nationen oder Völker aufzuteilen zu können. Ursprünglich dem Latein entnommen, diente der Begriff Nation («geboren») bis ins späte Mittelalter allein der räumlichen Zuordnung von Individuen - jedoch in großzügigeren Bezugsräumen, in welchem ein Finne auch schon mal der sächsischen Nation zugeordnet wurde...

Wie abstrus die Idee von einer wohl definierten Nation ist, hatte der französische Philosoph Ernest Renan in seiner, vor knapp 130 Jahren gehaltenen Lesung «Was ist eine Nation?», an der Pariser Sorbonne dargelegt. Er widerlegte die Aussagen, dass eine Sprache eine Nation formt oder eine gemeinsame Abstammung. Er zeigte, dass Grenzen so willkürlich verschoben wurden, dass Nation und Territorium nicht in Zusammenhang stehen können und er veranschaulichte die Gefährlichkeit Nation aufgrund von Religion zu begründen. Ernest Renan befreite den Nationenbegriff von seinen Dogmen. Und er zeigte uns die Bedeutung des Vergessens bei der Bildung einer «Nation». Die Menschen vergaßen schlicht, dass sie erobert und gewaltsam unter ein Herrscherhaus gestellt wurden. Die Menschen vergaßen, dass ihre Vorfahren eine andere Sprache gesprochen haben oder von weit entfernt zugereist sind. Das Einzige, was eine Nation ausmache, sei der Wille eine Nation oder neutraler: eine politische Gemeinschaft zu sein! Dieser Wille wiederum kann sich auf vieles begründen. Im römischen Reich waren es wirtschaftliche Interessen und die Pax Romana, welche die eroberten Provinzen dazu brachte, sich



selbst als Teil des römischen Imperiums zu betrachten. Neue, fremde Regeln aus Rom wurden implementiert um im Gegenzug neue Möglichkeiten einer leistungsorientierten Gesellschaft wahrnehmen zu können.

Im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert wurde die Idee der Nation dafür missbraucht, die Kriegswilligkeit der Bevölkerung zu stärken. Man propagierte die Überlegenheit der eigenen Nation gegenüber anderen und leitete daraus einen Anspruch auf Eroberungen ab. Diese Megalothymie, der Drang - wiederum Hegel - nach Anerkennung als Überlegen, ist jedoch weniger Ausdruck der menschlichen Natur nach Anerkennung, wie oben beschrieben, denn vielmehr ein irrationales Hingeben dem Verlangen danach. Ohne Ausblick auf Erfüllung natürlich. Denn der Nationalismus (Überbewertung der eigenen Nation) zu Ende gedacht - die Eroberung der Welt, lässt keinen Gegenüber mehr, der anerkennen könnte. Vielfach wurde daher verlangt, dass Gruppen, die sich als Nation verstehen, nach der Isothymie streben sollten, der Anerkennung als gleichrangige Nation unter gleichen. Dies bedeutet im Kern, dass jede Nation dazu bewogen wäre, sich intern zu vervollkommen um von den anderen als respektabel wahrgenommen zu werden. In der globalisierten Welt des 21. Jahrhunderts bedeutet dies weiterhin wirtschaftlichen und technischen Fortschritt. Aber auch Fortschritt, der ökologisch nachhaltig ist und essenziellen Menschen- und Sozialrechten gerecht wird.

Wir haben den Begriff Nation nun entzaubert oder eher: entmantelt. Eine Gruppe kann sich als Nation verstehen, seine Bedeutung jedoch nicht auf eine überlegene Historie oder gar naturgegebene Vorteile stützen. Renans Überlegung jedoch, dass eine Nation aus purem Willen eine Nation wurde und bleibt, scheint jedoch nicht hinreichend. Er ist mit Emotionen verbunden, mit einer Art Verbundenheitsgefühl, die Menschen gegenüber ihnen räumlich näheren Menschen viel stärker empfin-

den. Europaweite Regionalisierungstendenzen und Regionen, die sich auch in zentralisierten Staaten mehr Selbstverwaltung wünschen - neuerdings neben Großbritannien, Spanien und Italien auch in Polen - zeigen dabei, dass dieses räumliche Verbundsgefühl durch große Staaten überstrapaziert wird. «Heimatgefühl» ist regional, nicht national. Eine Europäische Identität kann also auch keinen räumlichen Bezug haben - man kann sich nicht «räumlich» als Europäer fühlen.

In einer Untersuchung über die Natur einer Europäischen Identität und ihre mögliche Kompatibilität mit einer nationalen Identität, haben Górnjak et al. herausgefunden, dass sich die Europäer am ehesten funktional mit der EU identifizieren. Das bedeutet, dass sie ihre Identifikation mit der EU, gleich den Provinzen im römischen Reich, einer Kosten-Nutzen Kalkulation unterziehen. Bei einem positiven Ergebnis akzeptieren sie die gemeinschaftlichen Regeln und identifizieren sich so mit der EU. Dies verleiht dem europäischen System Legitimität und Stabilität. Die empirische Untersuchung von Górnjak et al. zeigt, dass sich der Großteil der befragten EU Mitgliedsländern folgerichtig am ehesten in Fragen der Bewegungs- und Niederlassungsfreiheit sowie dem gemeinsamen Markt oder ökonomischen Elementen mit der EU identifizieren.

Fassen wir also zusammen: Eine Europäische Identität deckt einen anderen Bedeutungsraum ab als eine nationale Identität. Sie sind also kompatibel und verdrängen sich nicht gegenseitig. Von der Identifikation mit Europa zu sprechen muss demnach keine Angstgefühle bereiten, wenn man die Normalität multipler Identitäten in einem Menschen betrachtet. Eine Europäische Identität gründet sich auch nicht auf biologische Faktoren oder einer größeren Ähnlichkeit der Kulturen als mit anderen Kulturen. In diesem Falle würden wir wohl auch erwarten, dass sich z.B. Amerikaner als Europäer fühlen können. Eine Europäische Identität kommt eher der Definition Ernest

Renans nahe, wonach es allein der Wille der Europäer ist, sich als Gruppe zu fühlen, die gemeinsam bestimmte Aufgaben löst. Dieser Wille folgt einer Abwägung der Vor- und Nachteile dieser neuen Gruppenzugehörigkeit. Eine gewisse höhere Homogenität zwischen EU Mitgliedern muss dabei von den Europäern angenommen werden (nicht wirklich vorhanden sein!), damit die Kalkulation positiv ausfällt. Eine bessere Kommunikation der Fortschritte bei EU - Beitrittskandidaten kann dabei einen wichtigen Beitrag leisten. Zuletzt, um der Definition von reziproker Identitätsbildung (Anerkennung) zu entsprechen, müssen die nicht-EU Staaten eine Europäische Identität als solche anerkennen. Dies verlangt von den Europäern ein kohärentes und geschlossenes Auftreten. Eine Europäische Identität ist demnach der Wille eine Europäische Identität zu haben und die Kraft, sie aufrecht zu erhalten.

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Teaching the Polish experience to European and American Students

Slawomir Jozefowicz – Ph.D. Lecturer at the University of Warsaw



For many years quite many Poles have been frustrated by what they perceive as a striking anomaly. Most of them are convinced that the Polish history is rich, complex and fascinating (even if often tragic) and that their national experience is unique, valuable and inspiring. However, they are also acutely aware that the richness and originality are neither adequately known, nor appreciated outside Poland, that as a nation they have been long, if fact, underrepresented and marginalized, especially in the West.

Until the end of the communist regime it was easy to blame the circumstances of the Cold War. After WW II, Poland and other East Central European nations - to use Milan Kundera's famous metaphor - were "kidnapped" and deprived of their natural cultural association. The historic events of 1989 opened entirely new possibilities for Poland and other post-communist countries for promoting knowledge about the less-known, "forgotten" or "neglected" part of Europe.

Polish studies, occupying only a tiny niche in the academic world, has taken advantage of this opportunity. More and more courses and lectures on the Polish experience are becoming available to foreign students at Polish universities, some research and educational activities are being developed outside of Poland as well, mostly in European and North American institutions.

The following remarks stem from teaching the Polish experience (historical, social and political) to mostly European students visiting the University of Warsaw and American students at the State University of New York (SUNY) at Buffalo, over the last few years.

Evidently, teaching about Poland, carried out "on-the-spot", requires different approach than when it takes place on the other side of the Atlantic. Erasmus students come to Warsaw usually for one semester, sometimes two. Classes are always very international. Traditionally, majority of participants are German, some come from Italy, Spain, Sweden, Finland, France, the Benelux countries, Austria, Portugal, Ireland, Great Britain. Fewer students represent post-communist or non-EU countries.

Working with such multinational groups stimulates inspiring confrontations of different national and cultural perspectives and thus often brings about great educational results. There are some setbacks as well. Students represent not only various countries, but also slightly different academic backgrounds, their level of competence in English varies considerably, so communication and exchange of ideas is not always smooth. At SUNY Buffalo comparable student groups were more consistent, with fewer international students and no major communication issues.

When the teaching takes place in Poland, in one respect the task seems simpler. Erasmus Program students coming to Polish universities can learn about the Polish experience firsthand: living in Poland, interacting with Poles adds to their studies, strengthens not only their understanding of current political and social issues, but also helps them to comprehend social and historical consciousness of the Polish people.

Such exposure and "empirical" dimension is invaluable. A lecture on tragic dilemmas of Polish modern history is likely to be followed by a visit to the Warsaw Uprising Museum. It goes without saying

that it is easier to understand the processes of transition to liberal democracy and market economy when one actually lives in a Polish city - typically still full of remnants of the old system, yet visibly affected by capitalist modernization. Introduction to the problems of Polish constitutionalism and parliamentarism can be supplemented by a visit to the Sejm (parliament), etc, etc.

The overseas perspective brings in a different set of challenges. For majority of American students, Poland is a distant country, not only in geographic terms. Some see it as completely obscure, others as quite "exotic", though in the positive sense: mysterious, interesting, appealing.

Generally, students interested in Poland can be divided into three groups, the first two partially overlapping. First, some young Europeans and Americans with Polish background would like to know more about their heritage - the number of such students is growing, at least in the UE countries. The second group consists of those, with or without Polish origins, whose interest in Polish or East Central European issues is already well established, thanks to mostly academic reasons. That is the core group of the best and most competent students. Then there are those who are stimulated mostly by chance. For some European (Erasmus) students tourism and entertainment seem to play the decisive role. Some of the US students may be, in turn, intrigued by the "exotic factor": their topic of choice could be, let us say, Mongolia or Uruguay, as well as Poland. The attraction is in the difference, not necessarily (or not primarily) in the object of studies itself. The starting point does not have to trouble us though - the eventual outcome (i.e.



the actual knowledge) is more important than the pretext. As to the former though, it is a little unfortunate that the knowledge the American students acquire is much less likely to be directly used or personally confronted with realities of the East Central Europe.

The reason is simple: very few among my Buffalo students had a chance to visit Europe, not to mention Poland. Surprisingly many young Americans do not travel at all. Paradoxically, now the Internet seems to satisfy the curiosity which in earlier times would mobilize people to actually visit distant attractions and foreign lands. In comparison, their European counterparts who come to Warsaw seem to be true globetrotters and cosmopolites. For many of them the stay in Poland is a natural opportunity to visit a few neighboring countries as well, the relatively compact size of the Old Continent still makes it easier.

One of advantages of the American students is that quite often they seem more open and receptive to new knowledge than many European students. Partially it results from European students knowing already more about Poland and generally not expecting particular educational revelations. If they are curious of the Polish experience, their curiosity is less spontaneous and less enthusiastic. For some American undergraduates a lecture on Poland would be the very first academic opportunity to discover and appreciate the European history!

Yes, the US students are more likely to write at the final test that „at the end of the 18th century Poland was partitioned by Germany, Prussia and the Soviet Union”, or that “Copernicus was a Czech priest and precursor of the Protestant Reformation”. Their European peers for the most part do not make this kind of mistakes. However, it is easier to become liberal about it, if one takes into account the distance between USA and Poland, and deficiencies of average American schools.

Regardless the nationality of students and the place teaching is conducted, the most fundamental question is common: how to translate the Polish experience. And it is not about literal translation, even though linguistic aspects play a certain role here. (Unlike in France, Germany, UK or Spain, students visiting Polish universities are not supposed to know the language of the host country, English is usually the language of instruction.) It is a more profound task - how to convey in a possibly comprehensible way the specificity of the key historic experiences of Poles and the unique forms of Polish society and culture, as for example: Sarmatism – the libertarian and anarchistic ideology of Polish nobility, the insurgent and martyrologic ethos, special role of culture (especially literature) in the period of partitions, peculiarities of Eastern European social stratification, the importance of intelligentsia as a social class, characteristic features and the role of Polish religiousness, the legacy of the communist era.


To find the appropriate methods and accessible means for expressing the Polish experience, to adopt a reasonable approach, free from propaganda and exaggerated heroism, but also from excessive self-criticism and negative auto-stereotyping - that is a continuous challenge for a teacher of Polish history and national heritage.

The translation of the Polish experience involves the use of historical explications, sometimes quite complex, often simply necessary. Practically, no specialized lecture or course for foreign students regarding contemporary social, cultural or political issues makes much sense without a proper historical introduction and contextualization. Clearly, Poland belongs to those countries whose present cannot be fully grasp without at least basic knowledge of their past.

Whatever the teaching circumstances, the ultimate goal of the Polish studies goes beyond the contours of a regional niche. Indeed, it seeks to expand

and promulgate knowledge about less known areas, peoples and their narratives. Teaching the Polish experience helps also to create a more complete picture of Europe and the European experience. It clearly shows how much histories and fates of the Eastern and Central European nations are interconnected.

Some of the reflections presented here were expressed in the article “Polska dla początkujących” (Poland for Beginners) published in “Uniwersytet Warszawski. Pismo uczelni”, nr 1 (40), February 2009, pp. 14-15.



Europa ohne Europäer

Uli Brückner – Jean Monnet Chair for European Studies

Europa ohne Europäer – Europäische Identität als dynamischer Prozeß und notwendige Voraussetzung für den Erfolg der europäischen Einigung



Europa konnte zusammenwachsen, ohne dass eine weit verbreitete und verwurzelte europäische Identität entstand. Das ist kein ehernes Gesetz, sondern kann sich ändern, denn Identität ist nicht statisch und wesentliche Rahmenbedingungen für ihre Entwicklung ändern sich. Für die bisherige selbstzentrierte Integration Europas reichte die Zustimmung aus. Künftig wird aber die EU zunehmend an ihrer Rolle in der Welt gemessen. Ob dafür ein Europa ohne Europäer ausreicht wird eine Überlebensfrage für das europäische Einigungswerk.

Europa hat viel erreicht. Seit dem Fall der Berliner Mauer wurde der Euro eingeführt und der Europäische Binnenmarkt weit vorangebracht. Es gab vier Vertragsreformen, die die Handlungsfähigkeit und Legitimität der Gemeinschaft erhöhten. Mit der Erweiterung nach Osten konnte die Teilung des Kontinents überwunden werden und im Westen wurden die Staaten der EFTA entweder integriert oder eng mit der EU verbunden.

Auch erwies sich nach der deutschen Einheit die Sorge vor einem übermächtigen Deutschland als unbegründet. Die größte Ökonomie in der EU ist nach wie

vor dem europäischen Gedanken verpflichtet und trägt politisch und finanziell Verantwortung für Europa.

Auch der wirtschaftliche und soziale Zusammenhalt kommt voran. Peripherieländer wachsen schneller als das wirtschaftliche und geographische Zentrum der EU. Für den erhofften Aufholprozess der Transformationsökonomien infolge des EU-Beitritts, den Zugang zu EU-Transfers und Wettbewerbschancen im Binnenmarkt gibt es Indizien. Solche Erfolge könnten die Vermutung nahe legen, dass mit dem Fortschreiten europäischer Integration auch eine wachsende Zustimmung zur EU und eine Identifikation mit dem europäischen Einigungsprojekt verbunden sind. Dies ist aber keineswegs der Fall.

Umfragen wie dem Eurobarometer zeigen zwar noch eine allgemeine Zustimmung zur Idee eines vereinten Europas. Die Bewertungen, ob die Mitgliedschaft für das jeweilige Land in der EU oder in der Eurozone positiv gesehen wird, fallen aber erstens sehr unterschiedlich und zweitens generell nicht mehr so günstig aus. Als allgemeiner Trend zeigt sich eine abnehmende Zustimmung für die EU.

Bei der Frage, ob sich Menschen als Europäer sehen, bleibt die europäische Identität deutlich hinter der nationalen, regionalen oder kommunalen zurück. Tatsächlich scheint es in Europa weniger Europäer zu geben, die sich als solche sehen. Europa wächst zusammen, ohne dass eine europäische Identität ausgeprägt oder weit verbreitet wäre. Betrachtet man in die Ränder des Integrationsprojektes, so geht es nicht mehr um die Vollendung einer europäischen Einigung, über die geographisch und kulturell Einigkeit bestehen. Die Türkei ist ein Kandidat für die Mitgliedschaft in der EU und gehört damit politisch zu Europa. Im Vergleich mit den meisten EU-Gesellschaften ist Europäer zu sein dort noch weniger eine Kategorie, die etwas für die persönliche Identität bedeutet. Wie bei Russen ist es für Türken keine Frage ob eine Identität jenseits der nationalen existiert, weil die Identität ihres Landes als eine „ei-

gener Art“ angesehen wird. Man ist nicht Belgier, Deutscher oder Slowene in Europa. Sondern Russland oder Anatolien als Kulturgemeinschaften stehen für sich und quasi neben Europa. Eine solche Unterscheidung hilft allerdings insofern wenig für die Antwort auf die Frage wo Europa endet, weil sich diese Selbstwahrnehmungen auch wenig vom langjährigen EU-Mitglied Großbritannien unterscheiden, dessen Bürger sich ebenfalls überwiegend nicht als Europäer ansehen, denn Europa ist der Kontinent.

Europäische Identität wächst also nicht parallel und linear mit der Vertiefung und Erweiterung der EU, wie sich das die Gründungsväter des europäischen Einigungswerks ausgemalt und erhofft hatten. Das verlangt nach Erklärungen. Und es stellt die Frage nach den Folgen für ein Europa ohne Europäer.

Alle genannten Meilensteine europäischer Integration sind ein Elitenprojekt, das nicht vom Wunsch der verschiedenen nationalen Gesellschaften seiner Mitglieder nach weiterer Vertiefung und Erweiterung des europäischen Einigungswerks angeschoben und getragen wird. Die Menschen werden mehr oder weniger über Integrationschritte informiert und überzeugt. Sie arrangieren sich mit Veränderungen wie dem Euro, der Osterweiterung oder sich verändernden Regeln des europäischen Binnenmarktes. Auch sprechen sie sich für oder gegen einzelne Maßnahmen und Entwicklungen aus. Aber in kaum einem Land werden sie direkt über Volksentscheide oder Anhörungen in Entscheidungen einbezogen. Und selbst wenn das geschieht, sind das wie auch bei Europawahlen oft Abstimmungen über nationale Fragen oder Personen und weniger originär europäische Entscheidungen.

Weil die EU als abstrakt und weit weg von der eigenen Lebenswelt wahrgenommen wird, werden ihre Erfolge entweder nicht mit ihr in Verbindung gebracht oder als selbstverständlich



angesehen. Sie erscheint nicht nur kompliziert und intransparent, sie ist es auch. Allerdings ist die Komplexität des ausdifferenzierten Mehrebenen-systems kein Unfall oder bürokratischer Selbstzweck, sondern darin drückt sich der Wunsch nach Kontrolle durch die souveränen Mitgliedstaaten aus und es bietet vielfältige Teilhabemöglichkeiten.

In den Reformdiskussionen um den Verfassungsvertrag wurde deutlich, dass sehr unterschiedliche Vorstellungen in den Staaten existieren über das Ziel, die Geschwindigkeit und den Weg des Integrationsprozesses. Das ist ein Zeichen von Vielfalt und zeigt den Respekt und die Gleichberechtigung konkurrierender Vorstellungen. Es erleichtert allerdings nicht die Identifikation mit der EU. Und die Berichterstattung der vorhandenen Interessengruppen vermittelt ein Bild einer orientierungs- und ziellosen Union von nationalen Egoisten. So schlecht sich dies für die EU in der öffentlichen Meinung auswirkt, so günstig ist es für populistische Strategien in den Nationalstaaten. Die EU dient als Sündenbock, der von eigenen Fehlern ablenkt und sich auch nicht angemessen wehren kann, weil er nicht über den gleichen Zugang zu Informationskanälen und zur öffentlichen Meinung verfügt.

Trotz dieser strukturellen Gründe für das Fehlen einer weitverbreiteten und tief verwurzelten europäischen Identität ist Identität aber genauso wenig wie Kultur gegeben oder unveränderlich, sondern ein Prozess der Veränderung. Die Frage ist deshalb, ob die beschriebene Situation so bleiben muss und wenn nicht, wovon Veränderungen abhängen.

Empirische Untersuchungen zeigen, dass Migranten, die aktiv vom europäischen Arbeitsmarkt Gebrauch machen, sich besser über die EU und ihre Politiken informieren. Das Gefühl unmittelbar betroffen zu sein und die Beschäftigung mit EU-Regelungen führt dazu, dass sich diese Personengruppe stärker mit euro-

päischer Integration verbunden fühlt und ihre europäische Identität ausgeprägter ist als das für den Durchschnitt der EU-Bürger der Fall ist. Wissen und das Nutzen der Möglichkeiten, die ein Europa ohne Binnengrenzen bietet, erscheinen also als Voraussetzung dafür, sich als Europäer zu fühlen.

2011 endet die Übergangsfrist für die Liberalisierung der nationalen Arbeitsmärkte in den alten EU-Mitgliedstaaten vor der Osterweiterung. Auch wenn keine Migrationswellen erwartet werden so trägt die neue Freizügigkeit dazu bei, dass sich ein europäischer Arbeitsmarkt weiter entwickelt – mit möglichen Folgen für das Entstehen einer europäischen Identität.

Mobilität findet aber nicht nur auf Arbeitsmärkten statt. Durch die Öffnung der nationalen Luftfahrtmonopole und die Zulassung von mehr Konkurrenz im europäischen Flugverkehr hat sich die Reisetätigkeit deutlich erhöht. Europäer machen regen Gebrauch von den Billigflugangeboten und sie lernen nicht nur andere Länder durch Besuche kennen. Sie erwerben dort auch Immobilien. So besaßen beispielsweise vor der Finanzkrise offiziell über 200.000 Iren Wohneigentum in Spanien.

Die Bereitschaft, nicht nur als Tourist ein Land zu besuchen, sondern über Investitionen ein – zumindest zeitweise – Teil dieses Landes zu werden reicht allein nicht aus. Sie verlangt die finanziellen Möglichkeiten, die Einstellung, die Landesgrenzen überschreiten zu wollen, aber auch den Zugang zu Information. Die Entwicklung moderner Informationstechnologie bietet genau diese Voraussetzung. Sie lässt Zeit und Raum schrumpfen und erweitert Horizonte, die jenseits nationaler Grenzen liegen. Alles lässt sich online in Echtzeit abrufen als wäre man selbst dort. Das Fremde rückt näher und wird zur realen Chance oder Bedrohung. Die Bilder des Informationszeitalters transportieren Wirklichkeiten und Wahrnehmungen, die das kollektive Gedächtnis prägen. Katastrophen sind nicht mehr nur die Katastrophen der Betroffenen in der Ferne. Die Masse und Präsenz der Bilder und der Berichterstattung fördert das Gefühl den

gleichen globalen Herausforderungen ausgesetzt zu sein, seien es Terrorismus, Piraterie, illegale Einwanderung, gewaltsame Konflikte, Kernschmelzen, Erdbeben, Vulkanausbrüche oder Flächenbrände.

Daraus entstehen zuerst grenzüberschreitende Medieninszenierungen, aber auch Diskurse, Empathie und Betroffenheit. Sie treten nicht automatisch an die Stelle der nationalen Öffentlichkeit oder schaffen gar eine ähnlich entwickelte europäische, wie wir sie von westlichen Gesellschaften kennen. Aber Öffentlichkeiten öffnen sich. Und mehr und mehr Themen werden zeitgleich und auf ähnliche Weise kommuniziert.

Das gilt zwar für alle Teile der Welt, die im Informationszeitalter angekommen sind, aber die EU als Rechts-, Wirtschafts- und demokratischer Raum ist auch in diesem Fall mehr als eine internationale Organisation und weniger als der Nationalstaat. In der Finanzkrise ist der Euro für alle Bürger der Staaten im Euro-Raum eine unmittelbare Realität und für die übrigen EU-Länder zumindest eine mittelbare. Das Gleiche gilt für das Verbot genmanipulierter Lebensmittel, die Garantie von Bürgerrechten oder den Umgang mit grenzüberschreitenden Umweltverschmutzungen. Diese realen Gemeinsamkeiten unterstreichen den Eindruck, dass man in einem Boot sitzt. Aus all dem lässt sich noch keine Vorhersage entwickeln. Aber es lässt sich spekulieren: Die Antwort auf die Frage, ob diese Entwicklungen zu einer gestärkten europäischen Identität führen oder nicht, hängt am Ende wahrscheinlich weniger davon ab, was die EU ist oder was sie tut, sondern als was sie wahrgenommen wird. Werden ihre Politiken und Antworten auf die Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts als angemessen empfunden, haben die Menschen guten Grund, sich mit Europa zu identifizieren. Daran hat sich seit der Gründung der EG wenig geändert.



Neu ist nun, dass es nicht mehr genügt, dass es unter den nationalen Eliten genügend Europäer gibt, die am geeinten Europa bauen. Unter den Bedingungen des Kalten Krieges und der anschließenden Transformation in Mittel- und Osteuropa war es noch möglich, sich auf sich selber zu konzentrieren und am europäischen Haus

zu bauen. Künftig wird der Maßstab für den Erfolg der Europäischen Integration nicht ein neues Vertragswerk oder die nächste Integrationsstufe sein, sondern welche Teilnahmekancen die EU im Inneren bietet und welche Rolle sie in einer zunehmend globalisierten Welt spielt.



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Politiser l'Europe pour regagner la confiance des citoyens

Philip Corderoy - Secrétaire Général du Parti Socialiste Européen

Das verlangt nicht nur mehr Europa, sondern auch eine andere Haltung der Bürger. Die EU kann dieses Vertrauen verspielen, wenn sie nicht hält, was sie verspricht. Aber auch die Bürger haben eine Verantwortung dafür, dass die europäische Einigung nicht nur eine Episode in der Geschichte sein wird und an der Selbstverständlichkeit ihrer bisherigen Erfolge scheitert.

Les élections européennes de 2009 ont vu le plus fort taux d'abstention jamais enregistré depuis l'instauration de l'élection des députés européens au suffrage universel. Seuls 43% des électeurs se sont présentés aux urnes.

Certes, nous constatons une distance de plus en plus forte vis-à-vis des urnes pour tout type de scrutin, néanmoins, l'élection au Parlement Européen souffre d'un problème spécifique : celui du désintérêt pour et de l'incompréhension des enjeux politiques européens.

La défiance par rapport à l'Europe et l'incompréhension par rapport à ses pouvoirs et à ses compétences sont nourries par le traitement (ou plutôt le non-traitement) de la politique européenne dans les médias nationaux.

L'UE est absente des pages de nos journaux. Si elle apparaît, c'est sur un sujet institutionnel et en page international. Nous n'allons pas ici résoudre le paradoxe de l'œuf et de la poule, à savoir si les rédactions ne veulent pas traiter de sujets européens parce que les citoyens ne sont pas intéressés, ou si les citoyens ne sont pas intéressés précisément parce qu'ils ne sont jamais informés sur l'Europe.

Je ne veux pas blâmer les citoyens. Je suis convaincu au contraire que les acteurs politiques ont le moyen de les faire s'intéresser à l'Europe.

Le désintérêt vient en partie de l'opacité institutionnelle, mais aussi et surtout de l'absence d'une lecture claire de l'offre partisane européenne du fait de sa non médiatisation.

Le désamour vient du fait que l'UE aujourd'hui est synonyme d'austérité, de rigueur, d'exclusion, parce qu'elle est aux mains des conservateurs et des libéraux.

Il revient donc aux socialistes européens de continuer à œuvrer pour politiser l'Europe, pour montrer aux citoyens que la scène européenne est le terrain d'affrontements de projets politiques différents.

L'Europe de gauche n'est pas l'Europe de droite. Or, l'Europe en tant que telle a souffert du mythe de la culture de compromis nourri par la droite. Qui n'a pas entendu pendant la campagne des européennes un candidat conservateur affirmer « de toutes façons, au niveau européen, la droite et la gauche votent la même chose » ?

Premièrement, c'est faux. Sur les votes finaux en plénière, sur les sujets importants tels que l'économie ou les affaires sociales, les clivages sont très nets – et encore plus si l'on tient compte du processus législatif en commission.

Deuxièmement, c'est exactement le type de discours qui fait dire aux citoyens que rien ne sert de voter pour les européennes puisque que droite et gauche c'est la même chose. Ce qui donne de l'eau au moulin des partis d'extrême-droite.

Pour lutter contre cela, nous devons donc politiser l'Europe. Au niveau national, en France par exemple, quand on est insatisfait de la politique menée par le gouvernement, on critique le gouvernement, on vote contre ce gouvernement. On ne remet pas en cause l'existence du pays. Au niveau européen, les choses ne devraient pas en être autrement. Au lieu de critiquer « l'Europe », il faut blâmer les conservateurs qui la dirigent.

Le Traité de Lisbonne offre des niches pour parvenir à cette politisation de l'Union Européenne.

Le renforcement des compétences du Parlement européen est une avancée de ce point de vue, la diminution de la taille de la Commission, le droit d'initiative populaire, le poste de Président du Conseil Européen pourront permettre de voir plus clairement les orientations politiques de l'UE.

Mais au-delà de ces changements institutionnels, il échoue aux partis politiques européens de politiser la scène

européenne, ainsi qu'à la presse et aux partis nationaux.

Et pour que la politique européenne devienne réellement la résultante d'une collision entre les différentes forces politiques européennes, l'enjeu crucial est la constitution de véritables partis politiques européens.

Le rôle des partis politiques européens a été reconnu dans l'article 10.4 du Traité de Lisbonne, soulignant qu'ils contribuaient à exprimer les souhaits politiques des citoyens de l'Union.

Le Parlement européen a voté ce 7 avril un rapport très important sur les partis politiques au niveau européen, préconisant notamment la mise en place d'un statut européen pour les partis politiques. Aujourd'hui le PSE est légalement une association de droit belge ! Un statut légal européen permettrait aux partis de peser plus et de manière plus légitime et plus crédible sur la scène politique européenne. D'autres avancées sont également prévues, et notamment la possibilité pour les partis politiques européens de participer à des référendums nationaux sur des sujets européens. Car rappelons que nous n'avons légalement pas pu faire campagne par exemple pour le référendum irlandais. Nous attendons donc à présent une proposition de la Commission en ligne avec ces recommandations parlementaires.

L'opportunité la plus importante dans le Traité de Lisbonne pouvant amener à une véritable politisation de l'Union Européenne est le pouvoir de désignation de la Commission par le Parlement. La prise en compte des résultats aux élections européennes pourra conduire à un enjeu politique plus importants, et à donner du poids au vote des citoyens, qui pourront alors influencer directement l'orientation politique de la future Commission.

A nous partis politiques européens de faire des prochaines élections européennes une rencontre politique.

Le PSE a pris la décision de présenter un candidat commun à la Présidence de la Commission Européenne, qui per-



mettra aux citoyens d'identifier notre famille politique, d'organiser des débats contradictoires entre les candidats pour montrer les projets politiques différents proposés aux électeurs. Grâce à ce candidat commun, ainsi qu'un programme commun et une stratégie de campagne commune, le PSE entend faire des élections européennes de 2014 un véritable enjeu politique, un affrontement de projets politiques distincts.

Nous sommes d'ailleurs en train de travailler à la mise en place d'un processus démocratique, ouvert et transparent pour la désignation de notre candidat.

Si la campagne est ainsi relayée sur des clivages politiques, si les médias jouent leur rôle d'information, si les partis nationaux rentrent en campagne en soutenant leur candidat européen, alors nous une grande pression se créera sur le Parlement pour qu'il désigne le candidat de la famille politique ayant gagné les élections européens comme Président de la Commission européenne.

Les changements institutionnels ne prendront forme que si les partis et la presse jouent le jeu de la politisation de

l'Europe.

L'austérité, les coupes sociales, l'exclusion, ce n'est pas l'agenda de l'UE. C'est l'agenda de l'Europe conservatrice. Nous socialistes européens avons un autre programme de solidarité et de justice sociale à proposer. A nous de politiser l'Europe pour montrer aux citoyens qu'il y a une alternative à la désespérance sociale.





Kinderrechte fördern, Kinderrechte schützen

Viviane Reding – Europäische Kommissarin für Justiz
und Grundrechte

Kinder fördern, Kinderrechte schützen - die EU-Agenda für die Rechte des Kindes

Trotz europäischer, nationaler und internationaler Anstrengungen für den Schutz und die Förderung der Rechte von Kindern, ist die Situation von Kindern in Europa und auf der ganzen Welt noch lange nicht zufriedenstellend. Es bleibt viel zu tun. In der EU leben 19 % der Kinder mit einem erhöhten Armutsrisiko. Kinder, die aus Drittstaaten in die EU kommen, sowie Kinder in Gefahrenregionen haben oft große Schwierigkeiten, die Förderung und den Schutz zu bekommen, den sie brauchen. Kinder auf der ganzen Welt leiden in unterschiedlicher Weise unter bewaffneten Konflikten – sie können Opfer von Menschenhandel oder sexuellem Missbrauch werden. Die EU hat die Pflicht und die Verantwortung zu handeln.

Kinderrechte sind Menschenrechte, die die EU und ihre Mitgliedstaaten einhalten müssen. Die Europäische Union hat sich wiederholt zum Schutz, zur Förderung und zur Durchsetzung der Rechte des Kindes in allen internen als auch externen Maßnahmen und Politiken verpflichtet. Der Vertrag von Lissabon hat die Förderung der Rechte des Kindes zum Unionsziel gemacht, und die EU-Grundrechtecharta garantiert, dass die EU-Institutionen und die Mitgliedstaaten bei der Anwendung des EU-Rechts den Schutz der Kinderrechte garantieren. Gleichzeitig ist die EU an die Prinzipien der UN-Kinderrechtskonvention gebunden, die alle Mitgliedstaaten der EU ratifiziert haben.

Mit solch einer soliden Basis ist es nun Zeit für die EU, einen Gang höher zu schalten und die Anstrengungen im Bereich der Rechte der Kinder zu verstärken. Deshalb hat die Europäische Kommission im Februar 2011 eine EU-Agenda für die Rechte des Kindes beschlossen. Diese Agenda stellt die Weichen für alle EU-Politiken zur Stärkung der Kinderrechte in den nächsten Jahren, und

benennt konkrete Maßnahmen, die umgesetzt werden sollen.

Kinderrechte in der Grundrechtecharta

Die EU-Grundrechtecharta und die darin verankerten Rechte von Kindern sind für die EU-Institutionen rechtlich bindend wenn Gesetze oder Initiativen auf den Weg gebracht werden. Alle Politiken, die Kinder betreffen, müssen zum Ziel haben, das Kindeswohl bestmöglich zu fördern. Die Rechte des Kindes zum integralen Bestandteil der Grundrechtspolitik der EU zu machen ist eines der Hauptprinzipien, das alle EU-Politiken und Maßnahmen leiten wird. Im Oktober 2010 hat die Kommission eine Strategie zur wirksamen Umsetzung der Charta der Grundrechte der Europäischen Union angenommen. Diese Strategie sieht vor, dass jeder Vorschlag der Kommission voll und ganz im Einklang mit den in der Charta enthaltenen Grundrechten sein muss – einschließlich der Rechte des Kindes, sofern diese relevant sind. Wir müssen zudem sicherstellen, dass die Grundrechte während des gesamten Gesetzgebungsverfahrens im Europäischen Parlament und im Rat berücksichtigt werden.

Neben der Entwicklung von allgemeinen Prinzipien, die die EU-Politiken zu Kinderrechten leiten werden, geht es nun vor allem darum, konkrete Maßnahmen in Bereichen auf den Weg zu bringen, in denen die EU einen Mehrwert bieten und zum Wohl und zur Sicherheit von Kindern beitragen kann.

Kinderfreundliche Justiz

Maßnahmen im Bereich der kinderfreundlichen Justiz sollen sicherstellen, dass die Rechte des Kindes berücksichtigt werden, wann immer Kinder mit Justizsystemen in Berührung kommen, sei es als Opfer, Verdächtige oder als Scheidungskinder. Heutzutage sind nicht alle Justizsysteme genügend auf

Kinder ausgerichtet. Wenn ein Kind Opfer einer Sexualstraftat oder eines anderen Verbrechens geworden ist, trifft Polizei, Staatsanwaltschaft und Richter eine ganz besondere Verantwortung. Wenn ein Kind sexuell missbraucht wurde, muss es Alternativen geben zu einer persönlichen Vernehmung in der Hauptverhandlung mit dem Täter in einem Raum. Der Einsatz von Videokonferenzen oder von Ton- und Bildaufnahmen ist oft eine bessere Alternative, welche die Rechte des Kindes wahrt. Polizei und Staatsanwaltschaft müssen hinreichend ausgebildet sein, um Kinder in einer für sie angemessenen und verständlichen Sprache zu befragen und sie über ihre Rechte aufzuklären. Beispielsweise sollten, wenn Kinder an Strafverfahren beteiligt sind, juristische und praktische Vorkehrungen eingerichtet werden, um überflüssige mehrfache Befragungen zu vermeiden und die negative Erfahrung, an einem Strafverfahren beteiligt zu sein, zu begrenzen. Es kann vorkommen, dass Kinder nicht über ihre Rechte in Gerichtsverfahren informiert werden, keinen ausreichenden juristischen Beistand haben oder ihnen nicht die nötige psychologische und soziale Unterstützung zur Verfügung gestellt wird. Die Kommission wird Kinder in ihrem Vorschlag zum Schutz von Opfern von Straftaten (geplant für Mai 2011) besonders berücksichtigen, indem sie Schutzmaßnahmen für Kinder, die einer Straftat verdächtig sind, vorschlagen und die bestehenden Regeln für grenzüberschreitende Sorgerechtsstreitigkeiten überarbeiten wird.

Besonderer Schutz für gefährdete Kinder

Besonders gefährdete Kinder – zum Beispiel Behinderte oder Kinder, die in Armut und sozialer Ausgrenzung aufwachsen – benötigen besonderen Schutz. Der Schutz und die Integration von Roma-Kindern und das Problem vermisster oder weggelaufener Kinder



sind nur einige Bereiche, in denen die EU Maßnahmen ergreifen wird. Bei unseren Plänen für eine kinderfreundliche Justiz werden wir darauf achten, den Bedürfnissen der Kinder, die Asyl beantragen, und den Bedürfnissen von Kindern, die aus administrativen Gründen in Gewahrsam genommen werden, gerecht zu werden.

Kinder im digitalen Raum

Das digitale Zeitalter, in dem wir leben und welches das Leben unserer Kinder sogar in noch größerer Hinsicht berührt als das von Erwachsenen, bringt neue Herausforderungen für den Schutz des Kindes. Das Internet bietet erhebliche Möglichkeiten zu lernen, zu entdecken und mit anderen Menschen in Verbindung zu treten. Gleichzeitig können Kinder durch moderne Technologien in gefährliche Situationen geraten. Eine besondere Gefährdung kann sich ergeben, wenn Kinder im Internet mit bedrohlichen Inhalten und Verhaltensmustern konfrontiert werden, so wie cyber-mobbing und cyber-grooming, d.h. dem Herstellen eines Onlinekontakts zu Kindern mit dem Ziel ihrer Ausbeutung. Um schnelle und effektive Antworten auf diese Bedrohungen zu finden, müssen alle relevanten Akteure zusammenarbeiten, einschließlich der Betreiber von Internetportalen die soziale Netzwerke beherbergen, Internet-Provider und die Polizei. Noch in diesem Jahr wird die Europäische Kommission ein neues EU-Datenschutzrecht vorschlagen, in dem wir gesondert auf die Bedürfnisse der Kinder eingehen werden. Unser Ziel muss es sein, ein hohes Schutzniveau für Kinder im digitalen Raum zu erreichen, insbesondere für ihre persönlichen Daten.

Förderung der Rechte des Kindes

Die Förderung der Rechte des Kindes ist genauso wichtig wie ihr Schutz. Aktivitäten, die für die Rechte des Kindes sensibilisieren, die Schulung von Berufs-

gruppen, die mit Kindern arbeiten und derjenigen, die Gesetze und Politiken vorbereiten, sowie die Kooperation mit relevanten Akteuren sind weitere Teile des Puzzles, die wir zusammentragen müssen. Die Europäische Kommission wird beispielsweise ein Portal auf unserer Europa-Website einrichten, auf der Kinder jeden Alters Zugang zu Informationen über verschiedene Aspekte ihrer Rechte erhalten werden: EU-Politiken, die ihre Rechte schützen, nützliche Kontaktinformationen und Links zu anderen interessanten Informationen und vieles mehr. Sie werden durch attraktive Anwendungen und Material, das ihrem Alter angepasst ist, durch das Portal geführt.


Kinder als Akteure

Die Beteiligung von Kindern ist auch ein wichtiges Element in der Förderung und beim Schutz von Kinderrechten. Politische Entscheidungsträger sollten sich stärker bemühen, Kindern Möglichkeiten zu bieten, ihre Meinung zu äußern. Wir müssen Kindern besser zuhören und ihre Ansichten berücksichtigen, wenn wir Entscheidungen treffen, die großen Einfluss auf ihr Leben haben. So wollen wir erreichen, dass sich Entscheidungen an den Interessen der Kinder orientieren. Für die Ausarbeitung der EU Agenda für die Rechte des Kindes hat die Kommission Kinder mit unterschiedlichen Hintergründen aus allen 27 Mitgliedstaaten befragt. Diese Befragung hat uns geholfen zu verstehen, welche Probleme Kinder haben und welche Lösungen sie selbst vorschlagen. Einige dieser Vorschläge, z.B. besser über Kinderrechte informiert zu werden, wurden umgehend aufgenommen und finden sich in der EU Agenda für die Rechte des Kindes wieder.

Die Aktionen, die wir in der EU Agenda für die Rechte des Kindes ankündigen, kann die EU nicht allein umsetzen. Ein entschiedenes Engagement für den Schutz und die Förderung der Rechte des Kindes durch die Mitgliedstaaten,

Nichtregierungsorganisationen und die Beauftragten für Kinder ist notwendig. Die Kommission wird ihren Teil dazu beitragen. Wir werden weiterhin den Dialog mit allen Interessengruppen und den Erfahrungsaustausch fördern, damit die Kinderrechte überall in der EU und für alle Kinder spürbar werden.





Economy

- Économie - Wirtschaft

ENERGY FOR THE EUROPEAN UNION: GAS PIPELINES

Miroslav N. Jovanović - European Institute, University of Geneva

The quarrel between Russia and Ukraine over gas supplies and the cut of it to Ukraine at the beginning of 2009 reminded the EU about its dependence on the two countries. It also revealed another major weakness: inability to move easily gas and electricity within the EU. The most remarkable initiative in the EU to diversify sources of supply is the Nabucco pipeline project.


The dispute between Russia and Ukraine: the Russian gas supplier Gazprom offered already in 2008 to pay \$3 billion to Ukraine in advance to ensure the transit of gas in 2009. Even though this amount was in excess of Ukraine's de-

bits to Gazprom, Ukraine turned it down. On a visit to the EU in 2008, Gazprom officials alerted EU officials about the looming crisis and used the language understood by the West: debt must be paid and the price is the one that is contracted.

Transition to market-based international economic transactions made Russia adjust its international pricing policy of gas. In 2009, EU importers were buying from Gazprom for a value equivalent to \$450 for 1000 m3 of gas. The price formula links the gas price to oil prices with a six- to nine-months time lag. Since 2005 Russia increased the gas price

to former Soviet countries. Ukraine was offered a price of \$250 for 1000 m3 in 2009, but it wanted \$201-\$211. The difference seemed unbridgeable. 'Kiev should bite the bullet. It is a burden worth bearing for the sake of greater political independence from Moscow.' As a response, Ukraine siphoned off transit gas foreseen for EU buyers. Moreover, Ukraine was also selling arms to Georgia (2008 war), indirectly subsidised by the below 'market price' gas by the Russians. Thus, Russia cut its gas supplies to Ukraine and transit to the EU during the first weeks of 2009. Following the change of government in Ukraine in 2010 which is more Russian-friendly, Russia gave a 30% discount on the price it charged for natural gas. The message was obvious: cooperation with Russia has commercial benefits.

Discussions on the Nabucco gas pipeline started around 2000 with the idea to secure gas supplies independent of Russia. The company Nabucco Gas Pipeline International was set up in 2004 (Vienna) and an intergovernmental agreement was signed in Ankara by Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey in 2009 harmonising the legal framework and granting stable and equal transport conditions. Austrian Nabucco unofficial leader (OMV Konzern) sold, however, its stake in the Hungarian Nabucco partner (MOL) to the Russian firm Surgutneftgas (close to Gazprom). This move could increase Russia's say in the project and thereby lessen the bright future of Nabucco. Furthermore, big EU countries (Germany, Italy) signed bilateral contracts with Russia undermining the project. If Nabucco fails, Russia will have almost total control of supplies via the Nord and South Stream gas pipelines.





As part of the EU's energy policy, a number of energy supply agreements with countries such as Algeria, Azerbaijan, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Turkmenistan and the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council have been signed and one with Iran is envisaged. In spite of these deals, the heart of the EU strategic plan is to diversify its gas supplies via a gas pipeline through Turkey. 'Yet there is no earmarked gas to feed Nabucco, either in central Asia or in the Middle East.' In order to make the Nabucco pipeline viable, not only financially but also supply-diversification and security-wise, there ought to be long term supply contracts with producers. Yet, voices that cast doubts about the Nabucco project are frequent and loud: 'Nabucco remains far from a done deal: it is unclear where the gas will come from.'

The pipeline planned through Turkey triggers certain dangers. In large parts of Eastern Turkey the majority of some 15 million ethnic Kurds live. There is potential danger of blowing up a pipeline or of disrupting supplies. Even though Nabucco may reduce the reliance on Russia, dependence on Iran and Turkmenistan would be increased. Other alternative supplies and transit routes

for gas from Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia are vulnerable to terrorist attacks and political risks and uncertainty (upheavals and revolutions such as the ones in 2011, even the Western military intervention in Libya). How reliable are these sources? The construction of the Nord Stream is a sign of a deep and close cooperation between Germany and Russia. Launched in 2005, the pipeline is needed by Germany since environmental concerns, especially after the Fukushima disaster in Japan, prevent it from building new nuclear power plants, while Russia needs a reliable consumer. Construction carried out on the Baltic Sea bed. Costs are at least four times more than overland. Some newer NATO members from the former Soviet Union may see Germany as the Russian 'fifth column' in the EU. The messages from these two countries to the Baltic States and Poland are:

- we do not regard these countries as reliable long-term overland transit countries
- we are willing to incur enormous infrastructure costs to bypass you

This gives a blow to the energy unity in the EU and shows the importance and dominance of national interests.

In 2010, the European Commission started funding over 40 projects in order to reduce the dependence of Central and East European states on Russian gas supplies. The objective is to make it more difficult for Russia to target individual EU countries and to create infrastructure supporting eastern EU countries with energy supplies in times of crisis. The biggest challenge of the Nabucco pipeline project, also funded by the EU, is the lack of gas sources making it less viable as an alternative to Russian gas. The EU dependence on Russia is so strong that making a major difference even in the span of several decades seems impossible. Russia owns the biggest proven gas reserves in the world and there is an increasing appetite for gas in econo

The South Stream gas pipeline project is a joint venture between Gazprom and Eni (Italy). It will link in 2015 Russia with Italy via Bulgaria and Greece, while another prong will go from Bulgaria over Serbia to Hungary and beyond. Cooperation with the Nabucco project is not envisaged, especially in the light of the commercial feasibility of the South Stream.

The possibility of cutting gas supplies to



the EU by Russia has always been present. However, supplies have always been paid by the West. This offers solid political and commercial capital. The European Commission confirmed Russian reliability as a supplier but raised certain concerns regarding transport routes. Vladimir Putin, on the other hand, confirmed the long-term energy-supply policy of Russia (November 2009):

I stress again that Russia has never and will never, I would like to draw your attention - will never - disrupt supplies. Transit country problems are alone to blame for whatever disruptions there are, but I rely on Ukraine - our partner, friend and main transiter - to comply with its contractual obligations in conformity with last January's agreement.

Opinions in Europe differ: Some argue for the centralisation of energy policy decisions as it is necessary for the reliability of supplies. Others are against this approach thinking they can predict the future of energy supplies and consumption needs. The optimal policy choice is, therefore, diversification. The breaking down of the embedded national barriers in the EU energy market is necessary. The removal would enable smooth and reliable flow of energy from one country to another. While pipelines move energy from east to west, north-south links are yet missing. The European Commission assists financially to ease this challenge, however, restraints come from several countries (Britain, Nordic countries) requesting a reduction in the EU expenditure.

Overall, a clear move in energy affairs of the EU is visible - towards 'Europeanisation' with the completion of the internal EU market by 2014. The result would be an increased access to energy markets. The EU policy leitmotifs for the future are an increased internal solidarity, more investment in new sources and a more efficient consumption of the existing ones.. Nonetheless, bilateral deals

by major EU countries with Russia dilute EU unity. What to do with Russia? The EU needs Russian resources and market, while Russia needs the EU market, hard cash and technology. If there is cooperation between these two partners, it is due to a mutual interest and need. If cooperation grows, so do common interests and mutual gains. Should one rock this boat or try to strengthen it?

Figure 1 Projected gas pipeline routes (Nabucco, Nord and South Stream)
Source: <http://www.energy.eu/> (accessed on 23 February 2011)

Figure 2 Nabucco gas pipeline route
Source: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:2010Nabuccopipelinemap.jpg> (accessed on 23 February 2011)

¹ Lex, 'Gazprom/Ukraine', Financial Times, 5 January 2009.

² Editorial, 'Settle the Ukraine gas dispute', Financial Times, 6 January 2009. ³ Stratfor, 'Russia: formalizing energy leverages', 21 April 2010.

⁴ P. Noël, 'Europe needs a single market for natural gas', Financial Times, 14 May 2008.

⁵ Editorial, 'No pipe dream', Financial Times, 13 July 2009.

⁶ Stratfor, 'EU: funding energy independence', 9 March 2010.

⁷ Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council: 'Review of EU-Russia Relations', Brussels, 5 November 2008, COM(2008) 740, p. 3.

⁸ <http://premier.gov.ru/eng/events/news/8221/> accessed on 23 February 2011.



A new energy efficiency plan for Europe

Marie Donnelly - Director DG Energy/European Commission

A new energy efficiency plan for Europe: new impetus to reach EU's 20% energy saving objective in 2020

In March 2011 the Commission adopted a new energy efficiency plan, proposing a range of energy efficiency measures aimed at putting the EU on track to achieve its 20% energy saving objective by 2020.

Why energy efficiency?

Energy efficiency is our most sustainable source of energy. Optimizing the way we use energy throughout our economy creates substantial benefits for the entire society. Improving energy efficiency contributes to reducing our energy needs, strengthening our position in terms of security of supply and carbon footprint. At the same time, energy efficiency measures translate into local job creation or retention, improved living conditions and tangible cost reductions for private consumers and industry.

EU leaders, realizing the important benefits of energy efficiency and savings for the EU's social, economic and environmental agendas, set in 2007 the objective of 20% primary energy savings in 2020, compared to «business as usual» path expected then. Energy efficiency is a priority pillar of Europe's 2020 Energy Strategy, and it is at the heart of the Europe's 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth and of the transition to a resource efficient economy. Reaching Europe's 20% energy saving objective by 2020 is a key step on the way to achieving our 2050 goals of a low carbon economy.

What is our current situation?

A range of energy efficiency measures have been implemented at European and national level promoting a more efficient use of energy in sectors such as buildings, household appliances and industrial equipment, transport in-

dustry and energy supply. Despite the progress made, Commission estimates suggest that the EU is today on course to achieve only about half of its 20% objective in 2020. It is essential that the EU acts now to achieve its target and to give a new impetus to the energy efficiency agenda in the Member States. Responding to the call of the European Council of 4 February 2011 to take 'determined action to tap the considerable potential for higher energy savings of buildings, transport and products and processes', the Commission adopted a comprehensive new Energy Efficiency Plan in March 2011.

What are the key elements of the Energy Efficiency Plan?

The leading principle of the Plan is to achieve our 20% energy saving target in 2020. To this end, four main objectives are followed:

- Ensure continuity in the implementation of the current energy efficiency policy framework;
- Propose new stringent and binding energy efficiency measures addressing all sectors of the energy system;
- Build on the voluntary commitment given by Member States through their indicative national energy efficiency targets for 2020;
- Arrange a thorough intermediate assessment in 2013 of the progress made by the Member States towards reaching the 20% energy saving target, with the possibility of setting binding national energy efficiency targets at that point if progress is not sufficient.

Based on analysis of cost-effective energy saving potentials throughout the sectors, the Plan puts a strong emphasis on the building sector, where the greatest challenge is to trigger and accelerate energy efficient renovations to reduce energy consumption in our existing building stock. To this end, the Plan includes a bouquet of measures addressing shortcomings in financing, in the legal framework

(owner-tenant split incentive) and in worker skills and qualifications. We believe that public authorities should lead by example in this sector, and propose that they should renovate 3% of their building stock every year. We count on the exemplary role of the public sector to kick-start the renovation process in commercial and residential buildings in the private sector. In addition, efficiency in energy consuming appliances used in buildings (e.g. boilers, fans) and in building systems like lighting, heating and cooling, will be further promoted.

The Plan further reinforces the leading role of the public sector by introducing energy efficiency criteria in public spending and by supporting local initiatives to improve energy efficiency in cities and regions, through the Covenant of Mayors and a new research deployment initiative on smart cities and communities.

Energy efficiency in industry will be tackled through energy efficiency requirements for industrial equipment and improved information provision (e.g. exchange of best practices, benchmarking). Large companies will be required to perform energy audits and encouraged to introduce energy management systems. The business of providing energy services will be promoted by introducing national energy saving obligations for utilities and by providing transparent information on the availability and quality of services from energy services companies.

Improvement measures to the efficiency of power and heat generation are also proposed. These cover the efficiency of thermal generation, the promotion of cogeneration, district heating and cooling and new ways to optimize the use of waste heat resulting from energy transformation processes.

Transport is a key area for achieving energy savings. It is a large sector and the fastest growing in terms of final energy use, with the strongest reliance



on fossil fuels. The Commission has just adopted a White Paper for a competitive and resource efficient transport system, putting forward options to trigger energy efficiency gains across the different transport modes.

Finally, this Plan puts forward measures to ensure that improvements to the energy performance of devices used by consumers – such as appliances and smart meters – play a greater role in empowering them to monitor and optimize their own energy consumption, allowing for cost savings. This requires the development of standards for meters and appliances, obligations for energy suppliers to provide consumers with clear information and access to independent energy advice.

What comes next?

The Commission is now focusing on putting the Plan into practice with appropriate legislative and other measures. One major step will be to present to the European Parliament and Council a legislative proposal encompassing many of the measures put forward by the Plan and revising the 2006 Directive on Energy Services and the 2004 Directive on Cogeneration. The Commission aims to bring forward the new proposal before the summer break, for discussion under the Polish and Danish Presidencies.

Another important step in 2011 will be the establishment of a new dedicated financial instrument using the unspent funds under the European Economic Recovery Package to support energy efficiency. This will finance «bankable» energy efficiency and renewable energy projects, in particular in urban settings. In order to foster a large number of decentralised investments, municipal, local and regional public authorities will be the beneficiaries. The approach will build on the success of the Covenant of Mayors, signed by more than 2000 regions and cities across Europe.

To conclude

I would like to stress again the importance of energy efficiency to deliver gains for citizens and society in a cost-effective way with readily available technologies and the imperative of achieving our 20% energy saving target as a step towards achieving a low carbon and resource efficient European economy by 2050. I call upon stakeholders, businesses, citizens and policy makers alike to support the EU's efforts to achieve its medium and long term goals for the benefits of all of us.



Les pays baltes: tigres ou colosses aux pieds d'argile?

Nataliya Borys - étudiante à l'Institut européen de l'Université de Genève

Les pays baltes : tigres ou colosses aux pieds d'argile ?

Les pays baltes, là où la surchauffe était la plus manifeste avant la crise économique, ont connu un retournement conjoncturel courant 2007 et sont entrés en récession en 2008. Sur l'ensemble de l'année 2009, les Etats baltes ont souffert d'une récession particulièrement rude avec, notamment et pour

illustrer le phénomène, une contraction du PIB de 14% en Estonie, de 16% en Lituanie et de 18% en Lettonie. Jadis dopés par le crédit, un secteur de la construction florissant et une consommation hors normes, les Etats baltes se sont retrouvés les plus fébriles des pays de l'Est. La marche forcée vers l'économie libérale grâce à des crédits bons marchés (le taux en Estonie a été le plus bas de tout l'espace post-soviétique) et une consommation débridée

une croissance exceptionnelle. La crise de 2008 a néanmoins relevé des déséquilibres insoutenables : l'ancrage à l'euro, une politique monétaire trop laxiste, la bulle immobilière, l'endettement, les emplois soutenus artificiellement par les secteurs immobilier et bancaire, la croissance des salaires supérieure à la productivité du travail, etc. La Lettonie a eu sa spécialité. Ainsi, à force d'être compétitive et de développer son industrie, son gouvernement s'est tourné vers une autre source de revenus : la finance. Le boom économique letton reposait presque uniquement sur le crédit, ce qui a provoqué la surchauffe de l'économie. Les problèmes de la Lettonie ne sont pas les liquidités à court terme mais la viabilité de son modèle économique et démographique.

En 2009, les trois États baltes se trouvent pratiquement en situation de déflation : l'état de leur système bancaire, la dégradation du marché du travail et l'instauration d'une inévitable politique de rigueur annoncent une sévère crise d'austérité. La baisse du PIB a atteint -16.6% en rythme annuel au deuxième trimestre 2009 pour l'Estonie, - 19.6% pour la Lettonie et - 20.2% pour la Lituanie. Le chômage a plus que doublé, les salaires se sont effondrés.


Tout ceci a poussé les agents privés à s'endetter massivement en devises, rendant la demande intérieure très dépendante des financements extérieurs. L'éclatement de la bulle immobilière et l'effondrement du crédit mondial ont entraîné une chute sans précédent de la demande intérieure dans des pays dont la croissance et l'emploi étaient soutenus, en partie artificiellement, par les secteurs immobilier et bancaire.

Le « consensus balte » : clé pour sortir de la crise ?

Quelle sortie de crise peut-on imaginer pour ces pays ? Les analystes ont été particulièrement impressionnés par la rapidité avec laquelle l'Estonie est par-

Tableau: Les taux de croissance du crédit en devises (Source : FMI)

(Crédit en devises au secteur privé non financier, variation annuelle en pourcentage)



a fait plonger ces régions dans la pire dépression de leur existence.

Les pays baltes (Estonie, Lettonie et Lituanie) ont toujours été des pionniers dans le processus de transition et d'intégration en Europe : pionniers dans l'amorce d'une dynamique d'émancipation nationale avec leurs révolutions « chantantes », premiers parmi les républiques soviétiques à reconquérir leur indépendance et premiers d'entre elles à avoir, à marche forcée, mené des réformes économiques et politiques suffisamment audacieuses pour adhérer successivement à l'OTAN le 29 mars 2004 et à l'UE le 1er mai de la même année. C'est bien cette qualité

de «premier de la classe» qui leur a permis de conjurer leur perception et de rejoindre les structures occidentales à chaque opportunité, l'adhésion se faisant sans obstacle. Mais leurs options économiques très libérales n'auront pas pu leur éviter une crise sans précédent alors même qu'ils savouraient leur comparaison avec les tigres asiatiques, eux qui étaient devenu les « tigres baltes » à la suite de leur impressionnante rapidité pour transiter d'une économie communiste au capitalisme pur et dur dès leur indépendance. Dire que leurs voisins des PECO les ont enviés est un euphémisme : pendant qu'eux s'ensaisaient dans les problèmes sociaux et politiques, les tigres baltes affichaient



venue à assainir ses finances publiques et la Lettonie à réaliser des réformes. Aussi, même avec un déficit budgétaire de 8% de son PIB, la Lituanie reste en meilleure santé que les autres pays européens. Finalement, bien peu de pays ont réussi à mettre en œuvre l'ajustement de réformes. En effet, il s'agissait de plans comportant de réels dangers politiques. A titre comparatif, ni la Hongrie ni l'Ukraine n'ont réalisé ces réformes malgré la gravité de la crise dans ces pays.

Aujourd'hui, il fait sens de parler de « consensus balte » lorsqu'une population accepte des sacrifices économiques pour réorienter son économie, lui redonner de la vitalité ou la prémunir de futures crises. Il s'agit ici d'un élément économique-stratégique majeur de différenciation entre les pays baltes et les autres de type post-communisme. Les baltes ont réalisé des réformes radicales à l'origine de véritables miracles économiques.

La volonté de se réorienter vers l'Ouest, vers les sources de leur culture, leur a permis de surmonter les plus grandes difficultés et les a conduit à la table des négociations afin de rejoindre l'UE en tant que premiers Etats issus de l'ex-URSS.

Les observateurs avertis se posent souvent la question suivante : pourquoi les Etats baltes s'en sortent-ils relativement bien alors que la majorité des pays de l'Est semblent piétiner dans la dépression ? La première difficulté que rencontrent les pays de la CEI est la création d'un Etat ethno-démocratique. En effet, ces pays rencontrent les difficultés à sortir du soviétisme et à créer un « habitus national ».

Les Etats baltes ont su désamorcer à la fois les pièges de l'atonie sociétale et de la violence ethnique. Le peuple, doté d'une forte conscience de la personnalité et mis en mesure de développer celle-ci paisiblement, a eu plus de chances de « s'en sortir » qu'une nation brimée dans son identité ou en recher-

che douloureuse d'elle-même, comme l'Ukraine.

Du point de vue des Etats baltes, il n'y a aucune alternative à l'intégration. Elle constitue une sorte de certificat de crédibilité et de fiabilité, suscitant la confiance des investisseurs. Pour leurs populations, l'Europe constitue la seule garantie de survie de leur culture, de leur langue et de leurs différences. C'est aussi leur seule porte de sortie de la crise.

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The Single Market: outlining 12 levers for future growth and jobs

Michel Barnier – European Commissioner for internal market and services

The Single Market is a success story that still continues today. Between 1992 and 2006, it is estimated that the Single Market generated 2.75 million jobs and 2.15 percent of extra growth for the European economy – that is €518 extra for every person in the EU in 2006 alone. Intra-European trade currently accounts for 17 percent and 28 percent of world trade in goods and services respectively. Phone calls in Europe cost a fraction of what they did 10 years ago, many air fares in Europe have fallen significantly and new routes have opened up. Households and businesses are now able to choose who supplies them with electricity and gas.

The Single Market turned the EU into the largest economy in the world and has been a valuable shield in weathering the economic and financial crisis. But after the worst financial crisis since the great depression in the 1930s, Europe needs to take the next step.

In order to compete with economic superpowers like China, US and a string of emerging markets; more needs to be done to realise the full potential of the single market. With 10 percent of the population – 23 million people – currently unemployed, action is needed to create growth, jobs and new opportunities.

This is where the Single Market Act comes in. If we want to kick-start new growth that is both sustainable and fair, Europe needs to equip itself properly and act with strength and determination. A collective commitment at European level is required from all players involved – European, national or regional, public or private, economic and social – making these goals their own.

Following a wide-ranging public debate, the Commission adopted on 13 April the Single Market Act. The Act is the Commission's response to on the opinions expressed by key stakeholders such as the other EU institutions, consumer organisations, business federations, local and regional authorities and tra-

de unions.

Following a wide public debate, the Single Market Act identifies twelve levers that can boost growth and enhance citizen's confidence. Within each of these levers, a key action is singled out which, if adopted rapidly by European legislators, and properly transposed and implemented by Member States, can have a concrete effect on restoring economic competitiveness and the participation of citizens in the Single Market.

The Commission commits itself to delivering its proposals on the remaining key actions in the coming months. This would allow for adoption by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU of the legislative proposals by the end of 2012 – in time for the 20th anniversary of the single market.

Here is an overview of the twelve levers we are proposing:

Improving access to finance for our SMEs:

While our 21 million SMEs are the EU's engine for growth, poor access to finance is one of the main obstacles that hold them back in launching new products and hiring more employees. While our capital markets could provide risk capital, they are still insufficiently developed. The multiplicity of national regulatory regimes and tax barriers makes it difficult to raise capital abroad and to operate across borders. End 2011, we will table legislation to make it easier for venture capital funds established in one Member State to invest freely in any other Member State.

Facilitating the mobility of citizens:

More could be done to make it easier for citizens to take up employment in another Member State. In winter 2011, we will propose legislation that will simplify the EU legislation concerning the recognition of professional qualifications and further develop cooperation between Member States in this area.

Quintessential will be the introduction of a European professional card. This will encourage the mobility of professionals, who are discouraged by cumbersome procedures. The card will also constitute a guarantee of confidence for consumers and employers.

«Smart» Intellectual property rights:

Today, there are four times as many music downloads in the US as in the EU. However, piracy in Europe is brewing. This paradox is mainly due to the EU's fragmented markets and a lack of legal offers online. By revising our copyright rules this year, we should set the right incentives for our artists to be creative and attract investment, while stimulating the entertainment industry to further develop innovative business models and make sure that their music, films and literary works are as widely disseminated as possible. We will also put in place strategy that will clamp down on digital piracy.

Strengthening consumer confidence:

Today, only 7% of our 500 million consumers shop online in another Member State. One of the main reasons, according to our indicators, is that people are concerned about their consumer rights when warranty on a product expires or when faulty goods need to be returned. By the end of 2011, the Commission will introduce legislation to develop alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. These extrajudicial remedies can guarantee a simple, fast and cheap way for consumers to resolve disputes. More confidence in cross-border e-commerce could generate savings of € 2.5 billion or 0.02% of EU GDP.

Boosting standards in services:

The service sector – which covers areas such as retail, transport, construction services, tourism and many other services – is today one of the main drivers of the EU economy. It accounts for over 70% of all jobs and more than 95% of newly created jobs and it is estimated



that it still has huge growth potential. In order to give a further boost to the European services sector, the Commission will engage with business, consumers and NGOs to set European voluntary standards on services. These standards could be very useful for consumers and users as they define the quality of the service that the provider is supposed to deliver and the client can expect to receive. Compliance with a service standard can be compared with a quality label by which service providers guarantee their customers a high quality.

Improving transport and energy infrastructures: We have come a long way, but the EU is still to realise a Single Market in transport and energy. This is to change. In the second half of 2011, we will introduce legislation to identify and implement key infrastructure projects in order to obtain a seamless, efficient and ecologically friendly network. By 2020, investment in these could create 775 000 jobs and increase GDP by €19 billion.

Developing the digital Single Market:

The EU economy is steadily going digital: internet shopping is on the rise, online payment transactions can be handled with the click of a button and more and more government administrations offer their paperwork to be completed online. Building further confidence in electronic transactions is therefore a *sine quo non* for further growth in this dynamic sector. In the third quarter of 2011, we will review our legislation on the mutual identification and authentication of electronic signatures. The revised rules should set common standards that guarantee safe electronic interaction.

Facilitating social entrepreneurship:

In 2009, investment funds managed over € 7000 billion in Europe. In my view, Europe's asset management industry would have tremendous leverage in fostering the emergence of business that would like to pursue objectives

for the common good, be they social, ethical or environmental, instead of financial gain. In the winter of 2011, we will table legislation establishing a European framework for the development of ethical investment funds.

Improving energy taxation: The EU's legal framework for taxing energy is currently ill-suited to meet the challenges of the 21st century, such as reducing our dependence on fossil fuels and protection of the environment. In April, we tabled proposals that aim to restructure the way energy products are taxed. Once these rules enter into force, products should be taxed according to their CO2 emissions and energy content. This will stimulate energy efficiency and consumption of more environmentally friendly products.

Strengthening social cohesion:

A more unified European market in services means that businesses should be able to provide their services more easily throughout the EU. However, this should not entail a race to the bottom, in particular by posting workers on secondment. Our social market economy should provide more high quality jobs and a high level of protection for workers and their social rights. To facilitate this, we will introduce legislation that is to improve the practical enforcement of posted workers rights, including measures to prevent and punish abuse.

A better regulatory business environment:

Small and even smaller businesses form the backbone of our economy. However, their growth potential is stifled by administrative burdens, for example when it comes to complying with heavy accounting rules. Lifting these burdens could result in €1.5 billion in savings per year for over 1 million small businesses and €5.2 billion per year for nearly 6 million micro enterprises. By mid 2011, the Commission will come forward with proposals.

Modernising public procurement:

The public procurement sector - the way governments buy goods, services and works - is vast and worth over 17% of the EU GDP. However, the EU framework needs to be in line with today's needs: we need to make rules more simple and flexible, while fostering demand for environmentally sustainable, socially responsible and innovative goods, services and works. By the end of 2011, we will table proposals.

These twelve tools for success will improve and modernise the single market and bring growth, new jobs and opportunities to European citizens and businesses. To make this happen we need to act together and we need to act now!

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«Economic Governance» - Welches Europa wollen wir?

Isabelle Bourgois - Chefredakteurin der Zeitschrift
Regards sur l'économie allemande

Interview mit Isabelle Bourgois, Chefredakteurin der Zeitschrift *Regards sur l'économie allemande*



Nach der schwersten Wirtschaftskrise in der Geschichte Europas strebt die Europäische Union eine engere wirtschaftliche Kooperation zwischen ihren Mitgliedstaaten an. Im Jahr 2010 leitete die Europäische Kommission konkrete Schritte zur Gestaltung und Einführung der sogenannten „Economic Governance“ ein. Dazu zählt unter anderem ein Paket von sechs Legislativvorschlägen, das im September letzten Jahres vorgelegt wurde.

1) Wie beurteilen Sie, Frau Bourgois, generell die Initiative der Europäischen Kommission als Reaktion auf die Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise und mit Blick auf die Zukunft der Europäischen Union?

I.B.: Die Reaktion kommt zwar spät, geht aber in die richtige Richtung. Besonders die stärkere Berücksichtigung des Schuldenstands und noch mehr die Maßnahmen zur „Vermeidung und Korrektur makroökonomischer Ungleichgewichte“ waren dringend notwendig. Bleibt die Frage, ob sich die Mitgliedstaaten die-

sen Maßnahmen beugen...

2) Deutschland gilt als eines der Länder Europas, das relativ bald nach der Krise wieder Wirtschaftswachstum verzeichnete. Aus welchen Gründen gelang Deutschland ihrer Meinung nach der Umgang mit der Finanz- und Wirtschaftskrise besser als anderen?

I.B.: Deutschland hat die Krise am stärksten von allen zu spüren bekommen, das BIP ist 2009 immerhin um 4,7 % eingebrochen. Dass sich die Wirtschaft so schnell wieder erholt (+3,6 % ein Jahr später) hat denselben Grund. Als Folge der globalen Finanzkrise war die Nachfrage auf dem Weltmarkt eingebrochen und mit der allmählichen Erholung ist sie wieder angestiegen. Industrie und Verbraucher kaufen weltweit wieder verstärkt deutsche Konsumgüter und vor allem die Investitionsgüter, auf die die deutsche Wirtschaft spezialisiert ist. Die Rezession war nur „importiert“. Dass Deutschland sich schneller erholt liegt auch daran, dass die Industrieunternehmen aus der weltweiten Krise 1993 gelernt, d.h. die Produktion rationalisiert und modernisiert haben. Gleichzeitig haben die Sozialpartner zur Flexibilisierung des Arbeitsmarktes beigetragen, sodass die Unternehmen leichter auf Schwankungen in der Produktion reagieren konnten. Das kam auch dem Arbeitsmarkt zu Gute und führte zu dem viel bewunderten „Jobwunder“ während der Rezession. Und was die Politik angeht: Sie setzt seit 2003 Stück für Stück die Lissabon-Strategie um, besonders was eine nachhaltigere Finanzierung der Sozialversicherung angeht. Damit entlastet sie den Staatshaushalt. Ein Jahr vor Ausbruch der Krise hatte Deutschland einen ausgeglichenen Haushalt. Das machte es leichter, die damals notwendigen Konjunkturpakete zu finanzieren. Eine wettbewerbsfähige Industrie, ein flexibler Arbeitsmarkt dank verantwortungsbewusster Sozialpartner und eine Haushaltspolitik, die sich zumindest bemüht, die Stabilitätskriterien einzuhalten: Das ist Deutschlands Rezept.

3) Aufgrund seiner Geschichte hat Deutschland stets hinter der Europäischen Union gestanden und als größter Nettozahler die schwächeren Mitgliedstaaten unterstützt. Wie stehen Sie zu der Aussage Deutschland habe zum ersten Mal klare Bedingungen für Finanzhilfen an andere Länder formuliert und damit klar gegen europäische Solidarität verstoßen?

I.B.: Der Vorwurf ist nicht haltbar, die beiden Punkte haben nichts miteinander zu tun. Unterstützung der Mitgliedstaaten bezieht sich auf die Kohäsionspolitik der EU 27; sie verfolgt das Ziel, die Lebensverhältnisse anzugleichen. Die Frage der Finanzhilfen für überschuldete Staaten der Eurozone ist eine ganz andere. Viele Länder in der EWU haben sich nicht an die Stabilitätskriterien gehalten und auch nicht an die 2000 gemeinsam in Lissabon beschlossene Strategie zur Verbesserung ihrer Wettbewerbsfähigkeit (Strukturenreformen) – damit haben sie sich unsolidarisch verhalten. Frankreich und Deutschland hatten obendrein in einem seltenen Schulterschluss 2003/05 zusammen den Stabilitätspakt aufgeweicht. Die beiden zentralen Fragen lauten nun: Wie kann in der akuten Schuldenkrise den überschuldeten Ländern am besten geholfen werden? Sie brauchen und bekommen finanzielle Unterstützung, müssen aber auch als Gegenleistung die nötigen Reformen umsetzen. In einem zweiten Schritt müssen Lösungen für die Zukunft gefunden werden, um gerade in besseren Zeiten – überhaupt im Normalfall – das Einhalten der Verträge zwingender zu gestalten. Solidarität folgt auch im europäischen Rechtegefüge dem Prinzip Leistung/Gegenleistung – genauer: Da jeder Mitgliedstaat die Verantwortung für seinen Haushalt trägt (Subsidiaritätsprinzip), muss er seine Politik (Haushalt, Wirtschaft, Soziales) auch entsprechend verantwortlich bzw. EU-freundlich gestalten. Wie weit war das bisher der Fall?

4) Welche Rolle spielte Ihrer Meinung nach das Treffen von Deauville zwis-



chen Präsident Sarkozy und Bundeskanzlerin Merkel im Oktober 2010 in Bezug auf die Debatte über eine künftig stärkere wirtschaftliche Koordinierung?

I.B.: Es war eine wichtige Einigung in einer festgefahrenen Situation. Beide Länder haben sich auf den einzig möglichen Kompromiss geeinigt: mehr gegenseitige Transparenz in der Fiskalpolitik. Frankreich und Deutschland – zwei völlig entgegengesetzte Kulturen, was die Wirtschaftspolitik angeht – hatten bei der Entscheidung für eine EWU die Führungsrolle; nun haben sie das noch sehr lückenhafte Vertragswerk gemeinsam etwas weiterentwickelt. Es handelt sich hier nicht um einen Alleingang, wie beiden Ländern zuweilen vorgeworfen wird, sondern um ein unumgängliches Zusammenfinden der Gegensätze, ohne das die europäische Integration weiter auf der Stelle treten würde – in allen Bereichen.

5) Wie beurteilen Sie die bisherigen Verhandlungen zum Legislativpaket von 2010? In welchen Bereichen halten Sie eine baldige Einigung für eine engere wirtschaftliche Kooperation für möglich? Welche Bereiche sehen Sie kritisch?

I.B.: Man wird sich wie immer auf den kleinsten Nenner einigen, die eigentliche Frage dabei aber weiter in die Ferne schieben: die Vertiefung der politischen Integration. Eigentlich sollte der Euro ja dazu führen... Auch das strukturelle Grundproblem der EWU wird bleiben: Die ‚Sünder‘ sind gleichzeitig auch ihre eigenen ‚Richter‘. Auch in der jetzigen Form wird also das neue Regelwerk für den Euro ein zahnloser Papiertiger bleiben. Und was die geplante Transferpraxis zwischen ‚ärmeren‘ und ‚reicherer‘ Mitgliedstaaten angeht, da sollte eigentlich der deutsche Länderfinanzausgleich ein warnendes Beispiel sein, denn keiner – weder Geber- noch Nehmerländer profitiert davon: Je wettbewerbsfähiger die Geberländer sind, desto mehr müssen sie an die schwächeren abgeben; die Nehmerländer, die über eine Art Garantie

verfügen, dass die anderen notfalls für sie einspringen, haben keinen Ansporn, wettbewerbsfähiger zu werden. Solch eine falsch verstandene „Solidarität“ führt unausweichlich zur Nivellierung. Und sie ist ungerecht: Was rechtfertigt, dass ein Staat, der sich strikt an die Regeln gehalten hat, für einen anderen aufkommen muss, der sich an die gemeinsamen Regeln nicht gehalten hat?

6) Anfang Februar 2011 trafen Nicolas Sarkozy und Angela Merkel erneut auf der europäischen Bühne auf und stellten ihre gemeinsamen Vorstellungen für eine Politik des Euro-Raumes vor. Inwiefern beeinflussen diese die Ausgestaltung der geplanten „Economic Governance“ und könnte man von einer deutsch-französisch geführten europäischen Politik sprechen?

I.B.: Das ist absurd. Beide Länder führen, was die Wirtschaftskraft angeht und sind obendrein wirtschaftlich eng miteinander verwoben. Doch wie gesagt, es gibt keine entgegengesetztere Modelle als Frankreich und Deutschland. Nur wenn beide sich einigen, kann daher der gesamteuropäische Integrationsprozess fortschreiten. Sie müssen zusammenfinden – im jeweils eigenen Interesse und im allgemeinen Interesse aller Mitgliedstaaten. Das bedeutet noch lange nicht, dass die Europapolitik von Deutschland und Frankreich bestimmt, geschweige denn geführt würde. Und die sehr verzagten Schritte hin zu einer „Economic Governance“ sind nichts als gemeinsame Vorschläge, die EU ein Stück weiter zu integrieren. Welcher andere Staat hat denn seinerseits diesbezüglich Vorschläge formuliert?

7) Bis Ende Juni 2011 wird eine endgültige Einigung zwischen den europäischen Institutionen zur neuen Architektur der wirtschaftlichen Koordinierung erwartet. Glauben Sie, dass dieses Ziel ist erreichbar ist? Auf welche Aspekte sollte insbesondere geachtet werden, um eventuelle Verzögerungen zu vermeiden?

I.B.: Es mangelt nicht an Einigungen, Richtlinien usw. Es hapert an der Umsetzung in nationales Recht – offenbar herrscht innerhalb der EU ein sehr diffuses Verständnis des Prinzips *Pacta sunt servanda*... Die Frage der wirtschaftlichen Koordinierung wirft mehr denn je die Frage des institutionellen Gefüges auf: Wer ist für was zuständig? Auch der Lissabon-Vertrag hat hier nicht genügend Klarheit geschaffen, besonders was die demokratische Transparenz der EU-Institutionen angeht. Und schließlich: Wirtschaftliche Koordinierung kann es nicht geben, solange das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen Subsidiaritätsprinzip und zentralen Entscheidungen in „Brüssel“ nicht geklärt ist, und solange auch die Mitgliedstaaten den Eindruck vermitteln, dass „Europa“ ein unbekanntes Wesen ist, das aus dem Nichts heraus irgendwelche Initiativen ergreift, die man nicht teilt.

Die jeweiligen nationalen Politiker tragen hier eine große Verantwortung, und noch mehr die jeweiligen Medien. Ohne die ganz bewusste Zustimmung der sog. „Zivilgesellschaft“ – treffender: der Menschen – bringt uns auch die auf den Papier beste wirtschaftliche Koordinierung keinen Schritt weiter. Die jeweiligen Regierungen brauchen die Unterstützung und das Vertrauen der Bevölkerung, um die auf EU-Ebene beschlossenen und die eigenen Entscheidungen umzusetzen. Ohne das Vertrauen der Menschen im eigenen Land kann keine Strukturreform durchgeführt werden, geschweige denn Haushaltsdisziplin. Auch Kommission, EU-Parlament und alle anderen Institutionen sind gefordert. Wieso bleiben ihr Handeln und die Begründung dafür selbst für ‚Eingeweihte‘ so intransparent? Wen wundert’s, wenn da Uneinigkeit wächst und wenn da in allen Ländern die Europaskepsis zunimmt? Die EU krankt an ihren Institutionen selbst. Auch das hat die Schuldenkrise verdeutlicht. Einigungen, auch auf kleine Schritte, sind gut. Aber man sollte es nicht dabei belassen. Es geht ums Ganze. Welches Land stellt demnächst als erstes die bisher ungelöste Frage: Welches Europa wollen wir?



The path towards stronger EU economic governance

Olli Rehn – European Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs

The European Council on 25 March agreed on the elements of a comprehensive response to tackle the worst financial crisis since the start of the European integration. This response is of exactly the kind that the European Union was founded for – a joint and determined move to be able to withstand storms together, and to be able to come out of crisis stronger than before. This collective and comprehensive European response builds on four main elements.

First, the member states and the euro area member states in particular are all pursuing intensified fiscal consolidation and growth-enhancing structural reforms with very strong determination. This is particularly crucial in countries under the markets' spotlight, where the full implementation of the announced measures of consolidation is now of paramount importance to restore confidence.

Second, both the Council and the Parliament are delivering on their commitment to conclude the Commission's legislative package on economic governance by this summer. Reinforced economic governance is the cornerstone of Europe's comprehensive response.

Third, the permanent European Stability Mechanism will be made functional as of June 2013, with the effective lending capacity of € 500bn. By this decision, we will have in place a financial backstop with a sufficient containment effect to clear away even the slightest doubt about our capacity to act even in the most stressed scenarios. The role of the Commission in the running of operations of the ESM will be central, and the link of the ESM with the EU institutions will be clearly established.

Fourth, the banking sector repair must be completed, to safeguard the provision of credit to the real economy, to enterprises and to households. The bank stress tests, which are forthcoming this June and are coordinated by

the newly created European Banking Authority, are an essential element in this regard. Moreover, the European Commission has embarked on an ambitious reform programme for the financial sector.

The reform of economic governance in Europe is essential for preventing the re-emergence of such fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances which led the European economy to its current trouble. The current crisis has demonstrated that both markets and politics did not exert the necessary discipline. This is the reason why in September 2010 the European Commission presented the «six pack», the six legislative proposals for a fundamental reform of economic governance. Once approved and implemented by the Member States, they will mark a sea change in the way economic governance is dealt with in the European Union, and in particular in the euro area.

Economic governance will be strengthened in two dimensions. First, the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact will be sharpened, with more emphasis on debt levels and on early and more effective sanctions. Sanctions that would only come in midst of a crisis serve no purpose. Second, in a new procedure, we will be able to detect and act on severe macroeconomic imbalances. Let me outline this in more detail:

1) Strengthening the preventive part of the Stability and Growth Pact

The preventive part of the SGP is meant to ensure that EU Member States follow prudent fiscal policies in good times to build up the necessary buffer for bad times. To break off with past complacency in good economic times, we introduce the concept of prudent fiscal policy-making that should ensure convergence towards sound public finances over the medium term. According to this proposal the Commission may issue a warning in case of significant deviation from prudent fiscal policy for the euro area Member States.

2) Strengthening the corrective part of the Stability and Growth Pact

The corrective part of the SGP applies when one or both of the Maastricht criteria are violated. The Member State concerned would then fall under the Excessive Deficit Procedure. In the future, the pace of debt reduction would be regarded as satisfactory if it adheres to a clearly defined rule.

3) An effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area

Changes in both the preventive and corrective part of the SGP are backed up by a new set of gradual financial sanctions for euro-area Member States. As to the preventive part, an interest-bearing deposit should be posted in case of significant deviations from prudent fiscal policy making. In the corrective part, a non-interest bearing deposit amounting to 0.2% of GDP would apply upon a decision to place a country in excessive deficit. This would be converted into a fine in the event of non-compliance with the recommendation to correct the excessive deficit. To make the sanction application «semi-automatic», we propose a «reverse voting mechanism.» The Commission's proposal for a sanction will be adopted unless the Council rejects it by qualified majority.

4) A New Directive on the budgetary framework of the Member States

Since fiscal policy-making is decentralised, it is essential that the objectives of the SGP are reflected in the national budgetary frameworks, i.e. the set of elements that form the basis of national fiscal governance (accounting systems, statistics, forecasting practices, fiscal rules, budgetary procedures and fiscal relations with other entities such as local or regional authorities). The directive sets out minimum requirements to be followed by Member States.

5) Prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances



The proposed Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP) is a new element of the EU's economic surveillance framework. It comprises a regular assessment of the risks of imbalances based on a scoreboard composed of economic indicators. On this basis, the Commission may launch in-depth reviews for Member States at risk that will identify the underlying problems. For Member States with severe imbalances or imbalances that put at risk the functioning of EMU, the Council may adopt recommendations and open an «excessive imbalance procedure».

6) Correcting excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area

Like in the fiscal field, if a euro-area Member State repeatedly fails to act on Council EIP recommendations to address excessive imbalances, it will have to pay a yearly fine equal to 0.1% of its GDP. The fine can only


be stopped by a qualified majority vote («reverse voting»), with only euro-area Member States voting. A Member State under EIP would have to present a corrective action plan that will be vetted by the Council, which will set deadlines for corrective action. Repeated failure to take corrective action will expose the euro area Member State concerned to sanctions.


I am very confident that the Council and the European Parliament fulfil their commitment to conclude negotiations by June 2011.

Finally, at the time when public budgets need to consolidate, we must make sure that we can deliver growth and jobs. Structural reforms are necessary to bring European economies back on a sustainable growth path. Only this way, the consolidation strategy will be credible and we will be able to finance

our social models. The Commission has forcefully underlined this in its Annual Growth Survey of 12 January. Therefore, we welcome very much the commitment to structural reform that Member States express in the «Euro Plus Pact» (for euro area Member States plus other Member States willing to join), which is fully consistent with the path set out in the Annual Growth Survey.

I see the EU well on track to turn the economic tide in 2011. This does not mean that all is fine, even less that we can lean back – but it does mean that we are prepared to face current challenges, and to prevent them in the future





A New Decade for European Security

Eric Remacle - Professor at the Université libre de Bruxelles



Ten years ago a new American President named George W. Bush was elected, attacks on the Twin Towers in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington DC on September 11 were the starter of a new cycle in U.S. foreign policy based on the so-called « war on terror » and never-ending wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. European security has been directly influenced by this American agenda but also by other key international features : President Putin's emphasis on the Russian grandeur, securitization of energy and climate challenges, the syndrom of fortress Europe towards immigrants and asylum-seekers. Despite its new unifying steps like the single currency, deepening of the institutions, creation of a security and defence policy as well as territorial expansion eastwards, the European continent has remained uncertain about its ability to design its own future and influence the rest of the planet. During the Iraq war, French President Jacques Chirac promoted the

vision of a multipolar world while British Prime Minister Anthony Blair proposed a unipolar world led by the West.

Today's international and security challenges have dramatically changed. A new American President has been elected named Barack H. Obama but wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are not finished yet. Europeans have recently started a war in Libya under NATO's umbrella. The Arab peoples have started their own spring twenty years after Central and Eastern Europe. Securitization of energy, climate and migration remain cornerstones of European security strategy. The E.U. has finally adopted the Lisbon Treaty, appointed a President of the European Council and established the European external action service but few changes occurred in its external influence. After the financial crisis in the West, macro-economic policies in Europe have been decided mainly by German Chancellor Angela Merkel who is today the most influential leader in Europe. The world itself has definitely become multipolar.

It is rather challenging within such a moving context to teach European Security to Master's students. The new generation is facing issues that were not yet on the agenda not only in 1991, when the Cold war ended, but even in 2001. Therefore it is important to give the floor to students themselves. Eyes on Europe is a remarkable tool for such expression of the new generation. In 2009, we had cooperated by publishing a special issue of the magazine on Europe and Crisis Management with the support of the Bernheim Chair for the Study of Peace and Citizenship. In 2010, within the context of my courses « European Security » at the Université libre de Bruxelles, and « Peace and Conflict Studies – A European Perspective » at the

University of Geneva, we have given to students the opportunity to write short essays who are not only marked as a course assignment but also submitted for publication to Eyes on Europe.

Among more than 120 essays, I have selected around 20 very good and original contributions which have been read carefully by the editorial committee of the magazine in order to select finally 5 articles which are published in the current issue of the magazine. Some are written by one single author, others by two authors, coming from various nationalities and universities. Their topics illustrate the diversity of current security challenges : Russian vision of pan-European security, Canada-EU cooperation, Humanitarian aid to Pakistan, Securitization of customs policy, as well as Space policy. 5 other essays will be published on the website of the magazine. Many others might have deserved to be published and have been much appreciated by the instructor as well as the editorial committee. Thank you to Eyes on Europe for giving this fantastic opportunity to students from all over Europe.



Canada: A strategic partner for the EU?

Anna Oroianu - Professor Université libre de Bruxelles

Why Canada was included in the European Security Strategy

Recent decades have seen the steady deepening and extension of EU/Canada cooperation on different fields. But do both partners have the same goals and do they draw the same benefits from closer cooperation?

Introduction

In 2003, the European Security Strategy listed Russia, India, China, Japan and Canada as partners with which the European Union (EU) must seek closer political relations. Canada stands out because it is not a member of the Security Council, it does not have a significant population and it is not a global security player. To what extent can we consider Canada to be a strategic partner for EU security policy? This article will expose the characteristics of these two entities that make them ideal security partners, the main bilateral agreements and the key areas of co-operation, including crisis management and multilateralism.

Canadian Security and Defence Policy Exposed

Since the end of the Cold War, the Canadian security policy has been based on multilateralism and institutionalism. As a middle power, Canada has adapted its capacities in order to address the growing diversity of challenges facing the international community. While several policy papers have been written during this time, Canada does not have a truly coherent security strategy. Indeed, the Canadian government suffers from external pressures such as the US, and internal divergences along linguistic lines and immigrant communities.

The main tenets of current Canadian security policy are to keep conflict as far away from its borders as possible, to engage with like-minded states and to contribute to international peace and

order. These objectives were incorporated in the Human Security Agenda developed in the late 1990 by the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Lloyd Axworthy. The concept is theoretically anchored in the liberal school of thought and places the individual at the centre of international security. It highlights the need for individuals to live in freedom from fear and places the emphasis on human rights, legitimate political authorities, effective judicial instruments, a bottom-up and regional approach, multilateralism and the adequate use of force. By focusing on non-military aspects of conflict prevention and peace building, this policy has been highly successful both on the national and the international stage. Using this concept, Canada has justified its participation in international conflicts that do not directly affect its national security, such as its involvement in Kandahar (Afghanistan), Somalia and Rwanda. It also justified its participation in Kosovo – a non-UNSC-mandated operation – arguing that the intervention was the only means to protect Kosovar-Albanians.

From a realist point of view, Canadian and EU defence is guaranteed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While only 23 of the 27 EU member-states are NATO members, all EU states are represented at NATO assemblies. With the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), questions were raised regarding the compatibility of this new instrument with NATO. Canada took a firm stance in support of NATO primacy as a defence organization. We now know that the ESDP does not seek to replace NATO in its traditional role as a defence organization, but rather to complement it by giving Europeans the capacity to act without the US and non-member state involvement. In 1999, NATO Secretary General, George Robertson, stated that "a European security and defence identity is no longer just an attractive idea, it is a necessary priority." The transatlantic alliance has been tested and proved resilient on se-

veral instances, including the 2003 Iraq crisis. Currently, NATO and the EU are redefining their security agendas for the 21st century, which will further deepen transatlantic relations.

Bilateral Security Cooperation: Values, Capacities and Objectives

Canada has been supportive of EU integration since its inception. In 1976, the two entities signed an agreement for cooperation in the field of nuclear power, thus making Canada the oldest industrialized partner of the EU. Currently, negotiations are underway for the creation of a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement that is even more ambitious than the 1994 NAFTA agreement. Increased access to each other's markets means that relations between Canada and the EU will only continue to intensify. The major agreements are: the Transatlantic Declaration (1990) establishing biannual Summits between the Canadian Prime Minister and the EU Troika, the Action Plan (1996) that carries out Summit decisions, and the 2004 Partnership Agenda, which engages the two actors in closer collaboration on security, economic and justice and home affairs.

As a driving force behind the concept of Human Security, Canada has also been highly successful at exporting this agenda abroad, thereby raising its international profile and distinguishing its policies from those of the US. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), established by the Canadian government (09/2000), has been a channel for the spread of this concept. Its highly debated report about the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) was aimed at defining the norms and principles of human security and argued that sovereignty is not a privilege but a responsibility. Accordingly, States are responsible for preventing and ending four different types of crimes that may occur on their territories: genocide, war crimes,



crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Within the United Nations, this concept has been endorsed by two Secretary Generals (Kofi Annan and Ban Ki-Moon), and was the object of resolutions by the General Assembly and the Security Council.

In Brussels, this concept has received mixed responses. The former High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana, was reluctant to use the term in official speeches. However, in September 2004, he endorsed the Barcelona Report, which aims at introducing the human security discourse into EU policy. At the Commission, DGRELEX and DGDEV have incorporated the concept into their policy statements. Among the most important supporters of this concept we find Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for External Relations from 2004-2009 and Robert Cooper, personal advisor to Tony Blair and Javier Solana. In 2006, the Commissioner stated that there is a connection between Human Security and development, human rights, democracy, poverty and the proliferation of light weapons. Yet, the concept has not been officially integrated into the CFSP since member states have diverging views of the role that the EU should play on the world stage. Nonetheless, several States have joined the Human Security Network, which seeks to promote this concept in high circles.

At the international level, Human Security has positively impacted the fields of international law, development and arms control. The adoption of the Ottawa Treaty on the abolition of landmines (1997) and the Canada-EU Common Declaration (Bonn, 1999) on light weapons are significant milestones for the human security agenda. The establishment of the International Criminal Court and several ad hoc tribunals for war crimes are additional achievement for its proponents. Its application to conflict resolution has proven useful in the establishment of the Kimberly Process for verification of war diamonds and the rise of peacekeeping interven-

tions with the support of the Security Council.

Security Agreements & Operations

Bilateral mechanisms for consultation and cooperation in security matters have continued to evolve. In 1996, the Action Plan instated yearly meetings between Canadian representatives and the Directors of the EU Comité Politique et de Sécurité (COPS) and outlined common security issues such as environmental damage, nuclear security, uncontrolled migration, terrorism and international crime. Four years later a new impulse was given with the proposal of a Canadian Planning Group for the creation of a bilateral, expert-level consultation mechanism for closer political and military cooperation. That same year, the French Presidency and the Canadian Foreign Minister issued a Joint Statement on Security Matters. This Declaration affirmed that Canada and the EU will increase their dialogue on matters related to the CSDP and will build upon their common values and aspirations. Shortly after, quarterly meetings were set up to address "matters of mutual interest relating to security, defence, emerging conflicts, conflict prevention measures and the cooperation of military and police forces and civil experts in peace operations." By 2002, a complete revision of bilateral relations was underway in order to revamp the instruments already in place.

Multilateralism is a key component of the European and Canadian security strategies. In 2003, Canada expressed its desire to contribute to the objectives of the European Security Strategy. Both partners restated the desire to undertake common initiatives in the field of international peace and security and to expand their joint efforts within the UN framework during the Canada-EU Summit held in Quebec in October 2008. As they seek to foster an international order based on multilateralism, international law, democracy, the rule of law and human rights, Canada and

the EU have taken similar positions on issues ranging from the Peace Process in the Middle East, to the Iranian nuclear question, Darfur, Haiti, and Sudan. They also undertook several field missions together, such as the managing and monitoring of the 2009-10 Afghan elections.

By promoting peace and stability far away from national borders, Canada and the EU are contributing to their own security. Crisis management is a primary objective of the CFSP and the CSDP, and Canada has shown great interest in participating in EU missions. The conditions for participation were defined in Annex V of the 2002 Report of the Spanish Presidency. Shortly after, agreements for cooperation between European and Canadian Stabilization and Reconstruction Teams (START) were drawn up during the Seville European Council (10/2002) and the Niagara-on-the-lake Summit (10/2005). All EU member states have engaged through the Petersberg Tasks (1992) to contribute with soft or hard instruments to crisis management. In light of the difficulties experienced by traditional UN Peacekeeping operations in countries such as Somalia and Rwanda, Canada and the EU have embraced a new approach: Stability Campaigns. These types of operations are conducted by coalitions led by a major State, and are more likely to impose a ceasefire and take sides. By being more assertive, these types of operations promote stability and long-term solutions in troubled regions. Up to present day, Canada has participated in the EU crisis management mission EUSEC DR in Congo, the police missions in the Palestinian Territory, the stabilization mission in Guinea-Bissau, and the EUFOR operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the latter, 70 Canadian soldiers were placed under European command and trained alongside EU soldiers. This example is highly significant; it shows Canada's commitment to place its troops under the command of an international organization of which it is not a member.



Canadian participation in EU operations is beneficial to both actors. Following the Partnership Agenda of 2004, Canada asked to be treated on equal footing as European non-EU States, such as Turkey and Norway. The strategy Canada pursues is similar to that of Norway's, which can be summed up as "Troops for Influence". Norway offers resources for EU operations and in return it receives some influence over the activities that concern it. By engaging with a likeminded partner, the EU increases its multilateralism but also share the burden of the operation. In turn, these policies facilitate the continued development of common views and objectives as well as practical experience in fighting alongside allies.

Conclusion

In recent years bilateral security cooperation between Canada and the EU has increased. Indeed, both actors hold policies based on multilateralism and international promotion of stability and human rights. The Human Security agenda addresses these needs and has successfully contributed to common international objectives such as the spread of international justice and arms control regimes. As stability campaigns become more prevalent, the concept has also helped justify military interventions in far removed places. Canada and the EU collaborate on a number of security issues that have not been covered in this article such

as international terrorism, illegal migration and trans-national crime. These topics, as well as their common desire to counterbalance the overwhelming American military power, further reveal the intricacy of this transatlantic relationship.

Read the bibliography on eyesoneurope.com





The securitization of the role of European Customs

Coraline Goron -

Since 1st January 2011, all traders involved in customs transactions and international logistics have to provide EU Customs with security data through electronic declarations, up to 24 hours before goods are brought into, or out of, the European Union. Following strict guidelines harmonized at EU level, the electronic "Entry Summary Declaration" (ENS) must contain detailed information that identify the cargo (type and volume of good), the countries of loading and the traders involved in the movement of the goods up and down the supply chain, for security purposes. This measure is officially justified by the need to "increase security in international trade" against the threats of transnational crime and terrorism. Clearly inspired by the notorious Customs 24 hours Advanced Vessels Manifest Rule, in force at the United States borders since December 2002, this measure illustrates a major trend towards the securitization of the role of European customs.

This article argues that these new measures participate to the transformation of the role European customs from mainly "tax collectors" into "security actors". This movement fits into the larger trend towards the redefinition of the management of European borders. Whereas the securitization of migration has been extensively debated, very little research has contemplated the role of customs. This is striking compared to the research in the United States, where studies on the concept of "homeland security", in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, have included both the movement of people and the movement of goods.

Nevertheless, considering the fact that the EU is a major economic power, with approximately 173 million customs declarations handled in 2006 for a total export and import value of 2 500 billion EUR, the risk is high of adding a very sophisticated system of security control to an already complex border management environment. This argument certainly sheds new lights upon the rhetoric of the "Fortress Europe".

Framing the Context of Customs' securitization

Arguably, border control, defined as the effort to restrict territorial access, as long been a core state activity. Traditionally though, border controls have had two central focuses: the military defense against invasion by foreign powers and economic regulation (with the collection of tax revenues on imported products). However, customs have never been the instrument of military defense.

In the European Union, customs' cooperation and Europeanization has been originally brought about in the framework of achieving the "Internal Market" through the realization of a "Custom Union". Therefore, their role at the European external borders was mainly to apply the common external tariff on foreign goods.

The transformation of customs administrations into security actors has been the result of two simultaneous evolutions since the mid-1990s, namely the Europeanization of internal security and the identification of new threats to the security of European citizens.

The Schengen Agreement (1985) and the Schengen Convention, which entered into force in 1995, organized the removal of all national borders among five EU member states. It became EU law in the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 and today, nearly all 27 EU member states are "full right members" of the "Schengen Area". The free movement of goods and people has been accompanied by "compensatory measures" in border-related issues such as migration, asylum and organized crime. This has triggered the development, since the Treaty of Amsterdam, of the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). In this framework, the security of European citizens has become the concern of the EU and a shared competence between the EU and the member states. Although maintained in the third, "intergovernmental pillar" until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, police and

judicial cooperation in criminal matters has developed extensively.

The development of the AFSJ from the Schengen Area has to be linked with the redefinition of European security and the identification of new, non-traditional threats. Arguably, the traditional object of nation-state's defense policy, the territorial integrity of EU member states, is not threatened anymore. Hence, the European Security Strategy, adopted in 2003, states that "Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable." The document continues by listing these "new threats", which include terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and organized crime. Furthermore, a link is clearly made between "internal security" and "external security", as well as between organized crime and terrorism.

European security has not been directly linked to the role of customs. So long that cross-border criminality was only perceived as a matter of internal cooperation among EU member States, the role of customs, posted at EU external borders, was not apparent. Indeed, whereas the Treaty of Maastricht already gave customs a clear role in the protection of the financial assets of the EU and fraud issues in the framework of the first pillar, their role in the third pillar was not clearly defined. In the treaty of Amsterdam, custom's cooperation in the third pillar appeared only as one of the modalities of the "police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters". It is only with the redefinition of the nature of the threats to European security that the role of customs has been reconsidered. In the US, this movement has been addressed in terms of "externalization of homeland security". In the EU, one may speak of the "externalization of the AFSJ".

The tools of the securitization

According to the theory of securitization, such phenomenon occurs when



political actors present a situation as an "existential threat requiring emergency action or special measures" and that this particular rhetoric "is accepted by a significant audience".

Evolution of the role of Customs in the political discourse

It can be demonstrated that since the years 2000, the international movement of dangerous or illicit goods that fuel transnational crime and terrorist networks, has been identified as an existential threat to the security of the EU. The transformation of the role of custom authorities has been subsequently identified as a necessary response to these new challenges. In this field, the role of the 9/11 attacks as an accelerator of change is clearly visible. The European Commission, in a communication of 24 July 2003, "on the Role of Customs in the Integrated Management of External Borders", recognized that, whereas "customs' work in the Community had typically evolved in the context of financial and commercial controls", "in the light of the growing threats from dangerous goods, organized crime or terrorist organizations", this approach did not provide "adequate protection for the Community and its citizens at all points along the external border". It further warned that "The risks linked to the introduction into the Community of weapons, radioactive substances or explosives or contaminated meat or sub-standard medicines usually concern movements of goods at Community borders". The dramatizing tone and the sense of emergency that stems from this communication are perfect illustrations of the rhetoric of securitization. This new approach was endorsed by the Council in a resolution of 2 October 2003 on "a Strategy for Custom Cooperation" and further led to the adoption of the Safety and Security Amendment to the Community Custom Code in 2005.

The claim to tackle the threat by extraordinary means: the implementation of security measures

The rhetoric of securitization is also to be found in the Commission Press Release announcing the mandatory implementation of the new custom security rules from 1st January 2011. The statement refers to the October 2010 air cargo incidents, when a package containing explosive material, travelling on a plane from Yemen with destination the United States, was finally detected at East Midlands Airport (UK), after having landed a first time in Germany. According to Mr. Tomas Kucirek, Head of Unit, Risk Management and Security, Directorate General for Taxation and Customs Union at the European Commission, this incident testified of the need to reinforce custom risk analysis systems. The new system of risk analysis put forward in the Safety and Security Amendment is extremely complex and costly. Indeed, its implementation puts very high demands on all the stakeholders involved in cross-border trade with the EU, namely the custom administrations, on the one hand, and private actors such as buyers, sellers and transporters of goods, on the other. The security measures organize a system in order to sort "legitimate trade" from "trade that present a risk for European security". This method is based mainly on two elements. The "Entry Summary Declaration" (ENS) that the carrier must send to the custom authority of the country of first entry up to 24 hours before loading the vessel on departure for the EU, must contain a set of about 30 data, among which the so-called "Economic Operator Registration and Identification Number" (EORI), the countries of origin and transit, the type of goods, etc. These data are then analyzed, applying pan-European harmonized risk assessment criteria. In this regard, the criteria of "country of origin" could develop into a "black list" of "non-trusted" countries, following the same pattern as applied for European visas for physical persons.

Finally, if a risk is detected, the custom administration will have to perform security checks and inform the other custom administrations on the cargo's route. The whole procedure is supported by a computerized system called "Import Control System" (ICS), which has been designed to this end.

Complexities stem from multiple factors. First of all, whereas custom rules have been partly europeanized, custom administrations have never been merged and thus, remain national. So will be the implementation of the new security rules, with all the risks of delays and disparities that it implies. Secondly, the security rules will apply to a very complex and little understood cross-border management environment. International trade involves not only buyers and sellers, by also several intermediaries such as transport operators, freight forwarders and a range of specialist agents. As a consequence, for instance, different deadlines for submitting the ENS shall apply according to the transportation of the goods and changes of itineraries can result either in introducing an "amendment" to the initial ENS, or in introducing a completely new declaration. Finally, a great number of legal uncertainties remain, concerning which stakeholder has the burden to produce the ENS, to what extent it is supposed to know all the details of the cargoes it transports, and the sanctions that should ensure compliance. As far as "sanctions" are concerned, they remain the exclusive competence of the member states. Equally important, the immediate "sanction" to a carrier that would not have sent the ENS before the deadline, an automatic security check upon arrival at the EU border, will depend on capacity of the custom administration to perform them. Here again, disparities might appear between the member states.

Two elements are good indicators of the challenge that implementing these security measures represent. First of all, their enforcement, which should have begun in January 2010, has been postponed until January 2011 at the request of the trade, which were not



"ready". Secondly, the Commission, facing tremendous amounts of interrogations from the private sector, has felt the need to publish explanatory documents detailing dozens of "scenarios", telling what to do in what case. In order to monitor the implementation of the security measures, the Custom 2013 (2008-2013) has been allocated 324 million EUR, on top of which come the several millions engaged by the member states, which have to operationalize the procedure.

As a result, the potential for errors and blockages is enormous. The risk of transforming security measures into a trade barrier looms large. This phenomenon has been observed in the United States, in the days following the terrorist hijackings, when US border inspectors were put on "alert one" and systematic checks at the border with Canada and Mexico "resulted in a dramatic slowdown of cross-border traffic at enormous economic cost".

The European Commission has acknowledged the challenge of ensuring the balance between protecting society and facilitating trade, resulting from the "double-hatted" role of customs. One way of addressing this problem has been to put forward the status of "Authorized Economic Operator" since 2007, which grants International economic operators custom's clearance facilitation, in exchange of them providing guarantees that they ensure the security of their supply chain. It requires a pro-active attitude from the trade and meaningful incentives from the regulators.

A convinced audience


The discourse on terrorism has proved quite convincing. The fight against transnational criminality and terrorism, put at the top of the security agenda of the EU, has always claimed extraordinary means. EU member states have been more than willing to show their citizens that they were ready to take the necessary steps to ensure their security. Moreover, securitizing the movement of goods is far less controversial than

securitizing the movement of people. It has been argued that EU's strategy on counter-terrorism has led to the de-politicization of the instruments it uses to address the threat. In fact, the technical and rather "obscure" nature of customs' daily work was very favorable to such de-politicization, which partly explains why, despite the risks described above, it has attracted little attention from the European public. The discourse on security is so well embedded in western societies that even those potentially affected by the restricting security measures, namely the traders, for which the limitation of transactional costs is key to their international competitiveness; felt that they could not take position against it.

Conclusive remarks: Beyond securitization, a goal of further integration?

As part of the creation of the European Single Market, custom authorities have started cooperation far long before police administrations and judicial authorities. Therefore, using them for security purposes and anchoring them in the integrated management of European external borders makes sense. The theory of securitization does not pretend to offer a method to "measure security", to "measure the reality of a threat" or to judge whether a securitization move is justified or not. It simply argues that when states or nations securitize and issue, "it is a political fact that has consequences". In the case of the securitization of the role of European customs, a consequence is the further integration of EU member states. The implementation of the security measures has required the harmonization of custom rules and procedures beyond the application of the common external tariff. Furthermore, traditionally, the defense against common foreign threats has played a key role in the formation of the Nation State. The emphasis that the EU puts on the "new threats", which, arguably, are better handled at EU level than at the

national level, may serve other objectives than security. In this regard, at a time when European economic integration is put into question as a result of the global financial crisis, entangling the member states' security into a tight system of common border's regulation also serves integration objectives and identity objectives.





Dmitri Medvedev's draft treaty on European Security

Anne-Sophie Gousenbourger, Nadezdha Vozdvizhenskaya

With the end of the cold war, the EU has had to reinvent its relations with its former foe. Nonetheless the objectives between the two partners diverge. While the EU is trying to build interdependence, Russian assertiveness is more and more evolving towards dependence from the EU.

« La paix mondiale ne saurait être sauvegardée sans des efforts créateurs à la mesure des dangers qui la menacent. »

The introduction of Robert Schuman's declaration, in 1950, clearly establishes peace as the first and exclusive goal of the future European Union. However, the path towards the creation of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), in 1993 in Maastricht, was paved with obstacles. But the various regional conflicts in the 1990s, and the terrorist attacks in the beginning of the 21st century, made it more essential than ever for European countries to join forces against instability.

Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has had to reinvent itself, and to learn to collaborate with its 65-year-old enemy to ensure the continent's security. The new Russian Federation, for its part, sought to define a new clear and coherent foreign policy towards its former foes, as well as to find its place in this new multilateral world order, which was no undemanding process. Whilst Russia first underwent a rapid decline in the early 90s, this country is now regaining power and reasserting itself.

It is on these grounds that Russian President Dmitri Medvedev issued his draft Treaty for European Security, on November 29, 2009. This proposition was the direct outgrowth of three previous speeches, in Berlin (June 2008), Evian (October 2008) and Helsinki (April 2009), in which the President had already mentioned his will to renew the outdated framework of European Security. **DMITRI MEDEDEV OR THE CONTINUITY** By publishing his draft Treaty on European Security, Dmitri Medvedev, Pre-

sident of the Russian Federation since 2008, is clearly following the lead of his predecessor. The 14 articles of the draft Treaty take up the two recurrent themes of Putin's policy since 2000: deepening the ties with its international partners while keeping complete sovereignty and not committing too much to any kind of organization. Accordingly, the Russian president proposes a treaty "guided by the principles of the Charter of the United Nations [and of] Helsinki final Act", "acknowledging and supporting the role of the UN Security Council", an organization which, as already mentioned, presents for Russia the non-neglectful asset of counting the Federation among its influent members. Besides, the Treaty would give Russia, some people fear, an important droit de regard on NATO by a process of "peer review". Indeed, it is "open to [...] [some] international organizations", among which the North Atlantic Alliance, and Article 3.1 provides that "a Party to the Treaty shall be entitled to request [...] any other Party to provide information on any significant [...] measures taken by that other Party, which, in the opinion of the Requesting Party, might affect its security".

When it comes to the content, though Dmitri Medvedev makes a point when he argues that European Security is "fragmentary" and needs renewal, his proposed reform remains quite thin and vague ("any other actions" (Article 3.3), "the Party or Parties which, in its opinion, might be interested..." (Article 5.1)). This vagueness sometimes hides more realist concerns: for instance, the withdrawal conditions of Article 14 stress the "supreme interests" of the Parties. Also the second paragraph of Article 7 is nation-centred since it entitles any signatory to "consider an armed attack against any other Party an armed attack against itself" and "to render the attacked Party [...] the necessary assistance, including the military one, until the UN Security Council has taken measures", though those immediate reaction should be "immediately reported to the UN Security Council".

Apart from this Article, the procedure to decide on a collective action remains quite long and heavy, requiring unanimity for any important decision. One can therefore wonder about the true efficiency and *raison d'être* of this new treaty.

The european viewpoint

It is important to point out that the EU has never had such strong formal links with any other country in the world. On the other hand, Russia has also become one of the most divisive issues in the EU since Donald Rumsfeld split the European club into "new" and "old" member states.

Since the end of the Cold War, the European Union has been trying to deal with Russia just as with the other former countries of the Communist block, by introducing and promoting democratic and social reforms. In the 1990s, EU members agreed on a common approach to Moscow, setting up a strategy of democratising and westernising a weak and indebted Russia. It hoped to bring to Russia Western values of transparency, consensus and mutual interference in terms of European Security Policy. The current legal basis for EU relations with Russia is the Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA) that came into force in December 1997 for an initial period of ten years. It establishes the institutional framework for bilateral relations, sets the principal common objectives, and provides for activities and cooperation in a number of policies such as trade and economic co-operation, political dialogue, human rights and democracy, cooperation in science and technology. Russia was also the subject of the EU's 1999 Common Strategy, which turned out to be a failure (according to several European opinions) despite ambitious strategic goals and objectives, such as the establishment of democratic institutions, the integration of Russia in the European Common Economic and Social space, the guarantee of the transpa-



rency of its political institutions and the rule of the civil Law , or even the promotion of global security" . This failure can be explained by the fact that the EU had a "rather limited leverage on Russia" and by "the complex and interdependent nature of problems and challenges that Russia poses on the EU"

Since 2005, the EU and Russia have also created several 'common spaces' and working groups of cooperation in various fields linked to the economy, neighbourhood policy and security. But Russia is today trying to revise the terms of its commercial deals with western oil companies and its military agreements. And it is trying to establish a relationship of 'asymmetric interdependence' with the EU. While EU leaders believe that peace and stability are obtained through interdependence, Russia's government is willing to create a situation where the EU needs more Russia (and its energy) than Russia needs the EU. We may therefore argue that the EU has failed its strategy. Thanks to its energetic politics today's Russia is more powerful, less cooperative and above all less interested in joining the EU.

At the same time, the growing Russian assertiveness and strong belief in the successful building of pan-European security comes from its very perception of Europe. Indeed, it considers that the EU, divided by internal conflicts between new and old members, is incapable to react unilaterally. This vision derives from the complexity of the decision making process within the EU in general, and in particular when the CFSP is concerned. Due to this climate of European impuissance, Russia chose to rather act through bilateral acts with most EU member states than to wait for a common answer. It is important to underline that this problem of the common response is still typical of the EU. As the EU Commissioner for Trade, Peter Mandelson, has claimed: "No other country reveals our differences as does Russia. This is a failure of Europe as a whole, not of any member state in particular".

Generally speaking, the EU's approach to Russia is divided between two extremes. On the one hand, the EU encourages the Russians to get involved in several European institutions and to invest in the European energy sector. On the other hand, the EU perceives Russian expansionism as a possible threat and tries to increase its activities in countries such as Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova in order to control Russian influence and to promote political and social reforms. Marc Leonard and Nicu Popescu distinguish five European approaches to Russia :

- the 'Trojan Horses' (Cyprus and Greece), who often defend Russia interests in the EU
- the 'Strategic partners' (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) that enjoy a 'special relationship' with Russia, which occasionally undermines common EU policies.
- the 'Friendly pragmatists' (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia) that privilege business interests more than political goals.
- the 'Frosty pragmatists' (Czech republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland , Latvia, The Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the UK) , which are also more concentrated on business interests but are more open to discuss Russian behaviour on human rights or other issues.
- the 'New cold warriors' (Lithuania and Poland) that have more hostile relationship with Moscow.

Despite the first cool Western reactions , the Russian political promotion of a 'new architecture' of European Security especially highlights four 'Strategic partners': France, Germany, Italy and Spain . The Heads of these states were invited by Russia to participate in bilateral talks to discuss this topic. The Italian President and Spanish Prime minister, invited in Moscow in 2008, openly supported Medvedev's idea of a new European architecture, the latter even pointing out that this initiative was ta-

king into account European, Russian but also World interests. But the framework of these discussions was frequently treacherous, since they were held in parallel with several bilateral agreements in the fields of trade and energy: by offering advantageous contracts to their partners, Russia kept them away from a too critical approach regarding its policies.

Two countries were particularly receptive to Russian "offers": France and Germany do see in this proposal a possibility to build a common European security space, on the condition that it would not weaken existing European Security structures such as the OSCE. Germany's relationships with Russia in particular are more complex and contain the legacy of the Second World War and the Cold War. Germany is the biggest Russian trading partner, without speaking of several agreements on building The Nord Stream pipeline. During his official visit to Germany on June 2010, Russian President discussed with German chancellor Merkel the creation of a Russia-EU committee on foreign policy and security at ministerial level that would discuss crisis and conflict management. In fact, one could argue that this could be seen as an alternative way to implement his Treaty.

Nonetheless, not all European countries reacted enthusiastically on Medvedev's proposal. Indeed, some countries of Central and Eastern Europe such as Poland and Lithuania, perceived Moscow's project as an attempt to undermine NATO and to reinforce the Russian sphere of influence. This "New cold warriors" tend to preserve the interests of NATO and to underline the central role of OSCE in security policy making.

Conclusions

The vagueness of the draft Treaty, earlier mentioned, might be one cause of the apparent European lack of reaction. There still exists a slight tension when it comes to Russia. This country is regaining its assertiveness, but its fo-

reign policy still remains unclearly defined, which accounts for a certain "paranoia", especially coming from the CEECs : no one precisely knows what is to be understood behind this proposal. This idea of a hidden Russian agenda, aiming at weakening existing structures and reinforcing its influence, constitutes the central point of European fears and critics. Therefore, European countries might prefer to wait until the proposition becomes more detailed.

However, more than one could argue that the current European Security framework is not efficient enough, and the Russian proposition of renewal is the only one existing so far. Plus, the Russian Federation's energetic resources make it a non-negligible partner. The member states of the EU should therefore work on a better coordination in the field of Foreign and Security Policy, in order to reinforce its structural power on the international stage, by presenting a strong common position. The EU might therefore come up with another proposition of reform for European Security, which might better meet its interests and values, and avoid a "by default" acceptance of any other proposition from a structural power strong enough to impose its idea.

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Space Policy: a new pillar of European security

Elena Marda, João M. Mónica dos Santos

With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Space Policy has been formalized.

This domain, although rarely evoked, has major implications for Europe's security : state-of-play.

The love affair between Europe and Space is now a few decades old and has been particularly fertile since the inception of the European Space Agency (ESA) in 1975. Until recently, however, Europe's presence in space did not fully mirror the continent's evolving political landscape, the best case-in-point being the mismatch between the EU's growing political weight and its shy and apolitical presence in space. Last year, though, a first step was taken to reverse this situation when the Treaty of Lisbon was finally ratified. Under the new legal framework, the EU has now a shared competency in space and a European Space policy is called upon by article 189 TFEU. This new treaty provision fully opens the doors of space to the EU as it can now be present in space as a political actor of its own right and no longer as a crutch of Member States. Although the EU did not need this new competency to conclude ongoing space projects such as Galileo or the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES), article 189 was much needed as it expands the EU's horizons in terms of what it can do in space and from space. The new provision will namely allow the EU to develop reinforced partnerships with Member States in order to integrate current infrastructures and systems (national and European) and to complement them with new ones. In doing this, the EU will have at its disposal a complete set of space systems capable of providing an echelon of accurate and reliable information that, among other things, can strengthen its role as a security provider.

1. The EU as a security provider in space and from space

The term security has known a remarkable semantic evolution over the years. In an increasingly globalized, interconnected and interdependent world, threat perception is based today on a number of concerns that go well beyond classic military defence and territorial integrity, encompassing issues as varied as climate change or migrations – "threats are no longer solely posed by states, but increasingly by non-state actors, anonymous and diffuse networks and incremental developments that cannot be associated with a specific actor". It is in light of this broader concept of security that the role of the European Union as a security provider will be looked at.

Security applications of EU space projects

Currently, all projects under EU auspices are labelled 'civilian' and will be kept under civilian control once operational. Nevertheless, as the EU and ESA have both acknowledged, the borderline between civilian and military responsibilities is becoming increasingly vague as the term 'security' is used in a variety of contexts covering both civilian and defence-related security. Space technology, in particular, is said to be "dual by its nature", which explains why Europe wants to "substantially improve coordination between its defence and civilian programmes" and "develop robust, flexible and interoperable civilian and military capabilities". It is therefore unsurprising that the EU's most important flagship programmes – Galileo and GMES – will serve both civilian and military purposes once they are operational, as confirmed by EU authorities, even though they were initially conceived as strictly civilian projects.

The Global Monitoring for Environment and Security system (GMES) is a Euro-

pean Earth Observation programme launched in 2005. Initially, the project was very much environment-oriented as its applications targeted essentially climate change and the provision of services useful in scientific research and meteorology. However, the S in 'Security' was eventually re-evaluated to include a wider range of concerns and the EU Council later called for "the implementation of GMES security-related services to support the related European Union policies". GMES is now expected to assist in tasks such as border surveillance, maritime surveillance or infrastructure surveillance, and the system's capabilities in terms of imagery can also be of great use in peace-keeping, conflict prevention and disaster prevention and management. GMES thus carries an important strategic component as it will allow the EU and its Member States to have unrestricted access to a reliable and independent source of information which is vital for good policy-making in different fields, from Environment to Immigration policy, to Crisis Management. Moreover, this system also presents applications that are useful to military actors, namely at the level of Earth imagery where Europe is currently overly dependent on data coming from non-European systems. This dependency can at times turn into a liability and this was confirmed during the conflict between Georgia and Russia in 2008, when European actors were confronted to the unwillingness of both American and Russian actors to grant Europeans access to commercial imagery of the region. Galileo – the EU's first flagship programme – is a global navigation satellite system (GNSS) launched in 2002 that will provide an alternative to America's GPS or Russia's GLONASS, the sole existing GNSSs at the moment. Galileo was developed from a civilian perspective and was considered of strategic importance since GPS and GLONASS, both operating under military control, cannot give assurances of service continuity insofar as the civil component can be switched off or made less precise in the event of a conflict



for instance. However, as ESA and the Commission stated, we have become so dependent on services provided by satellite navigation in our daily lives that should any shutdown or loss of services from these systems would seriously affect an enormous range of commercial and civil activities, including land, air and sea travel, maritime navigation, telecommunications, information technology and networks, broadcasting, climate monitoring and weather forecasting, to name but a few and would thereby hit the entire economy besides leaving the continent extremely vulnerable. From a defence standpoint, Galileo will be crucial as it will provide an independent and reliable source of intelligence that will make European military actors less exposed to its non-European counterparts.

Lastly, there is the Space Situational Awareness (SSA) programme. SSA will see to provide security in space by monitoring the space environment and providing timely information that will allow operators of assets to avoid collisions between assets or strikes of space debris. Such a system is essential considering our dependency on space systems, which provide us with a range of services that, among other things, enable our economies to function and grow.

For a broader concept of European security: space to the service of other EU policies

The EU has supported many issues pertaining to the human security agenda, although without declaring it, and space policy is one of the new dynamics relevant in that sphere. Climate change, human and non-human disasters, terrorism are some of the aspects where space capabilities could offer a new dimension in terms of prevention and management. Even though not directly related to security and defense issues, these factors are widely influential to human life and, with that perspec-

tive in mind, space can play a pivotal role in promoting human security issues. It should be noted, however, that defense space assets are already an integrated part of member states security architecture when they contribute to operations like tsunami rescue missions, so here again civil-military synergies are welcomed too.

Many experts have doubted the effectiveness of space products regarding intentional or unintentional catastrophic events, based on the fact that satellite data dissemination requires several days in order to be useful. However, some progress and results have also been observed. For example, the Haiti earthquake proved to be a good test on the usefulness of space assets. Optical Earth Observation data was a crucial source of information for generating post disaster knowledge since it allowed a timely and comprehensive assessment of damage. Within 48 hours, the data collected by space assets allowed analysts "to evaluate the extent of destruction quite extensively and accurately".

It has been interestingly suggested, that space assets could contribute practically in projects concerning civil protection, such as coast-guards, police, and firemen. It is possible that in the near future we will see a more frequent implication of space based technology as a crucial aspect of what were once strictly ground-based civilian operations.

2. From theory to practice: The use of space assets in current conflicts operations

In order to be precise, it is important to highlight what exactly space assets, applications and intelligence may offer to a combined European security and defense policy. To better illustrate this we have chosen a few practical cases. The satellite center of Torrejón in Spain has notably become a vital element of ESDP and crisis management during all

recent operations of EU : Chad, Georgia and the fight against piracy.

One of the most well-known cases that shows in the most clear way the importance of space assets in European security, is that of the ESDP operation in Chad (EUFOR TCHAD/RCA), where imagery and geospatial intelligence is being used. It has upgraded the efficacy of the cooperation of troops on the ground and space applications collecting accurate up to date maps of remote regions, while at the same time are gathering information to relate events and evidence with the satellite image. In addition, European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) products are quite helpful in providing support to the protection of refugees' camps and UN personnel.

The conflict in Georgia intensified the actions related to space operations. Apart from mapping data and military activity monitoring, identification and analysis of Vehicle Check Points were also completed.

In addition, with piracy being one of the most important international problems, space applications cannot be ignored as a possible option contributing to the resolution of this problem for international stability. Operation Atalanta has been supported by geospatial products provided by EUSC that addressed monitoring of pirated bases (including possible preparations for pirate attacks), along the coast and around some offshore islands in Somalia. At the same time, the EUSC has offered substantial help on the research of terrorist training camps in the southern part of the country.

3. State-of-play of European projects and of the EU's space policy

With the exception of EGNOS (European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service), none of the EU's flagship space projects (GMES, Galileo and



SSA) is operational yet. Galileo will see its first four satellites be launched into space in 2011 but full capacity will be attained only when all thirty (27 operational plus 3 active spares) are in place, which will not happen before 2014. As for GMES, the five sets of Earth observation satellites (called Sentinels) are expected to be in place by 2019. With regard to SSA, it is still in preparatory phase and full operational services are expected to be implemented between 2012 and 2019.

It seems clear, as Paul Weissenberg, Director for Aerospace, Defence and Security Industry at DG Enterprise & Industry, affirmed, that the EU did not need article 189 to finish ongoing projects. But this provision was nevertheless urgently needed insofar as it expands the EU's horizons in terms of what it can do in space and from space. Still, a number of challenges might slow down the EU's rise as a leading actor in space, namely as a security provider.

With regard to the creation of a military space in Europe, the EU will have to face States' reluctance in sharing defence and intelligence data as well as budgetary constraints. Furthermore, the concept of a military governance structure would be very difficult to operationalize, and sensitive issues such as the creation of a data policy further complicate the picture, as States' space policies are traditionally firmly anchored to defence policies. Another issue of difficult solving for a European-level management of space is the need to manage simultaneously military and civilian concerns, which means that European systems would be utilized by different users and for distinct purposes that could, at times, be conflicting.

With regard to the construction of a European Space Policy more generally, there is not yet a defined strategy at the EU level, which means that Space policy continues to be "focused on space applications and broader benefits for other EU policies". In terms of funding, the prospects are still dim considering

that, as of today, Space Policy is not yet foreseen in the financial perspectives as a policy of its own merit – space projects will continue to be financed through other policy areas with an interest in them such industry, competitiveness or security, and through the Seventh Framework Programme. This solution is not likely to be sustainable if Europe wants to affirm itself as a leading actor in space and the very conclusion of projects such as Galileo and GMES are threatened as, concerning the former, there have been substantial budget overrides, while concerning the latter funding is only guaranteed until 2013, the future being uncertain. A setback on the conclusion of these projects would deal a blow to any EU's aspirations in becoming a central security provider.

Nevertheless, there are positive signs as well. Synergies between the European Union, the European Space Agency and the European Defence Agency are perceived as being particularly productive by enabling the development of more efficient space systems capable of responding to the needs of both civilian and military actors. Such synergies are essential for the EU to become a relevant actor in European security insofar as European space systems, although under civilian control, should be able to contribute to security from a military defence perspective as well, and not only in supporting of civilian activities. Also, the reinterpretation of ESA's mandate in favour of the agency's participation in defence projects has certainly eased the development of the aforementioned synergies with military actors.

4. Future perspective for space and security

Space based assets and applications can provide a valuable contribution to European Security from both a civilian and military perspective. Missing out on this potential would be a grave mistake that could namely hamper the

development of the European Security and Defence Policy since operations are increasingly dependent on information and services delivered from space assets. It would be exaggerated to argue that space capabilities have the answer to all security and defence issues. Nevertheless, they do have a lot to offer in the response to a broad range of conventional and non-conventional threats, and may exploit an impressive flow of information for civil and military actors. Accordingly, an improved security policy will depend on the integration of civil and military systems and of space and non-space based technologies in a more profound way in order to ensure effective responsiveness to an ever-changing international environment. And no other entity is better placed to perform this task than the EU. Therefore, a European Space Policy can indeed serve as a platform for the EU to affirm itself as a security provider and can thus become one of the fundamental pillars maintaining European Security.

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Eu's response to the Pakistani Floods: An Effective Means of Combating Terrorism?

Kloé Tricot, Alessandra Varesco



The 2010 floods in Pakistan plagued a country already struggling against underdevelopment but it also proved an opportunity for the EU to stabilize a strategic region...

In July and August 2010, Pakistan was devastated by monsoon rains and floods that severely affected some 18 million people and that are expected to result in a 2% reduction in Pakistan's 2010-2011 GDP, a 10% rise in unemployment and the loss of \$2bn in export revenues. In response to the severity of the crisis, the European Council agreed on September 16th, in addition to immediate and significant humanitarian assistance, to "grant [...] Pakistan increased market access to the EU through the immediate and time limited reduction of duties on key imports from Pakistan [...]". The humanitarian relief to-date amounted to €320 million and the trade measures, by far the most significant element in the EU's response

to the crisis, remain to be put in place.

Taking into account "the strategic importance of Pakistan's development, security and stability in the region", the agreement, worth \$900 million, is aimed at helping Pakistan recover from the floods and stabilize its economy in order to ensure its institutional and political stability. As stated by the German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle: «if you want to stabilize Pakistan on the long run so that it does not drift away to extremism or fundamentalism you have to make sure that the medium and long term consequences of the catastrophe will be countered economically». Pakistani Foreign Minister, Makhdoom Shah Mehmood Qureshi, agreed when he declared that Islamic militants would exploit the consequences of the disaster and the economic crisis to get new support.

The potential collapse of Pakistani governments has been of international concern for many years due to the presence of the Taliban in this nuclear-armed nation, the tensions around the Kashmir region and the situation in the

lawless north-western area next to the border with Afghanistan. Additionally, a stable Pakistan is an esteemed asset and ally in a strategically important but very unstable region. Indeed, according to Catherine Ashton, EU High Representative; "a safe, secure, stable Pakistan is manifestly in the interests of the European Union [...]". Therefore, the trade agreement would include clauses on issues such as counter-terrorism, human rights and regional stability, as had previous agreements between the two actors.

However, the proposal provoked opposition both inside and outside the European Union. The reduction of duties, concerning mainly textile products, raised concerns within EU Member States like Spain, Portugal and France. Additionally, the EU trade agreement, having to be approved by the World Trade Organization because of its breaches of GATT articles I – most-favoured-nation principle – and XIII – non-discriminatory administration quantitative restrictions – could also meet with opposition. Countries like India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Peru which have their own preferential trade agreements with Europe and which export many textile products to the region could oppose the deal. Consequently, the European Council Summit declaration of September 16th, 2010, invited the Commission to "explore options with WTO partners and to present its finalised proposal [...] taking account of industrial sensitivities in the EU". Moreover, the European Parliament, freshly empowered by the Lisbon Treaty, must also approve the tariff-cutting proposal. In response to an appeal to back the proposal from Pakistan's Foreign Minister, MEPs stressed that Pakistan must work alongside Europe in fighting international terrorism and bringing stability to the region.

Following lengthy exchanges within the EU, the Commission presented its "Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council introducing emergency autonomous trade preferences for Pakistan". The proposal



has still to be voted by the Parliament but has already been discussed at the WTO during a meeting of the Council for Trade in Goods (CTG) on November 30th. However, no agreement was reached and several countries including India requested additional consultations to discuss the issue. The trade agreement is therefore stalled at least until April 2011, when the CTG next convenes, although the EU hoped it would come into effect on January 1st, 2011. An important hurdle was overcome when on December 10th, following the 11th EU-India Summit, India declared its support for the Union's waiver request. In the words of Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh «[India supports] all international efforts to provide succour to victims of floods in Pakistan».

Despite the agreement having not yet been adopted, it marks a significant milestone in the evolution of the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy and in particular its stance on counter-terrorism. Against this background, the next section will be dedicated to the analysis of the EU counter-terrorism strategy.

EU and counter-terrorism

Subsequent to the 9/11 terrorist attacks and latterly to the London and Madrid bombings, the EU developed a comprehensive approach to countering terrorism. Indeed, the EU's strategy for fighting terrorism includes both internal and external activities. Although the internal aspect prevails, "counter-terrorism has [...] become a strategic priority of EU foreign policy and is incorporated across the whole gamut of the EU's relations with third parties". Therefore, the EU has identified several countries as being priority countries in the fight against terrorism thus being prime candidates for receiving EU support through capacity building and financing of specific counter-terrorism interventions¹.

Externally, the EU strategy regarding

terrorism can be seen as a mix of hard and soft power approach. According to J. Nye, hard power, on the one hand is the ability to use the carrots and sticks of economic and military might to make others follow your will, while on the other hand, soft power is the ability to get what you want by attracting and persuading others to adopt your goals. In the present context, soft power can be characterized by the use of civilian measures that aim to fight terrorism on the long term. Indeed, the EU seeks "to a greater extent than the US [...] to tackle the so-called "root causes" of terrorism and extremist fundamentalism"¹. Therefore the EU's foreign policy regarding counter terrorism can be considered as being structural. Structural foreign policy is "conducted over the long term and [and] seeks to influence or shape sustainable political, legal, socio-economic, security and mental structures"¹. Indeed, the EU tends to "[mainstream] cooperation against terrorism in its foreign policy"¹ and thus regularly links development with security². Terrorism being linked to other problems such as failings of governance and development or poverty and weak judiciary systems calls for such a multi-dimensional approach. Therefore, the EU often includes clauses on issues such as counter terrorism, regional stability and human rights in its agreements with third countries. In the event that these clauses are not respected, assistance can be reduced or interrupted. According to Keohane, however, "the counter-terrorism parts of these agreements are so vague as to be meaningless". It is worth noting that in the context of its longer-term aid programmes, the EU has also had recourse to financing practical measures on the ground. For example, under its seven-year programme for Pakistan (2007-13), worth €398 million, the two focal sectors for intervention are i) "rural development and natural resources management in North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan in order to with a view to reducing regional disparities and promoting stability in Pakistan's sensitive provinces bordering Afghanistan" and ii) "edu-

cation and human resources development which is a critical ingredient for developing a well-trained work force and creating a moderate and stable Pakistan". It is premature to measure the effects of these interventions but in relation to counter-terrorism programmes in general "EU officials [have admitted] that these programmes have had 'mixed results' so far"⁵. Finally, countering terrorism has also become a priority of the EU's political dialogue with third countries, as was noted in both EU-Pakistan summits held in June 2009 and 2010.

On the other hand, hard power is characterized by the use of short-term military responses that corresponds with a more conventional foreign policy. Despite the absence of European military instruments, the EU's counter-terrorism policy can be considered as being realist and primarily driven by security considerations². This is due to counter-terrorism generally been considered as a 'hard' security purpose⁴. Thus, similarly to the US, the Union has "[broke]red] agreements with countries which gained new strategic significance with the beginning of the [...] 'war on terror'"¹. Indeed, in 2001, the EU signed a cooperation agreement with Pakistan although the country had been sanctioned and President Musharraf, who came to power through a military coup, had been systematically criticized¹. This example illustrates the relative importance given by the EU to the respect by certain of its key allies in the fight against terrorism to democracy, human rights and the rule of law¹.

These features are not enough to label the EU a military power. According to M. Telò, in his book *Relations Internationales, une perspective européenne*, even if the EU wanted to become such a power, it would not be easy. The EU Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) will be an important pillar in the overall Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as it evolves. However, in the short to medium term, there are several obstacles for the EU to become a mili-



tary power in the international relations arena. Firstly, the EU does not have the budgetary means to carry out an offensive, military foreign policy. Furthermore, it would be difficult for the EU to be an effective military power given its highly complex internal and procedural structures. Additionally, the issue is further complicated by the fact that its Member States preserve their foreign policy power and often have diverging objectives. Similarly, there is no common EU opinion in this regard shared by all citizens. Some Member States wish to conserve their "neutrality" status while many Europeans are reluctant to foreign military adventures. Consequently, populations that are divided on so many issues would hardly agree on the use of 'stronger' means.

Therefore, we can argue, like M. Telò, that the EU is a civilian power. This means that Europe's influence on the international scene is linked to its socio-economical power that attracts many countries wishing to extend their export markets. Hence, the EU, by establishing trade with third countries, emphasizes long-term cooperation rather than a short-term one. It is thus clear that this type of long-term commercial strategy cannot be simultaneously applied with the use of military means. This does not mean that other tools of coercion cannot be employed. Indeed, the literature often mentions persuasion and positive incentives as prime civilian power tools. Additionally, civilian powers often rely

on social influence and have a wide range of tools that can be used to remain influential on the international scene. In the case of the EU, its main tool is its economic power. Indeed, the EU very often relies on economic mediums to achieve its objectives. The strategy has proven successful: the European market is so attractive for many third countries that they accept many European conditions in bilateral agreements. Clauses on such issues as democracy or human rights and more recently on counter-terrorism are thus often inserted in agreements with limited debate.

After having characterized the EU as a civilian power, the section that follows will demonstrate this by analysing the EU's counter-terrorism policy towards Pakistan.

The EU's counter-terrorism policy towards Pakistan

Pakistan is considered by the EU as a central ally in the global fight against terrorism. Indeed, the country faces serious threats from domestic terrorist groups operating both nationally and internationally. In 2009, the death toll in terrorist attacks amounted to at least 11,585 casualties, a number significantly higher than in previous years. However, this number could turn out to be even more important since the information provided by the Pakistani authorities can not be deemed entirely reliable.

Several distinct terrorist groups operate in Pakistan. The main groups are the Council for Independent Baluchistan – that seeks the independence of Baluchistan, the largest province of Pakistan–, the Taliban and the Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law – that aims at enforcing Sharia law in the country and that is especially active along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border –. The position of the Pakistani government towards these different groups is quite ambiguous. It sometimes offers them some support and occasionally collaborates with them when fighting external threats. But similarly it has shown strong commitment to counter terrorism and withdrew support of the Taliban regime after the 9/11 attacks. Nonetheless, a weak central government that possesses weapons of mass destruction, a country with widespread corruption and tense relations with its neighbours, has made Pakistan a strategic recipient of EU aid. Not only is Pakistan "located in a region which is of crucial interest to the EU and its security" it is also a federal parliamentary democracy and the world's second largest Muslim nation that "could be a powerful and stabilising voice in the Islamic world".

"Pakistan's relations with the European Union are [thus] in large measure influenced by its important role as a partner in the fight against terrorism"⁹. EU cooperation with Pakistan, which was reinforced in 2004, has materialized through an increased access to European markets. Pakistan's economy has severely suffered from its counter-terrorism activities: not only have foreign direct investments remained low due to security concerns⁹, but it has become increasingly difficult for Pakistan to export its products and to diversify its exportations. Financial aid is also of crucial importance to fight the root-causes of terrorism and the phenomenon itself. Therefore, the EU's long term strategy towards Pakistan includes programmes to help its socioeconomic development.

Annual Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan, 2003- 2009

Source: SATP Database⁷

	Civilians	Security Forces (SFs)	Terrorists	Total
2003	140	24	25	189
2004	435	184	244	863
2005	430	81	137	648
2006	608	325	538	1471
2007	1523	597	1479	3599
2008	2155	654	3906	6715
2009	2307	1011	8267	11585
Total	7598	2876	14596	25070



To conclude, we can first say that the EU's approach to counter-terrorism, as it was demonstrated by our case study, is civilian. It seeks to counter terrorism in the long term by fighting its root-causes and offering economic aid and trade agreements to third countries.

However, we can question the EU's efficiency. According to Wennerholm, Brattberg and Rhinard, the "EU assistance is surprisingly low and effectiveness is undermined by incoherence among different organ's inputs, lack of insight into local conditions, stronger roles played by individual EU and non-EU states, and timidity in face of the most sensitive cases"⁴. They go on by saying that the EU "is a partner that usually knows what it wants, but is rarely prepared to work out how to get it"⁴. There are nonetheless expectations of more coherent EU foreign policy with the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty and notably with the creation of the new European External Action Service (EEAS). Designed to defend "Europe's interests and promote its values", the aim is to add value to the efforts of the Member States in the international relations field and to ensure that even if Europe does not speak with one voice, at least it will transmit one message in areas of common concern. One might ask the question as to which is most effective in countering terrorism, civilian or military power. There appears to be little alternative between the two. Aiming to fight the root-causes of terrorism may seem the best way to eradicate the problem. However, as it was demonstrated, the EU is not always in good position to be truly efficient. The United States, on the other hand, with its mainly military approach, having failed dramatically in some theatres, has produced results others but the casualty rates have been high and the long-term political fall-out has been enormous.

Finally, as it was previously mentioned, Keohane considers that "the counter-terrorism parts of [EU] agreements are so vague as to be meaningless"⁵. In the present case, the counter-terrorism

efficiency of the EU trade agreement is undermined by the fact that there are not any specific clauses that refer to it despite the fact that various EU bodies and other stakeholders repeatedly refer to it as being a pre-condition for signature of partnership agreement.

At first sight, the EU's political dialogue, trade and aid foreign policy tool-box appear impressive. The effectiveness of the deployment of these 'soft power' tools as instruments to counter terrorism remains to be demonstrated.

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ESDP: is there a way out of NATO

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Over the last several years, there has been intense debate across the Atlantic about the relationship between the EU and NATO. Finally the arrival of ESDP in 1999 therefore led to confusion on both sides of the Atlantic. Will the European Union and NATO compete or cooperate, and if so, what might it look like? Whether there is a way out for European security from NATO.

An outstanding American General and Field Marshal of the Philippine Army Douglas MacArthur once said: "There is no security on this earth. Only opportunity." (MacArthur, 1955). From today's perspective, it is the NATO, which grabs this opportunity most successfully then other global players. For the time being there can be no security for Europe without the Alliance, as it remains the last coordinator and guarantor of European and transatlantic security. For today the matter of transatlantic security ultimately refers to the ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) and NATO relations.

The milestone of ESDP Franco-British summit at St. Malo in 1998 stirred up serious contradictions. While Chirac and Blair took a step further declaring ESDP should also have the capacity of "autonomous" action, many American officials worried that the summit represented an attempt to develop an autonomous European military capability outside NATO.

Two years earlier in 1996 NATO and Western European Union (WEU) negotiated the framework "separable from but not separate".

Finally the arrival of ESDP in 1999 therefore led to confusion on both sides of the Atlantic. Will the European Union

and NATO compete or cooperate, and if so, what might it look like? Whether there is a way out for European security from NATO.

Difference of views between the two sides of the Atlantic is a cold idea appeared since the beginning of Soviet-American block policy in Europe, when NATO was totally in charge of European defense. There was no doubt, that with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact, NATO had to be given a new role and functions, as well as a new "face", new tasks, and organization design. NATO needs to rephrase of its AGENDA after the end of the Cold War. For its part the EU with Maastricht (1992) began to craft its own post cold war destiny.

Yet at the same time for its more than ten-year run, ESDP (or, as it is commonly called since Lisbon, Common Security and Defense Policy) is step by step seeking for the coherence, effectiveness, and full-fledged military capabilities. The more or less stable world order of the Cold War no longer exists. Ongoing transformations triggered by dramatic changes rise question about the future of NATO and about Europe's security without US involvement (Naumann, 2009).

The EU has developed a number of relevant important tools (institutional framework, decision-making mechanisms, bodies, etc.); moreover politico-military integration within the EU has a strong public support. Meanwhile every next crisis provides striking confirmation of European weaknesses. Only six of the 23 missions on three continents, focusing on peace keeping, border control, and crisis prevention have been of military nature. Perhaps the way to compromise is to delegate the EU duties in civilian aspects, as the Europeans are quite successful in humanitarian operations and civilian instruments. But the Union will hardly restrain its ambitions for leadership. European leaders declare that for the EU there is no alternative accept to be the global player (Solana, 2008).

United States has long advocated the development of a European "pillar" within NATO – in essence the idea that a politically and economically strong Europe should contribute roughly equal military capacity as the US to mutual security. Hence there were two ideas embedded in the pillar concept – not only military strength, but also strength within NATO, not outside it. European Union and its particular members are of critical importance for the USA and NATO.

On the one hand, Americans have long been concerned that European military weakness is harmful to NATO and the USA, to say nothing of the Europeans themselves. Nevertheless the ESDP process has turned out to be a bittersweet development. It has been fraught with maneuvers that raise questions of whether the ESDP will be within NATO or outside it.

The worst possible outcome for the US is continuation of European military weakness and separation of Europe from NATO (in terms of European security reality concerning soft security problems).

The United States has had difficulty deciding whether ESDP is NATO's companion or competitor (Hunter, 2002). Inevitably, the parallel processes in NATO and the EU began to have a profound impact on one another, given that they both reach threat of some fundamental questions, including the nature of security in 21st century. On the other hand, Brussels claims that for today "Berlin plus" established in 2002 is not an appropriate framework. The EU is looking for flexible and pragmatic relations, which will promote discussions on issues of common interest (Solana, 2008). Europeans are calling NATO by sight the USA to accept Europe as equal partner.

NATO remains Europe's indispensable security provider despite the fact that ESDP has evolved significantly for the last decade. By and large, there are



three basic deficiencies of ESDP:

- The EU is unable to match their words with deeds. This is real consequence of the lack of political will. Europe is politically disunited and deeply divided over security policy.
- The ESDP is short of defense spending.
- ESDP and NATO need to cooperate more smoothly.

Each step of ESDP development and NATO response to it demonstrate high degree of misunderstanding and even distrust. But all these negative feelings are hardly being compared with other EU partners like China or Russia.

The United States is a deciding factor in the development of the Union's approach to security as a term of comparison and eventually competition (Hunter, 2002).

NATO is the main factor and primary forum for European security not only because most of the EU members are also NATO members, but most importantly because of the military capabilities made available the EU missions. The EU and NATO are fishing from the same pool of resources in terms of personnel and capabilities (Javier Solana, Paris, July 2008).

New NATO conception is like an attribute of political identity in addition to its military function. It can be seen in competition with the ESDP and the construction of an EU security identity distinct from the transatlantic partnership.

The nature of NATO and ESDP differs dramatically. In fact it is impossible to compare them, as originally NATO was created due to the time like response to communist threat, while the ESDP is just a pillar, or one of the policies, which let the EU to be a full-fledged actor.

Certainly two organizations will stand up to threats more effectively, but this duet will hardly duplicate security in Europe.

Both parties face different understanding of threats to security and their destiny as global players. NATO demon-

strates true global ambitions, so does the EU, but actually the Europeans are more worried about Justice and Home Affairs and problems at Europe's front door.

In principle, the United States wants – and needs – a strong European partner to help manage the new security threats, most of which emanate from beyond Europe's borders. New wave of revolutions in Maghreb states is the perfect example.


So genuine co-operation and burden sharing – real multilateralism – is possible and, indeed, necessary, but the European Union should at last establish a meaningful political role founded on a coherent ESDP, even if this role refers to the European understanding of threats to security and values, shared within the Union.

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EU and the southern neighbourhood

Ioannis Kasoulides - Vice-Chairman of the EPP Group in the European Parliament



EU and the southern neighbourhood: Protecting human security to defend regional security

The ongoing revolutionary wave in the Arab World has already exposed the EU's lack of prompt reaction and time lag to reach and defend a common position towards these groundbreaking events.

It is hard to argue that this EU weakness came about unexpectedly. It is also hard to ignore however the widespread disappointment from this failed, first test of the EU's foreign policy in the post Lisbon era and of the extensively advertised "one voice" in the EU's external policies that the new Treaty was supposed to bring about.

At this stage, building up the EU's coherence in its foreign policy is not enough on its own. The Union's self-identification as a "normative power", which was deeply wounded by its past relations with, and initial reluctance to denounce, the falling autocratic regimes in the region, is becoming increasingly imperative to be reasserted.

The unfolding events in the Arab World are proving groundless a Western perception that democracy and social

justice are not values shared by the rest of the world. But the young people on the streets of Tunis, Cairo and elsewhere were demanding exactly that: true democracy, human rights, social justice, good governance and independent judiciary. It is interesting to observe that in these uprisings, no slogans or directions were used from the habitual «...isms» like Islamism, imperialism, Zionism nor the plight of the Palestinians was mentioned. When the people, however resilient they may be, witness unprecedented corruption by their leadership and bad governance contributing to their extreme poverty, they need space, made available by traditional democratic means, in order to protest and express their anger and demand change. Oppression, the police state, torture and lack of democracy and human rights lead to revolt in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, Syria and the list keeps on expanding.

Not only was the EU unprepared for these developments, it was also reluctant to react in a robust and coherent manner towards them. Instead of immediately supporting the democratic aspirations of the Arab people, quite a few Member States saw this extraordinary situation as a realpolitik exercise, while the High Representative soun-

ded at times lukewarm and obviously constrained by the Member States' common denominator.

It is too early to tell whether the revolutions will be successful or not. This will be the case only if these countries manage to proceed to political, economic and social stability for the sake of their own people and for the security of the wider region. If not, a perpetuating instability and social unrest, rising of fundamentalism and unprecedented migration flows towards Europe are a bad scenario which can absolutely not be excluded.

It is thus now clearer than ever that regional security is interlinked to the human security of the countries' populations in question. In this important moment of history, the EU is called to bear its true weight. Far from becoming a democracy crusader, the Union must contribute to encourage the political debate, facilitate the normalisation process and support and, if necessary, protect the human rights and democratic aspirations of the Arab people. All these in a spirit of dialogue and accepting the principle that reforms are a matter to be achieved from within and not imposed from outside.



Within the context of an emerging and so long-awaited multipolar world, the EU should actively promote the necessary international understanding on the fundamental and elementary legal and ethical concepts of international peace and security. And as a recent study of the EU's Institute for Security Studies suggests, in the above perspective, «international peace bridges both security and human rights and certainly overlaps with the concept of human security». Consolidating the concept of «responsibility to protect», as described in the 2003 European Security Strategy and reiterated on timeless occasions thereafter, should be the EU's first priority for defending human and international security in the region and the whole world. Uniting with our partners to promote constructive and peaceful conflict resolution, we need to accept that our values have been proven to be universal with like-minded, educated and middle-class people and are key to regional and international security. And this should not remain wishful thinking or eloquent rhetoric but a top policy priority.

The forthcoming necessary review of the European Neighbourhood Policy should be a first tangible step in the right direction. In this context, as the EPP Group has timely underlined, a differentiated approach towards the Mediterranean partners is absolutely warranted. A general policy has led to serious errors on the part of the EU. We must strengthen common ideals and promote intercultural exchanges while taking into account the specificities of each country.

Reconsidering the EU's approach towards its southern neighbourhood and everything that the latter implies is not an easy task to be accomplished overnight. But for the EU critics who believe that «nothing will change in the end», one should recall what Harold Macmillan famously replied when asked by a young journalist «what sort of thing could blow a government off course?» ("events, dear boy, events!"). Much

more than any theoretical concept, it was indeed about groundbreaking, unexpected events that decisively changed the course of the EU's integration across its history. Reconciliation after the Second World War was the reason for its very creation. Its inability to play a concrete role in the former Yugoslavian war led to the creation and functioning of its CFSP and ESDP. It is to be hoped that the ongoing events in the Arab World will be lessons to be learned for a much more coherent and consistent EU foreign policy.



International Relations

- Relations internationales
- Aussenbeziehungen

The EU and the US: unhappy partners at the UN?

Richard Gowan, - associate director at the NYU Center on International Cooperation



A mere three weeks after the Republicans took control of the House of Representatives this January they organized a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on the United Nations. It was a rotten day for multilateralism. Newly-empowered conservative congressmen suggested that the US should slash much of its financial support to the UN.

If the Republicans paused to think how this might affect European observers (they probably didn't) they would have guessed that those Euro-weenies would be unhappy. The EU has made a lot of its commitment to "effective multilateralism" over the last decade. EU military operations from the Democratic Republic of Congo to Chad and the Gulf of Aden have deployed to support UN peacekeepers or humanitarian aid operations.

It is arguable that European support to the UN is one of its most distinctive contributions to international security – one that gained prominence during George W. Bush's two terms in the

White House as the EU emphasized its commitment to the UN as an alternative to American policy. The new Republican assault on the UN, still only in its early stages, brings back memories of previous transatlantic disputes over global order.

Yet European diplomats may have been secretly pleased to hear of the Republicans' initiative. One told me that he hoped that congressional pressure might persuade the Obama administration to propose cuts in the UN's budget – and that many EU members would happily back this move. Is the EU falling out of love with the United Nations?

If the EU-UN relationship is going sour it is – like so many floundering love-affairs – mainly about money. European governments pay roughly 40% of both the UN's regular budget and its peacekeeping budget, and an even higher percentage of humanitarian and development spending. The peacekeeping budget runs at over \$7 billion a year thanks to the large UN operations in Su-

dan and the Congo (there are 100,000 UN troops and police officers worldwide, a record) while the UN appealed for over \$10 billion to respond to humanitarian crises including the Haitian earthquake and Pakistani floods in 2010.

Meanwhile the US covers a far larger share of the UN's costs than any other country – including more than 27% of the peacekeeping budget, for example. Congressional Republicans have repeatedly called for cuts. The Democrats are not cast-iron fans of the UN either: in the late 1990s, the Clinton administration pushed Kofi Annan to make major cost. Yet the Obama administration made a point of taking its UN dues seriously from its first days in office, assuming that this would win some global goodwill. The U.S. has paid new UN bills on time – although it still has over \$700 million in outstanding debts – and is perceived to have taken a relatively relaxed view of costs.

The Obama administration's generous approach to the UN has created a dilemma for European officials who would prefer to see UN costs fall during the economic crisis. While the EU's contributions to the UN are paltry relative to the sums spent on bailing out Greece and Ireland, diplomats are under pressure to find savings wherever they can. But it's been an unpleasant experience for the Europeans to push this issue while the U.S. has been emphasizing its new credentials as an honest and enthusiastic donor to the UN.

Non-European officials around the UN have noted an increasing European tendency to frame all policy issues in terms of money. Some argue that financial concerns have made it impossible for European representatives to think about the UN's work in places like Darfur or Haiti in an objective fashion. This is not totally fair. The EU's members have avoided calling for major cuts



in aid in situations such as Darfur, and their response to the Haitian earthquake was rapid and generous. But the EU's critics do have a point.

France has, for example, cut its contributions to UN funds and agencies by about 20% in each of the last two years. The new Dutch government is promising big cuts too, while cash-strapped EU members including Greece, Hungary and Ireland have already reduced funding. Other European powers – including Germany, the Nordic countries and the UK – have avoided comparable cuts, but even their representatives emphasize the importance of austerity. One non-European diplomat argues that Britain has shifted from an "internationalist" approach to the UN (i.e. viewing strengthening the UN system as an inherently good thing) to a "national interest" one (i.e. probing how multilateral initiatives serve specific UK interests). The same could be said of other EU members.

This is naturally painful for the UN Secretariat's staff, who long viewed the Europeans as their natural allies. And it has emboldened many developing countries to defy the EU's wishes at the UN – a trend that grabbed attention in Brussels when the UN General Assembly failed to grant the EU a specially-devised "enhanced observer status" last year.

Nonetheless, many European readers may be inclined to dismiss such concerns with a weary shrug. Surely the EU's cost-consciousness at the UN is just a rather minor symptom of the new frugality that is reshaping European domestic and foreign policies?

This is, of course, half-right. But the EU's difficulties at the UN are also a case-study of another significant strategic trend: the unexpected disconnect between the Obama administration and European governments about how to address the new world order. Before Obama took office in 2009, many European officials in New York thought the Democrats would share their view of how to manage multila-

teralism. This, they assumed, would be a pleasant change from the Bush era. They were surprised when the new administration prioritized outreach to emerging powers like India and African states.

For the Obama administration the UN is a useful testing-ground for building alliances with rising global powers rather than simply reinforcing ties with long-standing partners. This hasn't stopped France and the UK cooperating closely with the US in the Security Council on topics like sanctions against Iran. But it has generated a great deal of friction over second-order issues. In 2010, the US and the EU engaged in an improbable but ill-tempered battle over the new governance structures for a new UN women's agency. EU members felt that they should have extra powers on the new entity's board to reflect their financial support to its work. The US dismissed this as unnecessary, and won the fight.

This was hardly the stuff of great power diplomacy. But European officials claim that the US has cut the EU out of rather more important UN-related issues, such as the Middle East peace process. US officials complain that the EU's financial concerns make it harder to reshape the UN as a mechanism for building new relations with rising powers.

European diplomats are fully aware of the need to accommodate the rising powers at the UN but believe that US efforts to do so are often simplistic. The Obama administration's decision to partner with Egypt on some human rights issues at the UN – meant to show goodwill to the Islamic world – looks naïve after this year's outbreak of protests in Cairo.

European observers also contrast America's recent willingness to absorb the relatively limited costs of UN peacekeeping and aid programs with its failure to make potentially far more expensive compromises in multilateral climate change negotiations. But these differences may soon be overshadowed by

a broader attack on US support to multilateral institutions by the expanded Republican caucus in Congress. This will present problems not only for the Obama administration but also a strategic dilemma for European leaders.

The dilemma is easy to summarize. In the past, the EU has tried to gain international influence by demonstrating support for multilateralism when (as so often in the Bush years) the US adopted unilateralist positions. Although big donors to the UN such as Germany have always watched its accounts closely, the EU's readiness to bankroll UN activities has frequently been a simple way to underline Europe's multilateral vision.

Now, however, EU members are actively keen to keep UN costs down. If the US does start to cut back its multilateral commitments – a near-certainty if a Republican wins the presidential elections next year and possible in any political scenario – European governments are far less likely to rush forward with offers of new money than before.

But if the EU's members are increasingly unwilling to fund UN operations, they will also increasingly struggle to set the rules of "effective multilateralism". European officials say that they would love to see rising powers such as Brazil, China and India pay a larger share of the UN's costs. Yet there should be no illusions about what this would mean: the less financial leverage the EU has at the UN, the less it will be able to direct how peacekeepers deploy, humanitarian aid is delivered and development programs are run.

This loss of influence will negatively impact on perceptions of Europe as a global player. In spite current financial constraints, the EU still has an interest in maintaining significant financial support the UN as the price of influencing crises far beyond its borders

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L'objectif d'un Etat palestinien: Une ambition sans moyens politiques

Elena Aoun – Maître d'enseignement, Université Libre de Bruxelles

Alors même que la perspective d'une solution au conflit israélo-palestinien fondée sur deux Etats est, dans les faits, en train de s'éroder, on ne peut que constater l'effacement persistant du volontarisme politique européen au profit d'une approche purement humanitaire à Gaza et 'institution-building' en Cisjordanie. Ce qui ne saurait être sans conséquences, la nouvelle date butoir pour la création d'un Etat palestinien se rapprochant dans un contexte rendu hasardeux par les bouleversements régionaux.

Il fut un temps où l'Europe, acteur balbutiant sur la scène internationale, s'efforçait d'apporter sa pierre à la résolution du conflit israélo-arabe, au risque de se voir critiquée de toutes parts. Aujourd'hui, bien que forte de moyens sans précédents et d'une PESCE éprouvée, l'UE semble avoir renoncé à assumer un rôle politique volontariste, se contentant d'œuvrer, par son savoir-faire technique et son avoir financier, à la construction d'un Etat palestinien qui, au regard des évolutions sur le terrain et en l'absence de toute perspective tangible de négociations, semble condamné à rester dans les limbes.

L'Europe : un acteur pionnier

Parmi les Etats dont la parole compte sur la scène internationale, les pays de la CEE avaient été les premiers à évoquer les « droits légitimes des Palestiniens », « la nécessité d'une patrie pour le peuple palestinien », et le fait que « l'OLP (...) devra être associée à la négociation ». Vivement décriées à l'époque par les États-Unis et Israël, les vues européennes ont néanmoins été au cœur du processus de paix enclenché en 1993. Ce sont également les Européens qui, au terme de l'infertueuse période intérimaire prévue par

les accords d'Oslo, avaient formellement reconnu le « droit inconditionnel » des Palestiniens « à l'autodétermination, comprenant la possibilité d'un Etat », Etat que l'UE serait « disposée à envisager » de reconnaître « en temps opportun ». Un gage donné aux dirigeants palestiniens, mais qui n'a pas été concrétisé en dépit des bouleversements ultérieurs.

Hypothéqué par des termes initiaux trop flous, une mise en œuvre erratique, la violence croisée entretenue par les extrémistes des deux bords et les dérobades du parrain américain, Oslo a finalement décaillé avec l'éruption de la deuxième Intifada en 2000. Dans un contexte marqué par un changement d'administration aux Etats-Unis, l'UE avait alors cherché à promouvoir une issue politique, en portant notamment le projet de Feuille de route et la constitution du Quartet, censés l'un dessiner une sortie de crise, l'autre amener l'administration Bush à se ré-intéresser au dossier.

La dépolitisation de l'approche européenne

Il s'agissait là des dernières initiatives politiques européennes, et toutes deux ont été abandonnées aux Etats-Unis. Le contenu de la Feuille de route a été re-négocié par Bush et Sharon, son agenda défini par Washington, et son lancement opéré en l'absence des Européens après la guerre en Irak. Quant au Quartet, il s'est vite transformé en organe de validation des orientations américaines, dont l'abandon ultérieur de la Feuille de route.

Cette tendance est notamment attestée par l'acceptation européenne du retrait israélien de Gaza (août 2005) en dehors de tout cadre négocié alors même qu'une fenêtre d'opportunité s'était ouverte avec le décès d'Arafat, disqualifié comme obstacle à la paix, et l'accession à la tête de l'Autorité palestinienne (AP) de Mahmoud Abbas, homme pourtant préféré des Israéliens et des Américains. Revenant sur les conditions initialement posées, l'UE s'était ralliée à Washington dans

son soutien à une démarche purement unilatérale et, pour viabiliser la situation à venir, avait accru son soutien aux autorités palestiniennes et mis en place deux missions : EUPOL COPPS et EUBAM Rafah.

L'immobilisme politique allait cependant déboucher sur de nouvelles complications. Le Hamas ayant gagné les législatives de janvier 2006, l'UE opte à l'instar des Etats-Unis pour le boycott du gouvernement mis en place (avril 2006). Tous les efforts visant à créer les institutions d'un futur Etat palestinien sont interrompus. Consciente des risques de détérioration accrue des conditions socio-économiques de la population palestinienne, l'UE met néanmoins en place un « Temporary International Mechanism » permettant d'acheminer une aide à la population sans passer par l'AP.

Si, pour ses concepteurs, ce mécanisme est un succès, il n'empêche ni une dégradation drastique des conditions de vie palestiniennes, ni une détérioration sécuritaire, à la fois intra-palestinienne, et israélo-palestinienne. Le Fatah, grand perdant des élections de 2006, s'engage avec son rival dans un bras de fer qui culmine en juin 2007 lorsque, selon la version communément admise, le Hamas s'empare par un coup d'Etat de la Bande de Gaza. Mais symétriquement, le Fatah s'empare aussi du pouvoir en Cisjordanie au détriment du gouvernement issu des élections de 2006. L'heure n'est toutefois pas aux subtilités démocratiques. Le soutien européen au gouvernement que désigne Abbas est immédiat : les relations officielles reprennent avec les autorités de Cisjordanie, tandis que l'approche vis-à-vis de Gaza reste minimaliste et exclusivement humanitaire.

Inertie politique face aux impasses actuelles

La générosité de la communauté internationale et en particulier celle de l'UE contribuent à une reprise économique en Cisjordanie mais rien n'est entrepris côté politique. L'initiative viendra des Etats-Unis et, tant en amont qu'en aval



de la conférence d'Annapolis (novembre 2007), l'UE se contentera de soutenir la diplomatie américaine malgré ses faiblesses et de ses biais. Il en ira de même lorsque le volontarisme de l'administration Obama se heurte au refus de Netanyahu de lâcher suffisamment de lest sur les colonies pour permettre à Abbas de revenir à la table des négociations alors que la communauté internationale dit viser la naissance d'un Etat palestinien fin 2011.

La confiance récemment réaffirmée de Catherine Ashton en ce dénouement paraît exagérément optimiste. La rupture entre Hamas et Fatah subsiste ; le dialogue entre Israël et l'AP est rompu du fait de la colonisation rampante ; la situation économique demeure incertaine : même les avancées en Cisjordanie sont précaires, puisqu'elles reposent presque exclusivement sur l'argent injecté par les donateurs. De plus, après s'être tassée pendant quelques temps, la violence resurgit. Dans les dernières semaines, plusieurs événements ont rappelé la volatilité de la conjoncture : reprise du cycle de lancement de roquettes à partir de Gaza et de représailles israéliennes, premier attentat depuis 7 ans à Jérusalem, assassinats d'une famille de colons en Cisjordanie. En outre, la diplomatie américaine a récemment refait la démonstration de ses limites en opposant son veto à une résolution du Conseil de sécurité condamnant la colonisation israélienne.

L'impasse israélo-palestinienne perdue avec, d'un côté, un gouvernement palestinien incapable d'obtenir le moindre gain politique, et un Etat hébreu qui, plus conforté qu'il ne l'avait jamais été auparavant par sa proximité avec l'OTAN, son adhésion à l'OCDE (mai 2010), son statut de pays non européen le mieux arrimé à l'ensemble européen, semble plus intéressé par le phagocytage de Jérusalem-Est que par la fin de son conflit avec des Palestiniens largement bridés, les uns à Gaza par le boycott multidimensionnel, les autres par la nécessité de se plier aux injonctions de leurs banquiers et nourriciers.

Dans cette conjoncture, l'absence de

tout volontarisme politique européen ne peut qu'interpeller. Certes, l'UE ne ménage pas ses efforts pour assurer la survie matérielle de l'AP et la construction des institutions d'un futur Etat palestinien. Mais cette stratégie – que certains analysent comme aboutissant, in fine, au financement de l'occupation israélienne – ne peut faire advenir la paix en l'absence de toute dynamique politique. Et celle-ci achoppe constamment sur la problématique de la colonisation. Or contrairement à ce qu'elle a pu faire dans les années 1980 et 1990 – utiliser son poids économique et ses instruments de coopération pour amener son partenaire hébreu à modifier certaines de ses pratiques – l'Europe a complètement soustrait ses relations avec ce dernier aux aléas du processus de paix au prétexte que toute pression exercée sur Israël amènerait des résultats contraires à ceux souhaités.

L'Etat palestinien : un défi trop grand ?

Cette même logique s'est appliquée à la question de la reconnaissance de l'Etat palestinien : chaque fois que les dirigeants palestiniens, confrontés à l'impossible reprise des négociations et au démantèlement graduel de la possibilité même de la solution des deux Etats, lui ont demandé son soutien pour une déclaration unilatérale, l'UE s'est dérobée. Rien pour l'instant n'indique qu'elle réagira différemment lorsque, dans quelques mois, la question se posera. D'ailleurs, au-delà de l'enjeu, certes important mais surtout symbolique, de la reconnaissance d'un Etat palestinien, l'essentiel reste la conclusion d'un accord de paix qui permettrait de re-concentrer les énergies sur la construction d'un Etat viable et non plus sur l'édulcoration des mille maux de l'occupation. Aller en ce sens impliquerait aujourd'hui pour l'Europe de boussuler tant Israël que les États-Unis. Or au vu des évolutions de la dernière décennie – qu'on peut résumer par une dépolitisation des relations avec Israël et un suivisme par rapport aux États-Unis – il apparaît peu probable

que l'UE le fasse même si une solution juste et durable au conflit en dépend. Ainsi, après avoir été un moteur de la transformation des approches internationales quant au conflit dès les années 1970, l'UE est finalement devenue l'un des acteurs qui, de par leur effacement politique, entretiennent les conditions d'une nouvelle flambée de violence, à un moment où les bouleversements en Afrique du Nord et au Moyen-Orient complexifient la donne et menacent de remettre en question tous les statuto quo dont a pu bénéficier précédemment l'Europe.

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11th EU-India Summit - 11th EU-India Annual Summit: An Assessment in the Larger Analytical Framework of Relationship between the two Strategic Partners

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Last year on the 10th of December, the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh arrived in Brussels to attend the 11th European Union - India Annual Summit. He was welcomed by the two presidents; Jose Barroso from the European Commission and Herman Van Rompuy from the European Council. The summit saw issuing of a Joint Statement, making of a Declaration on International Terrorism, launch of a Policy Dialogue on Culture apart from the speeches given and the questions answered by the leaders of the two partners.

Now, how can one analyze this summit? Whether any real progress has been made in the so called Strategic Partnership between India and the EU, or not? Or, the summit exposed stagnation, or even degradation in the relationship? This is the object of this article i.e. to critically assess the last EU-India summit and then to anchor it in the analytical frames of the Indo-EU relationship. To do so, this essay is divided in two parts. First, comments will be made specifically on the results of the last summit through a reading of joint declarations made, and the speeches delivered by the leaders. Apart from this, there will be a discussion on the postponement of the important EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA). In the second part, an attempt will be made to situate the analysis of the 11th EU-India summit in the larger analytical framework of Indo-EU relationship.

A Reading of the 11th EU-India Annual Summit:

Let's start with the political aspects of the Summit. No speech or joint statement/declaration made by the leaders of the two entities avoid from the apparently banal harping on the shared values of democracy, human rights, rule of law, and stabilization and promotion of peace in different regions of the world. But, when it comes to real situations like those of Afghanistan, one can read the difference in the European and Indian positions. While Van Rompuy asked for "afghanization" of Afghanistan, Singh stressed on the success of internatio-

nal community's effort to stabilize the war-ravaged country for the security of both India and Europe. Similarly, on the important question (from the Indian perspective) of cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan's territory against India, none of the EU leaders spoke about it far from holding Pakistan accountable for it. Even the Joint Declaration on International Terrorism just underlined the need for cooperation to combat it, shying away from its denunciation. Now, contrast this with the statements, even the recent ones, of the Head of States and/or Government from Britain, France and Germany. All of them condemned Pakistan asking it to stop the cross border terrorism.

As for the institutional set-up of the Union, the two leaders from the Union informed Singh that there will be more coherence in EU's position and thus more achievement of concrete results thanks to the welcome changes the new post-Lisbon setting promises to bring. Even Singh seemed to be hopeful about it when he expressed his delight regarding the changes in European institutional architecture.

On the front of energy required to support and to sustain the growing Indian economy, the EU is trying to help India in the peaceful use of nuclear technology, but obviously with a business purpose in mind. The European countries like France and Germany are competing hard with the USA to sell reactors

and other components to India for the production of nuclear energy. It gets reflected in the Joint Statement announcing an early conclusion of an Agreement for Research and Development Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. Similarly, on the issue of green technology, the Commission's President Barroso hinted towards the potential the European companies possess in helping India to transform towards a 'clean' economy.

No discussion on the last summit between India and the EU can be complete without broaching the question of the FTA between EU and India which got postponed till the spring of this year. It was in 2007 that this FTA was first mooted. However, even after four years this immensely win-win agreement for the both the parties seem to be hamstrung by EU's conditionality for trade. The chapter on the sustainable development in the EU-India FTA treaty is asking India for binding commitment on a range of issues including human rights and environment. The Indians aren't really happy about such clauses. Another reason for the delay in conclusion of the FTA includes Indian non-respect of the Intellectual Property Rights. Europeans complain about violations of patent laws by the Indians in their production and exports of generic medicinal drugs to other countries of the South. However, the Indian side points out to the fact that its IPR regime





is in conformity with the international laws on the IPR. Other plausible reasons stopping the FTA from being concluded include export subsidies to European farmers, opposition to Foreign Direct Investment in retail sector from the large unorganized sector in India.

Situating the 11th EU-India Annual Summit in the Larger Analytical Framework:

As political entities, there is no doubt that there is a big overlap between India and the EU in the self-identification and its projection on the international stage. The EU is a champion of democracy, human rights, rule of law etc. All these values are the cornerstone of its foreign policy. It is evident in the "System of Conditionality" it has consciously and consistently developed while fostering relationship with third countries. Similarly, India takes great pride in being the largest democracy of the world, in a region littered with countries having authoritarian regimes. India differentiates and projects itself as liberal, tolerant and multicultural polity flowing from the nonviolent and humanistic outlook of its two founding fathers, Gandhi and Nehru. The reading of the Joint Statement and speeches delivered by the leaders of the two partners points towards this overlap of value-laden worldview and foreign policy approach.

However, as Realists say, all influential actors couch their external policies in moralistic terms and claim to pursue a normative agenda. But, when this way and agenda come in conflict with vital national interests, it is the latter which is preferred and pursued. This can be said to be true for the two partners, at least for India which is located in a region (South Asia and the contiguous areas) where jungle laws still rule the roost. Surrounded by perceived or real hostile state and non-state actors, India doesn't take much of time to opt for Realist doctrine in its foreign policy. This means power maximization and aligning with those countries which

possess military capabilities and are ready to project India against its perceived or real foes. And there comes in the US. Aligning with the US gives India a perceived assurance against the threat from her 'enemy number one', China, and a real edge over her constant headache on the north-west, Pakistan. On the other hand the EU, is a self-proclaimed civil power, or may be not even a power in the Realist sense of the word. This point of the EU being just a soft (read weak) power and India looking for hard power can be the single most important explanation for weak EU-India political relations. Therefore, Indo-EU partnership is still stuck at the dialogue level. Furthermore, the matter gets worsened due to EU's own internal divisions. The Indians are said to be waiting for the time when the Common Foreign and Security Policy will develop into a Single Foreign and Security Policy. To add more, the EU and Indian strategic interests, priorities and positions in the region don't really align together. Afghanistan and Myanmar certainly prove the above point.

Speaking with a single and more coherent voice has always been mandatory while running and managing the external affairs of any country or organization. The question which was posed four decades ago by the former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger regarding 'a phone number of Europe' seems to have been answered by the post-Lisbon institutional streamlining and expansion of European foreign and security policy through appointment of a High Representative and the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS). This brightens the prospect of better European relations not only with the US but also with India especially when the Indian side has always pointed out towards the complex and confusing institutional architecture of Europe. However, the much commented performance of Madame Ashton and a delay in setting up of the European diplomatic service EEAS dampens the spirit of even diehard Europeanists and those expecting a bet-

ter Indo-EU relationship.

What role do values and norms play and what role should it play when dealing with other countries? It is important to reflect and decide on this question especially when it is impinging just not on political partnership but also on the economic relationship. This question is a bit more pertinent for the EU, and especially when dealing with a big upcoming market like India. As mentioned before the European insistence on including the conditions regarding the human rights for the agreement on FTA is one such stumbling block. On the other hand, the Indian side quite cleverly turns upside down the European complains of Indian breach of international legal norms by not adhering to the IPRs. The Indian side starts playing the moral card saying that if European patent laws are strictly adhered to it, it will become a question of life and death for millions of poor patients in the global South and not just in India. To deliver a judgment on the fact that who is right and who is wrong is always difficult. But, one thing is certain that the delay in the conclusion of the FTA isn't beneficial for any side. According to some studies if the Indo-EU FTA is concluded, the economic activity between the two partners can jump to twice the level of what it is now. Moreover, it is important to note that economic relationship between India and the EU isn't only the main thread but also the springboard of Indo-EU relationship. Let's hope that the leaders from the two will understand this ending the status quo in the relationship by an early conclusion of the FTA.

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EU-Brazil environment cooperation: A new push for multilateralism

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cation institutions, and supports projects to protect forests and fight poverty in the most fragile ecosystems.

Since the establishment of bilateral cooperation the range of political dialogues has quadrupled, and it now covers more than 20 different areas. In addition to dedicated dialogues on climate and on broader environmental issues, dialogues have been established on topics such as energy, macroeconomic and financial issues, trade, education, research and development, social policy and employment issues, information and communication technology.

Building the environmental partnership

Brazil is endowed with a significant share of the global natural resources: it has the world's largest rainforest and may hold up to 25% of the world's total biodiversity. It is also playing an increasingly significant role in international environmental negotiations. This emerging international role, coupled with its environmental responsibilities, has led some to describe Brazil as an environmental superpower. If the EU is to advance its global environmental objectives, it is essential to build an effective cooperation with Brazil. Let's take a closer look at how this cooperation is evolving.

Brazil's economic development in recent years has seen the country lifted out of its developing country status. In parallel, its international role has evolved dramatically. Brazil has gone beyond the traditional dichotomy of industrialised versus developing countries, and established itself in a new position in the world's geopolitical system. While remaining a keen advocate for developing countries, Brazil is also beginning to accept the responsibilities that come with increased global influence.

The intensified cooperation between the EU and Brazil over the last decade, and the mutual trust resulting from it, have been instrumental in unblocking the systemic failures that threatened to cast a shadow over the Biodiversity Convention (CBD) COP 10 in Nagoya, Japan, last year. This new spirit of cooperation will be invaluable in the run-up to the Rio+20 conference in 2012, and beyond in the transition to a global green economy.

This article explains how cooperation on the environment between the EU and Brazil is framed, what it covers and how it has evolved in recent years. It will show how the build-up of trust was key to achieving a successful outcome of

biodiversity negotiations in Nagoya.

EU-Brazil Cooperation

Over the past decade, Brazil has embarked on a course of stable economic growth and modernisation, establishing itself as a major emerging economy. Coupling this growth with sound policies for economic redistribution, it has strengthened its position as leader for South America's economic integration and stability.

The EU has responded to this transformation by intensifying bilateral relationships, and in 2007 Brazil became one of nine countries with whom the EU maintains a Strategic Partnership. This complements the 1992 EU-Brazil Framework Cooperation Agreement which establishes the basic political framework for bilateral cooperation. The sectoral policy dialogues that have been established in all major domains remain the cornerstone of EU-Brazil cooperation. Typically, these dialogues consist of annual senior level meetings and technical exchanges throughout the year. They are supported by a budgetary envelope of € 61 million for the 2007-2013 period. This budget also fosters cooperation between higher edu-

Good forest governance is a key environmental challenge at the global level. Since adopting the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) Action Plan in 2003, the EU has been reaching out to third countries to develop FLEGT partnerships. However, Brazil's forest product exports to the EU are primarily pulp and paper made from Eucalypts and pine in well-managed and productive plantations rather than products made from Amazon hardwoods. Brazil argues that international trade instruments like FLEGT are not an efficient means to address concerns over Amazon deforestation. Moreover, reinforced measures taken by the Lula administration have considerably improved Brazil's forest gover-



nance. Instead of a fully fledged FLEGT partnership, and in view of possibly developing trilateral cooperation with third countries, the two parties have therefore agreed to exchange best practices to promote sustainable forest management through tailor-made activities. They will be looking, for instance, at how Brazilian domestic practices will help their exporters comply with the recently adopted EU Due Diligence Regulation (DDR). Brazilian legislation and practices will also be the focus of a study tour and two workshops in 2011. The most recent EU-Brazil biodiversity discussions revolved around last year's CBD COP10. Before the conference, both parties were committed to finalising negotiations on a complete package, including the adoption of an international regime on access to genetic resources and benefit-sharing (ABS), a new Strategic Action Plan with new biodiversity targets, and mechanisms to finance the conservation of nature.

Other discussions have also advanced. Talks on waste issues have centred on the Ban Amendment to the Basel Convention for the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. A technical exchange on Waste from Electrical and Electronic Equipments (WEEE) took place during an international seminar in Recife.

The key event on the horizon will be the upcoming Rio+20 Summit, and preparing for it will be a major point in the dialogue. The institutional framework for sustainable development will be a central topic at Rio+20, but one where progress is likely to be slow. The EU wants to see investment in more efficient and effective international environment governance, while Brazil will probably put additional stress on creating a more suitable governance structure to deal with sustainable development at UN level. Despite these different emphases, I am confident that the EU and Brazil should be able to find enough common ground to make Rio+20 a success

on this point of the agenda. As an initial endeavour in bridging the positions, the two parties will hold a workshop later this year on the potential outcomes and joint deliverables expected from the conference.


Both Brazil – the driver behind Rio+20 – and the EU agree that the 'green economy' should be one of the main foci of the conference. Greening the economy is a core priority for the EU, in line with our EU2020 Strategy and its Resource-Efficient Europe Initiative. By placing resource efficiency at the heart of a green economy, we regard it as a key instrument to create additional economic growth, reduce poverty and promote employment opportunities, while keeping the use of natural resources at sustainable levels. With its abundant resources and its commitment to lift people out of poverty, Brazil has the potential to become a champion of green, inclusive growth.

A common push to multilateralism

The CBD conference in Nagoya illustrated the benefits of this intensified EU-Brazil cooperation. After the disappointment of the UNFCCC Copenhagen meeting, with faith in the multilateral system at its lowest, Nagoya was widely seen as a last chance for the system to prove itself. Reflecting its global player status, Brazil was as concerned for the systemic health of the process as it was for the content of the negotiations: while still an advocate for developing countries, Brazil accepted the responsibilities that come with increased economic and political influence. In the run-up to Nagoya, Brazil's approach to other major players at the international level was strategic: the EU was the other only major counterpart in the negotiations, since the US acted as an «invisible guest», and excluded itself again from the negotiating process. Both the EU and Brazil understood the importance of building mutual trust and common ground through frank and frequent exchanges.

At the end of the Nagoya conference, and against this backdrop of substantial prior engagement with the EU, Brazil took a leap of faith and emerged from the ranks of the developing countries. Their negotiating approach became more conciliatory. They proposed a cooperation deal, worked with it and stuck to their guns. The EU and Brazil proved to be strategic partners committed to delivering concrete results for the global interest

Ultimately, Nagoya served as a test case of constructive partnering between major players. Faith in the international process was revived. Barely a month later, progress was also made at the Cancún UNFCCC COP16. We are convinced that the iterative and varied bilateral cooperation between the EU and Brazil helped catalyse multilateral success in both instances. The coming UN Commission on Sustainable Development – and more importantly, the Rio+20 Conference to be hosted by Brazil in 2012 – represent the next opportunities for global advances on the sustainable development agenda. The Rio+20 summit must meet difficult challenges through tangible, effective action that will resound across the world. In the current multipolar geopolitical context, constructive engagement will be the only means to achieve significant results. The EU-Brazil dialogue is building the trust that is needed to make this possible.



Tribune

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Der erste Weltkrieg im Museum - Das Historial von Péronne und neuere Entwicklungen in der musealen Präsentation des Ersten Weltkrieges

Gerd Krumeich - Historiker an der Universität Düsseldorf

Kriegsmuseen haben eine lange Tradition und sind im Grunde schon vorgebildet in den Triumphbögen zum Einzug siegreicher Feldheeren der Antike, mit ihren Gefangenen und der Kriegsbeute. So ist es noch bis in die Neuzeit geblieben: 1871, nach dem Sieg Preußen-Deutschlands über Frankreich wurde in Berlin das Zeughaus – also die Waffenkammer der preußischen Könige – mit Trophäen aller Art voll gestopft. Nach 1945 erlosch in Deutschland verständlicherweise das Interesse an Kriegsausstellungen und die erste nennenswerte Ausstellung war die 1976 vom Frankfurter Stadtmuseum veranstaltete Präsentation seiner enormen Schätze in deutlich kritikritischer Absicht. Überhaupt wurde in den „post-68er“ Jahren in Deutschland der Erste Weltkrieg überwiegend zum Einstudieren der Demokratie benutzt. Konnte „Bonn“ wieder „Weimar“ werden? Um Rückfälle zu verhindern, schien es unerlässlich, über Nationalismus und Militarismus als Kernübel der neueren deutschen Geschichte zu reflektieren. Kriegsausstellungen zum Ersten Weltkrieg waren Teil dieser Intention. In Frankreich, wo der Erste Weltkrieg nicht ähnlich überschattet war, blieb er *La Grande Guerre*, eine wichtige Ausprägung der nationalen Identität. Als Kriegsausstellungen dienten hier vor allem das Musée de l'Armée im Invalidendom und das Mémorial von Verdun.

Mitte der 1980er Jahre wandelte sich im internationalen Maßstab das Interesse am Krieg. Was vordem mehr oder weniger reflektierte Abrechnung, Abgrenzung bzw. Identifikation mit der noch nahen Vergangenheit gewesen war, machte einem neuen Interesse am Verstehen einer so weit entfernten und gleichwohl verstörend nahen Zeit Platz. Es fand also eine Historisierung und gleichzeitig eine Bedeutungs-

zunahme statt. George F. Kennans Formulierung, dass der Erste Weltkrieg die „great seminal catastrophe“ des 20. Jahrhunderts gewesen sei, ist in der deutschen „Urkatastrophen“-Übersetzung zu einem der geläufigsten historischen und journalistischen Topoi unserer Zeit geworden.

Nach meinem Eindruck erklärt sich die museale Bedeutungsaufladung des Ersten Weltkrieges genau aus dem skizzierten Zusammenhang. Und es gab denn auch seit den 1990er Jahren immer wieder neue Versuche, den historisch Interessierten mit einem Angebot von Weltkrieg I-Inszenierungen der verschiedensten Art – von Büchern über Filme und nicht zuletzt: Ausstellungen – entgegenzukommen. Allerdings existierten bis in die 1990er Jahre keine Ausstellungsformen, die dem neuen Bedürfnis nach einer Geschichte entgegenkamen, die weder als militaristische Waffen- und Waffentaten-Schau noch als Mahnung zu Frieden und Demokratie auftrat. Darin lag die Überlebensfähigkeit der traditionellen Militärmuseen und Schausammlungen, ob nun des belgischen Armeemuseums, des Musée de l'Armée in Paris, des Heeresmuseums in Wien oder des Imperial War Museum in London. Nationalistische Beschränktheit und militaristische Engführung des Krieges, auch das Heldenlied der Soldaten erschienen immer mehr Interessierten als nur noch ödes Relikt der Vergangenheit.

In jener Zeit des Umbruchs der politisch-pädagogisch orientierten kritikritischen Historiographie hin zur eher „historistisch“ orientierten Mentalitätsgeschichte, die dann in den großen Strom der Kulturwissenschaft einmündete, öffnete auch das Historial de la Grande guerre in Péronne an der Somme seine Pforten. Dieses 1992 eröf-

fnete und heute weltweit wohl führende Weltkrieg I – Museum inmitten der gigantischen, Menschen fressenden Schlachtfelder der Somme, kann als zukunftsweisend betrachtet werden. Die région Picardie beauftragte den französischen Stararchitekten Henri Ciriani mit der Errichtung eines modernen Museums, welches quasi als An- und Einbau in die imposante mittelalterliche Burg von Péronne, ein Wahrzeichen der Region, erstellt werden sollte. Gleichzeitig wurde 1987 für das Museumsprojekt ein internationales Team von auf den Ersten Weltkrieg spezialisierten Historikern einberufen, welches unter Leitung des renommiertesten französischen Spezialisten, J.J. Becker stand. Zu dessen Gründungsmitgliedern zählten neben den jungen französischen Historikern Stéphane Audoin-Rouzeau und Annette Becker auch der Pionier der angelsächsischen Weltkrieg-I-Kulturgeschichte, Jay Winter, sowie der Verf. dieses Artikels.

Die Originalität des Historial, auch seine Besonderheit bis heute, liegt nicht zuletzt in der Tatsache, dass hier ein internationaler Kreis von Historikern einberufen worden war, der nicht als wissenschaftliche Absicherung und Alibi für die Museumsmacher sondern als lebendiger think tank zur Konkretisierung der Gesamtausstellung des Museums und zur Kommentierung der einzelnen Objekte gedacht war. Die von der Ausstellungsgesellschaft Repérages (Paris) gemeinsam mit den Historikern erarbeitete – und bis heute weitgehend unveränderte – museale Präsentation ging von einem bis dato unbekanntem, deshalb provozierenden aber auf Dauer offensichtlich überzeugenden Standpunkt aus: das Historial von Péronne sollte ein „stilles“ Museum und keine Show werden; es sollte nicht besserwässerisch sein und keine aufdringliche „Botschaft“ ve-



rkünden. Die Objekte sprechen sicher nicht „für sich“, sie werden schriftlich und in dem von den Historikern selbst gesprochenen dreisprachigen Audio-Führer kommentiert. Aber der Besucher wird nie ideologischer Engführung unterworfen, sei es in heroisierender, sei es in kriegskritischer Absicht. Der Erste Weltkrieg soll so vielfältig präsentiert werden, wie er der internationalen und vergleichenden historischen Forschung heute erscheint, was auch der einzige Weg ist, eine wahre Erinnerung zu konstituieren. Eine Erinnerung, die aufbewahrt, was die Menschen von damals bewegt hat und gleichzeitig versucht zu zeigen, wieso und warum der Erste Weltkrieg wirklich unsere „Urkatastrophe“ war, nämlich der Beginn eines totalitären Zeitalters, einer „totalen Mobilmachung“ (Ernst Jünger) der Menschen, der Technik und der Wirtschaft. Die Besonderheit des Historial ist nicht zuletzt, dass es aus dem Blickwinkel der sog. „Kriegskultur“ konzipiert ist. Was hier ausgestellt wird, stärker als die (noch ergänzungsbedürftige) Waffentechnik,

sind die Objekte der Alltagskultur des Ersten Weltkriegs. Einen großen Platz in der Darstellung nimmt das Kriegsleid an der Front und in der Heimat ein. Hier findet man Darstellungen von Kriegsverwundung, Prothetik, Filmsequenzen über sog. „Schüttler“ oder „Kriegszitterer“, d.h. von Soldaten die durch Explosionen oder Verschüttung traumatisiert waren, die ihre Nerven nicht mehr „im Griff“ hatten und in Spezialkliniken mehr oder weniger kompetent therapiert wurden. Es wird die Welt derjenigen evoziert, die keine Gesichter mehr hatten, weil ein Geschoss oder Schrapnell die Augen, die Nase und – besonders häufig – den ganzen Kiefer weggerissen hatte, die aber überlebt und medizinisch versorgt worden waren. Das Leid der Zurückgebliebenen in der Heimat, auch die Not und der Hunger der Zivilbevölkerung, wird mit wenig Text, aber mitnehmenden Bildern, Filmstreifen und emblematischen Objekten dokumentiert: durch ein Trauerkleid oder ein Gemälde dreier trauernder Frauen: Mutter, Ehefrau Schwester; Bilder und

Objekte der zerstörten Dörfer und Städte der Kampfzone; „Verschiebungen“ der Menschen in ein ungewisses Schicksal. Dies sind nur einige Beispiele für die „Objekte des Leids“, welche im Historial dezidiert ausgestellt werden als dies in Kriegsmuseen zuvor üblich war. Skandalisiert hat vor allem die Tatsache, dass Soldatenfiguren kopflös sind, anonyme und typisierte Objekte jenseits der Pseudo-Individualität und Pseudo-Anschaulichkeit, die den in den meisten Museen noch immer üblichen soldatischen Schaufensterpuppen zu Eigen ist.

Wenn also das Historial von Péronne großen Wert legt auf die Darstellung der Schrecken und der Leiden des Krieges, so beachtet es aber auch – und das ist wohl das bislang Einzigartige – die Ambivalenzen und die kriegsbejahenden, auch kriegstreiberischen Dimensionen der „Kriegskultur“. Der Begriff „Kriegskultur“ könnte als Un-Wort aufgefasst werden, ist doch jeder Krieg Unkultur. Aber gemeint ist auch nicht eine kulturelle



Überhöhung der durch den Krieg entstandenen Verhaltensweisen, sondern vielmehr die Darstellung der schlichten aber fundamentalen Tatsache, dass dieser über mehr vier Jahre andauernde Krieg, der mindestens 10 Millionen Todesopfer und allein in Deutschland mehr als 4 Millionen Verwundete und Krüppel hinterließ, nur die Dauer und Intensität haben konnte, die er ja tatsächlich hatte, weil in ihm kulturelle Praktiken entwickelt wurden, die es erlaubten, über so lange Zeit hinweg die „Kriegsmoral“ aufrecht zu erhalten.

Das gewiss ungewöhnliche Insistieren des Historial und seiner Historiker auf allen möglichen Aspekten der Kriegskultur hat auch Protest hervorgerufen und Abwehrbewegungen - vor allem in Frankreich - erzeugt, was sicherlich für den historiographischen Fortschritt auf Dauer von Nutzen sein wird. Vor Rückfällen in Kriegsnationalismus oder einseitige „Memorialisierung“ des Weltkrieges schützt das Historial aber bereits sein demonstrativ internationaler Anspruch und tatsächlicher Charakter. Nicht allein ist die Beschilderung und der bereits erwähnte Audio-Führer dreisprachig, sondern mehr noch: alle Kriegsobjekte der verschiedenen Nationen werden absolut gleichrangig präsentiert und erklärt. Und keine andere Forschergruppe weltweit ist in den letzten 20 Jahren konsequenter

und erfolgreicher um eine international vergleichende Sicht des Weltkriegs bemüht gewesen als die internationalen Experten des Historial. Immer wieder haben wir dort die Erfahrung gemacht, und in den „Diskurs“ der Ausstellung integriert, wie different - oft eigentlich unvereinbar - die Kriegserzählung der verschiedenen Völker bis heute noch ist. Es gilt in erster Linie, hier nicht etwa politische Vermittlung und Verständigungsdiskurse zu etablieren, sondern klar und deutlich die nationalhistorisch motivierten Unterschiede in der Darstellung zu benennen, die es für die Geschichte des Ersten Weltkriegs selbst auf der Ebene geschulter Historiker auch heute noch im Übermaß gibt.

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
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Recommended Books

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Ulrich Franke - *Die Nato nach 1989*




Der Fortbestand der NATO nach dem Ende der Blockkonfrontation wird innerhalb der politikwissenschaftlichen Teildisziplin der Internationalen Beziehungen gern als „Rätsel“ aufgefasst. In erster Linie gilt dies für die Vertreter der neorealistischen Theorie, die schon früh prognostiziert, dass das Bündnis auseinanderfallen werde. Schnell entwickelte sich eine Debatte, in deren Verlauf der Neorealismus von verschiedenen Seiten herausgefordert wurde. Gestützt auf die Idee, dass alle Gegenstände der sozialen Welt Sinn und Bedeutung haben und daher als Text interpretiert werden können, leistet *Die Nato nach 1989*. Das Rätsel ihres Fortbestandes einen Beitrag zu dieser Debatte, ohne eines der daran beteiligten Paradigmen zu favorisieren. Konkret werden fünf Verlaufbarungen der höchsten Entscheidungsgremien des atlantischen Bündnisses analysiert. Die Interpretation orientiert sich dabei an den Verfahren der „objektiven Hermeneutik“, einer Methodologie, die der Soziologe Ulrich Oevermann maßgeblich entwickelt hat: Die zu untersuchenden Dokumente werden in ihre kleinsten Sinn und Bedeutung tragenden Partikel zerlegt und Sequenz für Sequenz interpretiert. Auf diesem Weg erweist sich als die entscheidende Bedingung der Möglichkeit des Fortbestandes der NATO, dass die Verbündeten ihren Zusammenschluss

als wirksamere Alternative zu den Vereinten Nationen präsentieren. Sie sind davon überzeugt, die Prinzipien der UN-Charta besser verwirklichen zu können und versuchen, die Legitimität des Bündnisses in direkter Konkurrenz zum UN-Sicherheitsrat zu erhöhen. Gleichzeitig droht sich jedoch jeder Mangel an Einigkeit unter den Partnern rasch zu Identifikationsproblemen mit dem Bündnis und dessen Selbstblockade auszuwachsen.

Magnus Eken gren and Greg Simons - *The Politics of Security Sector Reform*



The Politics of Security Sector Reform
Challenges and Opportunities for the European Union's Global Role



Security Sector Reform (SSR) is increasingly becoming a cornerstone in international security and development cooperation. Indeed, the concept has often been seen as a panacea for many of the biggest threats to the world such as failed states, terrorism and poverty. In particular, this book focuses on the complexities of implementing SSR across the globe and the actual and potential role that the European Union (EU) can play in SSR.

- Through its European experiences, the European Union has developed a holistic approach to these issues. It has often worked with the development of national administration in its entirety, not least in the process of adapting the EU's candidate countries for the membership requirements. Therefore the EU has developed practices to support and evaluate reforms that are unique. The challenge now is to adapt the methods to interna-

tional use and for countries where the membership perspective is missing as an incentive for reform, says Magnus Eken gren, one of the two editors of the book. The purpose of the book is to come to a common understanding of the concept of SSR, as currently envisioned by the EU, and the challenges of implementation. To this end, the contributors take stock of SSR as practised in the EU thus far and discuss policies for the future. Moreover, they address respectively the needs for SSR and the status of SSR cooperation programmes in a selection of recipient regions and countries such as the Western Balkans, Ukraine, Sub-Saharan Africa, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau and Afghanistan.


- "With its focus on understanding and linking policies and practice – 'the politics of SSR' – this book makes an important contribution to the process of enhancing international capacity to address SSR challenges. Bringing together key thinkers and doers, it provides a valuable in-depth analysis of SSR experiences and prospects. It highlights the need for balance between respecting national ownership of reforms and providing support to democratic forces, and argues that international efforts should be guided to a greater extent by the long-term goals of democracy and regional cooperation rather than short-term security objectives in areas such as counter-terrorism", the Swedish Minister for International Development Cooperation Gunilla Carlsson writes in the preface of the book.

"The Politics of Security Sector Reform" appeals to audiences interested in the EU as a global actor and the interrelationships between foreign, security, defence and development policies.

The Politics of Security Sector Reform: Challenges and Opportunities for the European Union's Global Role' can be found on the Ashgate publishing website via the link below.

http://www.ashgate.com/default.aspx?page=637&calcTitle=1&title_id=10295&edition_id=13397

Frédéric Esposito et Nicolas Levrat (eds) -
Europe: De l'intégration à la
fédération



Le résultat actuel du processus d'intégration européenne est incertain, peu lisible. L'effort constitutionnel, qui aux yeux de beaucoup rapprochait l'UE d'une forme connue, a fait long feu. En 2007, émerge une Théorie de la Fédération qui examine la Fédération en tant qu'objet politique propre et singulier, qui ne saurait être un Etat fédéral. La Fédération est un mode particulier, non-étatique, d'organisation sociétale. En conséquence, selon cette théorie, les Etats fédéraux ne sont pas des Fédérations, mais des Etats. L'UE, par contre, pourrait bien être un cas de Fédération, puisqu'elle n'est pas un Etat. C'est à explorer cette hypothèse qu'est consacré cet ouvrage.


Une première partie cherche à « penser l'Europe comme une Fédération », alors que la seconde aborde un problème douloureux pour l'UE, sous l'angle nouveau du paradigme de la Fédération, à savoir « comment légitimer la Fédération européenne ? ». La première partie contient un texte d'Olivier BEAUD, l'auteur de la Théorie de la Fédération, lequel aborde la question centrale : « Peut-on penser l'Europe

comme une Fédération ? » ; sa réponse est nuancée. Nicolas LEVRAT, plus catégorique, affirme que l'intégration européenne à la lumière de la subsidiarité explique pourquoi l'UE ne deviendra pas les Etats-Unis d'Europe. Jean Louis QUERMONNE clôt cette partie avec une interrogation sur de possibles nouvelles formes de fédéralisme. Ouvrant la seconde partie, Dusan SIDJANSKI, affirme l'existence d'une Europe fédéraliste, mais la situe entre utopie et réalité. Alors qu'Olivier COSTA avance la thèse d'une responsabilité politique effective au sein de l'UE selon une logique fédéraliste, et que Frédéric ESPOSITO voit dans les « votes européens » un catalyseur de la Fédération démocratique européenne, Mario TELO souligne la pertinence, certes, mais aussi la limite des thèses fédéralistes, préférant réactualiser la thèse de la « constitution mixte ».

On le voit, cet ouvrage engage un dialogue, plus qu'il ne propose de solution ; il montre que l'hypothèse de l'UE en tant que Fédération mérite discussion, pas nécessairement adhésion.

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
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Conference
«Fukushima and Arabic Revolutions:
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16/05 at the IEE (6.30 pm)

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